Invalid Default Notices

[MandM]

The Court went on to say that an error that could be described as minimal might be overlooked, but the substantial inaccuracy in this case rendered the default notice ineffective, so the appeal should be allowed.

Tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of default notices are issued every day. This case illustrates how vitally important it is that any default notice is correct in form, as well as in substance. It is likely that the Court would take the same view with regard to the form and contents of regulated agreements.

*Case reference

Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain & Co NLD 14 July 1998

[diddydicky]

Hi All

 

Just thought I would throw this one in for debate.

 

Under the 1983 amendements a DN shall contain certain information. We have debated dates, arrears, format etc but what happens if the following statements are missing

 

"This notice should include a copy of the current Office of Fair Trading information sheet on default. This contains important information about your rights and where to go for support and advice. If it is not included, you should contact us to get one.".]

A statement in the following form--

"IMPORTANT-YOU SHOULD READ THIS CAREFULLY".

 

I know the obvious comment is that it is defective, but would it be enough to convince a court and why.

 

Thanking you all in anticipation

 

Pedross

 

it is missing in many DN's and as luck would have it- it self serves the argument

 

that is to say it is IMPORTANT INFORMATION as to how the debtor can get help and advice in respect of the DN- so if this wasnt included nor the leaflet itself- i'd say it was a pretty serious defect and one that the wording itself would persuade the judge to the same opinion

 

( unless he has another definition of "important"

[emandcole]

I think you want the ICO default guidance:

 

http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/default_tgn_version_v3%20%20doc.pdf

 

 

Didn't know they have to wait for around 6 months before going for the default! I reckon there's a few people here (me included) who have had them placed on CRA files far sooner than that . Thanks for that info, off to read the ICO guide .

[pedross]

Thanks MandM & Dicky

 

Why don't I recall seeing this on threads before, if its as fatal to the claimant as you believe.

 

Interesting.

 

Pedross

[welshperson3]

I think this is important for people who have not written and accepted

unlawful termination on the back of a faulty default notice.

 

so have look and let the debate Begin

 

 

The election to affirm or terminate a

contract after breach

The Court of Appeal has considered the principles which govern whether a party

has exercised an election to affirm a contract following a repudiatory breach

by the other party, as well as the effect of a “boilerplate” clause that was

designed to preserve a party’s rights to enforce the contract despite delays on its

part in seeking to protect or enforce its position. The principal judgment was

delivered by Aikens LJ, with whom Ward and Richards LJJ agreed. The case

also dealt with other matters, but the discussion as to the doctrine of election

is the one that is important for present purposes.

The facts concerned a contract which one party (T) had breached in a

repudiatory manner, which would have entitled the other party (P) to terminate

the contract. With full knowledge of the breach, P did nothing and continued with

its own performance for almost a year. At that point, P purported to rely on its

right to terminate the contract. T alleged that P had elected to affirm the contract

and so had lost the right to terminate the contract and that, in consequence, P’s

purported termination had itself amounted to a repudiatory breach of the

contract which gave rise to a right in T to terminate and claim damages.

In answer, P claimed that it was entitled to delay in exercising its rights as it

could rely on a clause in the contract which provided that:

“In no event shall any delay, neglect or forbearance on the part of any party

in enforcing (in whole or in part) any provision of this Agreement be or be

deemed to be a waiver thereof or a waiver of any other provision or shall

in any way prejudice any right of that party under this Agreement”.

Aikens LJ summarised the principles that apply to determine if a party has

elected to affirm a contract, as they had been set out by Lord Goff in Motor Oil

Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v. Shipping Corp. of India (The

Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391, at 397- 399, as follows (at [53]):

“(1) If a contract gives a party a right to terminate upon the occurrence of

defined actions or inactions of the other party and those actions or

inactions occur, the innocent party is entitled to exercise that right. The

innocent party has to decide whether or not to do so. Its decision is, in law, an

election. (2) It is a prerequisite to the exercise of the election that the party

concerned is aware of the facts giving rise to its right and the right itself. (3)

The innocent party has to make a decision, because if it does not do so

then ‘the time may come when the law takes the decision out of [its] hands,

either by holding [it] to have elected not to exercise the right which has

become available to [it], or sometimes by holding [it] to have elected to

exercise it’ [per Lord Goff in the Motor Oil Hellas case at 398, left side

of the report]. (4) Where, with knowledge of the relevant facts, the

party that has the right to terminate the contract acts in a manner which is

consistent only with it having chosen one or other of two alternative and

inconsistent courses of action open to it (ie. to terminate or affirm the contract),

then it will be held to have made its election accordingly. (5) An election

can be communicated to the other party by words or conduct. However, in

cases where it is alleged that a party has elected not to exercise a right, such

as a right to terminate a contract on the happening of defined events, it will

only be held to have elected not to exercise that right if a party ‘has so

communicated [its] election to the other party in clear and unequivocal

terms’ [per Lord Goff in the Motor Oil Hellas case at 398, right side of the page]”.

His Lordship said that it is a question of fact whether a party has elected to

terminate or affirm a contract in a situation where it is in the position that it

has to decide whether or not to exercise the right to terminate. The party has

elected either to affirm the contract or it has not done so. If it has not affirmed the

contract then the right to terminate will remain exercisable. In that light, he said

that the clause set out above was of no help to P, except in emphasising that a

clear and unequivocal communication is required of the exercise of an election to

abandon the right to terminate and to abandon its right to terminate or it did

not. If it did elect to abandon its right to terminate then the whole contract,

including the clause, would continue in existence. He said that, “The general law

demands that a party which has a contractual right to terminate a contract

must elect whether or not to do so”. His Lordship did say, however, that a party

which had elected to affirm the contract and not to terminate it might still have a

action for damages arising from the breach that had occurred.

Aikens LJ also said that, on its wording, the clause quoted above did not deal at

all with the issue of whether or not an election had been exercised. By way of

commentary, it is difficult to imagine how much more explicit the clause could

have been. From other comments that he made, it appears that his Lordship was

doubtful whether any clause could exclude the operation of the doctrine of

election and the requirements as to its exercise.

It is also interesting to note that in another part of his judgment, his

Lordship referred to the principle that if a party to a contract purports to

terminate it for the wrong reason but subsequently discovers facts which

would have justified its action in terminating the contract, the termination

will be valid. In that regard, he referred to Boston Deep Sea and Ice Co. v.

Ansell (1888) 39 ChD 339 and Lord Sumner in British and Benningtons Ltd

v. North Western Cachar Tea Co. Ltd [1923] AC 48, at 72. By way of

additional comment, in the context of the operation of an events of default clause

and the enforcement of security, see Byblos Bank SAK v. Al Khudhairy

(1986) 2 BCC 99549, Anglo Petroleum Ltd v. TFB (Mortgages) Ltd [2003]

EWHC 3125 (QB), Brampton Manor (Leisure) Ltd v. McClean [2006] EWHC

2983 (Ch), County Leasing Ltd v. East [2007] EWHC 2907 (QB), at [120]-[124].

Tele2 International Card Co. SA v. PostOffice Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 9 (21/1/2009).

wp3

 

 

[haggis1984]

Some v informative discussion on DNs and termination here:

 

http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/legal-issues/216538-claim-stayed-due-unenforceable-85.html

[diddydicky]

Thanks MandM & Dicky

 

Why don't I recall seeing this on threads before, if its as fatal to the claimant as you believe.

 

Interesting.

 

Pedross

 

ive posted in in lots of threads- pay attention!!

[diddydicky]

The first para below distinguishes this matter froma CCA which does not have this clause

 

The second one sums the general rule up in one word and is entirely in accordance with the example in the following post (by x20)

 

 

 

 

 

In answer, P claimed that it was entitled to delay in exercising its rights as it

could rely on a clause in the contract which provided that:

“In no event shall any delay, neglect or forbearance on the part of any party

in enforcing (in whole or in part) any provision of this Agreement be or be

deemed to be a waiver thereof or a waiver of any other provision or shall

in any way prejudice any right of that party under this Agreement”.

 

“The general law

demands that a party which has a contractual right to terminate a contract

must elect whether or not to do so”.

[diddydicky]

The contention advanced by ABC's lawyers was that if the DN was ineffective, the termination which ABC subsequently brought about in reliance upon that ineffective DN, was itself ineffective. In support, ABC said that since the law did not permit a creditor to terminate an agreement unless there had been serivce upon a debtor of an effective DN, by extension therefore, rather than having been terminated, the agreement endured.*

 

The law in support of this proposition was Consumer Credit Act 1974 section 87(1)(a) which says:

 

(1) Service of a notice on the debtor or hirer in accordance with section 88 (a “default notice ”) is necessary before the creditor or owner can become entitled, by reason of any breach by the debtor or hirer of a regulated agreement (a) to terminate the agreement

 

ABC went on to say that owing to the agreement enduring, ABC were therefore at liberty to serve a second DN.

 

At first blush, that looks quite a convincing argument. The Act itself forbids the creditor the right to terminate save in certain circumstances. So if the required circumstances were not present, how could the law regard the agreement as having terminated?

 

[1] Termination of a Contract and General Principles

A good place to start would be to dispel the myth that the law will not tolerate contract breaking. On the contrary whilst not actively encouraging it, the law will tolerate it. The courts will rarely impose upon one party an obligation to perform under a contract against its will, to do what it failed to do or redo what it tried and failed to do. Instead, what the law will do is on the one hand restrain the contract breaker from procuring the benefits it would have enjoyed had it fulfilled its contractual obligations and on the other, enable the injured party to recover damages flowing from the breach.

 

In*Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishka Kaisha*[2007], Lord Bingham said:

 

'The repudiation of a contract by one party ("the repudiator"), if accepted by the other ("the injured party"), brings the contract to an end and releases both parties from their primary obligations under the contract. The injured party is thereupon entitled to recover damages against the repudiator to compensate him for such financial loss as the repudiator's breach has caused him to suffer. This is elementary law.

 

The damages recoverable by the injured party are such sum as will put him in the same financial position as if the contract had been performed.'

 

What's more, the law will not merrily award whatever loss the injured party says he suffered. The court will require the injured party to prove his loss and further, will expect the injured party to take steps to mitigate the loss.*

 

'An injured party such as the owners may not, generally speaking, recover damages against a repudiator such as the charterers for loss which he could reasonably have avoided by taking reasonable commercial steps to mitigate his loss.'*[Lord Bingham in Golden Strait Corporation.]

 

Further still, in assessing damages the law will not even award what the parties may at formation of the agreement have agreed should be payable as liquidated damages in the event of breach. The court will not permit the recovery of liquidated damages unless the damages represent a fair pre-estimate of what loss might flow from the breach. If the liquidated damages are shown to be excessive and unrepresentative of the sactual loss suffered the law will readily declare the liquidated damages as a penalty and unenforceable.

 

In short, not only does the law tolerate contract breaking, but also, it will not tolerate the injured party taking advantage of the wrongdoer. The law does not pounce on the contract breaker to teach him a lesson. The court only awards the innocent party what damages truly flow from the breach. That admits of the possibility that a contract breaker can get away with it. If the injured party is unable to show resulting loss, the injured party may get nothing.

 

'One must look at the contract as a whole, and if it is clear that the innocent party has lost nothing, he should recover no more than nominal damages for the loss of his right to have the whole contract completed.'*[Edmund Davies LJ in*'The Mihalis Angelos'*(1971)]

 

[2] Termination in Non-Conformity with section 87.

The contention I advance is that an ineffective DN does not prohibit the creditor from terminating the agreement. Termination after service of an effective default notice is lawful termination, but as we have seen, a party may still terminate an agreement and be in the wrong for doing so. The law operates on a wrongful termination to offer to the injured party the choice of accepting the termination or to hold the contract breaker to his promise.

 

In the world of consumer credit, I contend a termination of the agreement by a creditor in terms whereby he announced he would no longer permit the debtor time to repay the credit, was a creditor in repudiatory breach of the agreement, unless in leading up to termination, the creditor complied with the requirements of the Act in circumstances where the debtor was in first breach of the agreement.

 

Further, and it is worth remembering, the Act is an Act for the purpose of consumer protection. The purpose of the Act is not to preserve the rights of creditors in contracts and to protect them from misadventure where for example, they terminated an agreement where it subsequently transpired the termination had not been in their interests. If that were so, the Act would have been an Act for the better protection of financiers.*

 

In a proper case, the law will come to the aid of the vulnerable to protect them from the consequences of their contracts (for example the unsound in mind, children, those under duress or undue influence). To suggest financiers fell into that bracket and the Consumer Credit Act*

operated to protect them and not the consumer, was absurd. The civil law does not come to rescue the misadentures of the sain and the savvy.

 

The clue to the position of the creditor on termination is in the use of the word 'entitled' in section 87(1). 'Entitled' connotes a right or a benefit. The Act therefore confers rights, conditional upon the provisions of section 87(1) being fuilfilled. Fail to fulfill the condition and the entitlements do not become available.*

 

In the case of a contract entered into by a person under duress and who then breaks the contract the law will come to that person's aid by recognising that person's plea that the contract was made under duress. If that person seeks a declaration of the court that the contract was made under duress the court wil readily declare the contract void.

 

If the Act had intended that a creditor's termination in circumstances where section 87(1) had not been fulfilled by the creditor and was to be of no effect, the Act would have declared that termination void. It doesn't. The termination is voidable at the option of the debtor.

 

[3] The Debtor's Point of View

Third, let us look at the position from the ordinary man as debtor's point of view in a consumer credit situation.*

 

The DN is defective for failing to conform to the prescribed terms, or gives misleading information or at worse is plain nonsense so that the debtor does not know precisely what he has to do in order to comply with it and is consequently disadvantaged. Should the law disregard the fact that the creditor put the debtor at a disadvantage and thereby at risk the creditor might lawfully terminate the agreement?*

 

'This statute was plainly enacted to protect consumers, most of whom are likely to be individuals. When contracting with a large financial organisation they are at a disadvantage. The contract is likely to be in standard form and relatively complex with a number of detailed provisions. If the hirer is said to have broken its terms, the hirer needs to know precisely what he or she is said to have done wrong and what he or she needs to do to put matters right. The lender has the ability and the resources to give that information with precision. If he does not do so accurately then he cannot take what Mr Gruffyd conveniently referred to as "the next step".*[per Kennedy LJ in Woodchester v Swayne [1998]]

 

Moving on, if the debtor receives a notice from the creditor in which the creditor expressly states the contract is terminated, what is the debtor supposed to think? Would the law regard him as likely to think the creditor had terminated the contract or would the law regard him as thinking it had not terminated because strictly speaking, the creditor had served a default notice which was not in accordance with prescribed terms?

 

Or where perhaps the creditor did not expresly terminate but sent the bully boys over to demand the keys to the car. What was the debtor to think then? Would the debtor think the creditor had terminated?

 

It seems to me on the basis of the passages below, the courts will be ready to hold a creditor to his words and actions.

 

"... a person who signs a document, and parts with it so that it may come into other hands, has a responsibility, that of the normal man of prudence, to take care what he signs, which if neglected, prevents him from denying his liability under the document according to its tenor".

[per Lord Wilberforce in*Gallie v Lee*(1971)]

 

'.. a man cannot escape from the consequences, as regards innocent third parties, of signing a document if, being a man of ordinary education and competence, he chooses to sign it without informing himself of its purport and effect..'

[per Scott LJ in*Norwich & Peterborough Building Society v Steed*(1992)]

 

In short, the creditor is bound by his deed. All that is required is for the debtor to accept the creditor's termination. He can write saying 'thank you I accept you termination' or he can conduct himself in a way in keeping with that termination. Not paying the instalments would be in keeping with an acceptance of the termination.

 

[4] The fiction of the Second DN and the Enduring Obligation

The service of any second default notice, at a time when the contract is terminated, owing to the wording of the DN in its prescribed form, would perpetuate the fiction that the contract endured. The same can be said owing to the provisions of section 89 of the Act.

 

The form of words in the DN incorporate text in order to meet the intention of section 89 of the Act which provides:

 

'If before the date specified for that purpose in the default notice the debtor or hirer takes the action specified under section 88(1)(b) or © the breach shall be treated as not having occurred.'

 

In other words, in serving the second DN, the creditor would be suggesting:

 

[a] an obligation had persisted post termination by which the debtor was bound to make instalment payments (ie post-termination 'arrears'), and

that if payment of those 'arrears' was made, an obligation to make future instalment payments would endure.

 

The obligations at [a] and are obligations enduring during the currency of the agreement. Besides maintaining the fiction of the enduring agremeent as I say, it seems to me any second DN would be bound to be defective for over-stating the sums due. The creditor can not state as an amount due for 'arrears' of instalments that which he said in consequence of his termination was no longer due and payable by instalments. If the creditor sought to use a form of DN which made sense by getting round the fact the agreement had been terminated, the DN would not be in prescribed form.

 

The only way in which a second DN would be of value to the creditor would be where the contract had been re-instated. If the debtor has accepted the termination, re-instatement requires the consent of the debtor.*

 

The net result of [1] to [4] is the agreement is terminated for all time. The creditor's remedy is now limited by section 87(1). All that is left for the creditor to recover is the sum truly in arrear at the date of the default notice.

 

Damage to Credit

A man's credit is damaged when it is impugned. He learns it is damaged when he seeks credit to fund a transaction and is turned away or when his creditors seek to call in debts. The effect can be simple embarrasment to being totally destabilising. A learned his credit was impugned when he was warned by his bankers. The damaging effect of the adverse reporting could have been a lot worse.

 

I had deliberately tried to keep my first post as simple and straight forward as I could. I hope this expanded version showing the way strands of law can intertwine to build a case is of assistance.

 

 

the danger in relying upon not paying monthly payments is that if the payments were not being made before the unlawful repudiation then you may have difficulty in proving that after the repudiation - the reasons fro non payment changed !! better to write

[welshperson3]

The part i think is going to help is this

 

clear and unequivocal communication is required of the exercise of an election to

abandon the right to terminate and to abandon its right to terminate

[welshperson3]

Will need to pick the bones out but i think there is case law in there to show that the option to accept termination will always be there never mind how long has past or how Manny payments you make

[diddydicky]

Will need to pick the bones out but i think there is case law in there to show that the option to accept termination will always be there never mind how long has past or how Manny payments you make

 

1/ what part of what you posted leads you to that conclusion

 

2/ why, when it is so easy to write and accept it- would you want to

"take the risk"?

[C2K]

I've received a DN from MBNA dated 08.02.10 but they registered the account as default with CRA - Experian with a status [8] on 29.01.10.

 

According to the Experian's explanation of status history, the status [8] means that: "The account is in 'default'. You failed to keep to your credit agreement and have not responded satisfactorily to requests to bring your payments up to date, so the credit agreement has ended."

 

Am I right in thinking that the account would be terminated from the date they registered the account as default, so any DN served afterwards would not save them from breaching the s87 of the CCA 1974, and surely it's a unlawful rescission.:?

[welshperson3]

1/ what part of what you posted leads you to that conclusion

 

this part

 

His Lordship said that it is a question of fact whether a party has elected to

terminate or affirm a contract in a situation where it is in the position that it

has to decide whether or not to exercise the right to terminate. The party has

elected either to affirm the contract or it has not done so. If it has not affirmed the

contract then the right to terminate will remain

 

2/ why, when it is so easy to write and accept it- would you want to

"take the risk"?

 

For some people they find out that they had this option month's or Even years after the fact this point shows that time is not a factor

Edited February 12, 2010 by welshperson3

[welshperson3]

I've received a DN from MBNA dated 08.02.10 but they registered the account as default with CRA - Experian with a status [8] on 29.01.10.

 

 

According to the Experian's explanation of status history, the status [8] means that: "The account is in 'default'. You failed to keep to your credit agreement and have not responded satisfactorily to requests to bring your payments up to date, so the credit agreement has ended."

 

 

Am I right in thinking that the account would be terminated from the date they registered the account as default, so any DN served afterwards would not save them from breaching the s87 of the CCA 1974, and surely it's a unlawful rescission.:?

 

just my opinion but i think that a default that is registered with CRA is not a act of termination it just says that the account is in default. a DN doesn't terminate the agreement a termination noticeis needed for that, or a act on they're behalf refusing you your rights to carry on with the agreement

Edited February 12, 2010 by welshperson3

[charlie*]

Re the above post....

 

.... just checking....

 

by issuing a DN demanding payment in FULL, they automatically remove your right to carry on with the agreement and this is unlawful rescission as they are demanding future payments.

 

I have posed this elsewhere, just trying to get comfortable before I risk

opening old wounds - which we can well do without.... sitting here with nervous fingers over the key board ready to write that letter.

 

Suddenly, after the Waksman Incident in Manchester and the judges being told by those who control them to use any excuses to find in favour of the bloodsuckers, nothing seems quite as clear cut as it first seemed... talk about smoke and mirrors, even the article in the Online Times yesterday schrieked "good news", but, it still gave new powers to the banks.... how can we as a group get thru to the 'others' that the banks cannot produce the original agreements because they have been sold into the investment markets.

 

charlie

[brooooooooooce]

Hi. What article in the Times?

[nks22]

1/ what part of what you posted leads you to that conclusion

 

That would be my interpretation also.

 

2/ why, when it is so easy to write and accept it- would you want to

"take the risk"?

 

I don't think it's any reason to delay but it should reassure those who, probably through ignorance, have not done so sooner. (It reassures me, anyway, having had a gap of six months with a couple of cases.)

[tedney]

Not withstanding whether a DN was correct or not (I have yet to fully get my head around that in my particular circumstances:confused:) if the DN refers to a consequence of not paying repayments (as outlined in the DN) is a termination of the agreement as at a date indicated on the DN, but then the debtor does not receive a termination, can the account be construed in law as terminated? What, if any, are the implications of continuing to make reduced monthly payments on the account.

Views would be welcome, thanks.

[silverfox1961]

Not withstanding whether a DN was correct or not (I have yet to fully get my head around that in my particular circumstances:confused:) if the DN refers to a consequence of not paying repayments (as outlined in the DN) is a termination of the agreement as at a date indicated on the DN, but then the debtor does not receive a termination, can the account be construed in law as terminated? What, if any, are the implications of continuing to make reduced monthly payments on the account.

Views would be welcome, thanks.

 

My opinion only,

 

Unless you get absolute proof an account has been terminated then it is still "live"

To my mind, if you SAR them and in the screenshots it says "Charge Off", that to me is termination; also, if a DCA chases and they want payments made out to them then that is also termination.

[tedney]

if you SAR them and in the screenshots it says "Charge Off", that to me is termination; also, if a DCA chases and they want payments made out to them then that is also termination.

Thanks for that silverfox1961, I have SAR with exactly that and DCA asking for payments to them, but I am still paying OC.

[C2K]

just my opinion but i think that a default that is registered with CRA is not a act of termination it just says that the account is in default. a DN doesn't terminate the agreement a termination noticeis needed for that, or a act on they're behalf refusing you your rights to carry on with the agreement

 

Thanks, I understand that the account is not necessarily terminated just because they marked it as default, but surely the Experian's "Explanation of status history" (status [8]) must mean something as they clearly states that "the account has ended", and this must be an instructions taken from the creditor. Perhaps someone can clarify that.

[frettful38]

yes if its true but no, if it isnt

 

the law doesn't say that you have to write to accept- merely that your actions should demonstrate the fact

 

simply referring back to your "acceptance" of the unlawful repudiation will be sufficient without actually stating the manner of your acceptance- especially if the don't respond (which is highly unlikely- since they would not admit that they unlawfully terminated anyway

 

 

Hi DD, I have just received a response to my Unlawful Rescission letter and faulty DN to HSBC, Blimey that was quick. This is what they wrote, any ideas on where I go from here next please. The DN they issued was faulty and this is their response,

 

http://i450.photobucket.com/albums/qq223/sophiak_bucket/HSBCResponsetoFaultyDN.jpg

[emandcole]

HSBC would respond like that even if you'd got a picture of their Chief Exec. in a compromising position with a tin of sardines and a pair of marigolds .

 

With that type of defiance accepted as 'the norm' you can either call their bluff and litigate (messy) or just sit tight and see what they do. Importantly they now know you've got them over a barrel so if anything it is their actions in the coming months that will tell you all you need to know .

 

Out of interest I'm also waiting to hear from them about a wonky default and a seperate termination notice they sent my fiance late last year. We accepted their kind offer to terminate and asked for an accurate arrears balance. So far they've chosen to bury their heads in the sand but this morning we did get a letter informing us we haven't paid them anything and we are in arrears. We'll see what they try next.

[frettful38]

Thanks emandcole, I think I will just wait now and see what happens as there is not much else I can do at present.

 

Thank you