walton v rbos

[The GodMother]

I know that is brilliant but hey what would i know as the law on charges comming out of benefit money is wrong and l am wrong for quoting it according to my bank.

[citizenB]

I've been demanding a response to 11 letters sent to one finance company ALL Recorded Delivery, I have ALL the receipts downloaded and signatures from Royal Mail Tracker and what do the company say?

 

We haven't received ANY of them - yeah yeah, I'm asking THEM for money, different when it's the other way around so I'm not surprised by this Paul, the excuse is doing the rounds..

 

 

Sarah

 

This is something that bothers me greatly. The consumer in some form or another be it a Recorded Delivery/Special Delivery proof of Posting or just one of the free Royal Mail Proof of Posting slips HAVE to prove we have posted something. Companies appear to be able to just SAY they have sent it and they are believed. Because they dont use Recorded/Special Delivery services ???

[car2403]

This is something that bothers me greatly. The consumer in some form or another be it a Recorded Delivery/Special Delivery proof of Posting or just one of the free Royal Mail Proof of Posting slips HAVE to prove we have posted something. Companies appear to be able to just SAY they have sent it and they are believed. Because they dont use Recorded/Special Delivery services ???

 

The Court uses first class post for claims, so what makes you think you need any of this? These companies get away with this as the Court would be inconsistent in an approach in telling them they can't rely on it, then being hypocritical about it when they rely on exactly that, themselves.

 

CPR only requires a postage service that amounts to first class post - having proof of postage, which is free, must be a saver for most claimants, then? I can't see why anyone would use Recorded/Special Delivery, IMHO.

[FANTASY CHARGES]

The Court uses first class post for claims, so what makes you think you need any of this? These companies get away with this as the Court would be inconsistent in an approach in telling them they can't rely on it, then being hypocritical about it when they rely on exactly that, themselves.

 

CPR only requires a postage service that amounts to first class post - having proof of postage, which is free, must be a saver for most claimants, then? I can't see why anyone would use Recorded/Special Delivery, IMHO.

 

PERHAPS Someone would like to start a new thread on what exACTLY is first class postage : because we have we have various types of "on the cheap" postal delivery services

 

eg "tnt premier post": "ukmail business post" to name but two

 

and some companies have sent default notices , THE DATE OF SERVICE TAKING UP TO 6 DAYS : by the above methods which in no way constitute "FIRST CLASS POSTAGE":grin::grin::grin:

[paulwlton]

Work in progress. I need to get this spot on, i can't afford to confuse the judge, any input is appreciated.

 

Paul

 

 

1 The claimant held a Royalties current account no 10017026 (“the account”) with the defendant. Which was governed by their standard terms and conditions?

2 In March 1998 the claimant took out a fixed rate personal loan no 03805926 (“the loan”) which was governed by terms and conditions contained in the agreement and regulated under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

3 On the 16th of July 1998 a termination notice pursuant to sec 76 and 87 of the Consumer Credit Act was issued by the defendant for the outstanding account overdraft balance and arrears on the personal loan. Subsequently, on the 30th July 1998 the defendant terminated both agreements.

4 On the 20th August 1998 the defendant opened two capital and interest variable rate loan accounts entirely without the claimant’s knowledge or consent and these were then used to replace the claimant’s original accounts.

5The claimant draws the courts attention to exhibit A and B.

6 Exhibit A clearly shows that the claimant’s original loan balance was discharged by monies transferred from a capital and interest loan account (no 00726774) and Exhibit B clearly shows that the claimant’s overdraft balance was replaced with a capital and interest loan account (no 00726766).

 

The claimant cites the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879.

 

Sec2: subject to this Act, a copy of any entry in a banker’s book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of that entry, and of the matters, transactions and accounts recorded in it.

Therefore, it is submitted that all transactions and entries on the claimant’s accounts are a true record of past and present accounting events.

 

7 In December 1998 the defendant sought and obtained a county court judgment with the court setting payments of £38.00 per month to discharge the balance. The defendant then opened two further accounts “the judgment account” ref 499152 Exhibit C and “Router account” no 499152 Exhibit D. The judgment account shows a correct balance of the amount outstanding which decreases monthly. However, the “router account” continues to accrue compound interest, and contains the heading “monitoring for arrears”.

 

8 In April 2007 the claimant challenged the defendant’s legal right to apply all and further interest to the claimant’s accounts by requesting a “true copy” of the original agreement pursuant to sec 77 Consumer Credit Act 1974. To try to justify the appliance of such interest the defendant conjectured two consumer credit act agreements Exhibit D and E which contain a clause allowing quarterly interest to be applied to the claimant’s accounts both before and after judgment. It is noted, these were passed off as “true copies” of the claimant’s loan agreements, and therefore binding under sec 172 (1) of the aforementioned Act.

 

9 The terms and conditions of the claimant’s loan agreement and current account banking contract does not contain a covenant allowing the defendant to apply post judgment interest. Therefore it is submitted that the defendant is precluded from applying such interest. The claimant relies on the authority cited below.

 

The Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc, [2001] UKHL 52.

 

10. Thus a lender under a regulated credit agreement who obtains judgment against a defaulting borrower in the county court will be entitled to recover the principal outstanding at the date of judgment and interest accrued up to that date but will not be entitled to an order for statutory interest after that date, and even if the court had power to award statutory post-judgment interest it could not do so, in any case where an instalment order had been made, unless there had been a default in the due payment of any instalment. The lender may recover post-judgment interest only if he has the benefit of an independent covenant by the borrower entitling him to recover such interest. There is nothing to preclude inclusion of such a covenant in a regulated credit agreement, unless it falls foul of the fairness requirement in the regulations.

 

11 In November 2007 the defendant’s senior management finally conceded that the agreements which they purported to be “true copies” were in fact created from accounts that the claimant had never signed or agreed to, and that the only account relevant is the judgment account.

 

12 I think it fair to conclude from evidence submitted that the defendant’s continual processing of incorrect data is both unlawful and unwarranted and breaches principles set out in the Data Protection Act 1998

13 Furthermore their prolonged and repeated refusal to admit their conduct has caused me and my family, as well as mental distress, considerable time, money & effort in trying to prove my case

Summary

In summary it is the claimant’s contention that the defendant, in the absence of a true copy agreement, did reconstruct by means of conjecture an unrelated copy agreement which the defendant continued to claim for some considerable time was a true copy when it was not contrary to law

[car2403]

PERHAPS Someone would like to start a new thread on what exACTLY is first class postage : because we have we have various types of "on the cheap" postal delivery services

 

eg "tnt premier post": "ukmail business post" to name but two

 

and some companies have sent default notices , THE DATE OF SERVICE TAKING UP TO 6 DAYS : by the above methods which in no way constitute "FIRST CLASS POSTAGE":grin::grin::grin:

 

Actually, that's probably not required, as CPR states;

 

6.2 (1)A document may be served by any of the following methods –

(a)personal service, in accordance with rule 6.4;

(b)first class post (or an alternative service which provides for delivery on the next working day);

©leaving the document at a place specified in rule 6.5;

(d)through a document exchange in accordance with the relevant practice direction; or

(e)by fax or other means of electronic communication in accordance with the relevant practice direction.

 

So, anything alternative to first class post, which has delivery on the next working day, suffices.

 

What is interesting, though, is that if you ask Royal Mail about first class post, their delivery target for it is 1-2 days. Does this mean that first class post isn't sufficient for service, as it doesn't guarantee next day delivery? The answer is surely "no", as it's explicitly stated in CPR and that's what the Court uses - the fact "first class post or an alternative with next day delivery" could mean those other services aren't sufficient for CPR.

[car2403]

Work in progress. I need to get this spot on, i can't afford to confuse the judge, any input is appreciated.

 

Paul

 

 

1 The claimant held a Royalties current account no 10017026 (“the account”) with the defendant. Which was governed by their standard terms and conditions?

 

2 In March 1998 the claimant took out a fixed rate personal loan no 03805926 (“the loan”) which was governed by terms and conditions contained in the agreement and regulated under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

 

3 On the 16th of July 1998 a termination notice pursuant to sec 76 and 87 of the Consumer Credit Act was issued by the defendant for the outstanding account overdraft balance and arrears on the personal loan. Subsequently, on the 30th July 1998 the defendant terminated both agreements.

 

4 On the 20th August 1998 the defendant opened two capital and interest variable rate loan accounts entirely without the claimant’s knowledge or consent and these were then used to replace the claimant’s original accounts.

 

5The claimant draws the courts attention to exhibit A and B.

 

6 Exhibit A clearly shows that the claimant’s original loan balance was discharged by monies transferred from a capital and interest loan account (no 00726774) and Exhibit B clearly shows that the claimant’s overdraft balance was replaced with a capital and interest loan account (no 00726766).

 

 

 

The claimant cites the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879.

 

 

 

Sec2: subject to this Act, a copy of any entry in a banker’s book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of that entry, and of the matters, transactions and accounts recorded in it.

Therefore, it is submitted that all transactions and entries on the claimant’s accounts are a true record of past and present accounting events.

 

 

 

7 In December 1998 the defendant sought and obtained a county court judgment with the court setting payments of £38.00 per month to discharge the balance. The defendant then opened two further accounts “the judgment account” ref 499152 Exhibit C and “Router account” no 499152 Exhibit D. The judgment account shows a correct balance of the amount outstanding which decreases monthly. However, the “router account” continues to accrue compound interest, and contains the heading “monitoring for arrears”.

 

 

 

8 In April 2007 the claimant challenged the defendant’s legal right to apply all and further interest to the claimant’s accounts by requesting a “true copy” of the original agreement pursuant to sec 77 Consumer Credit Act 1974. To try to justify the appliance of such interest the defendant conjectured two consumer credit act agreements Exhibit D and E which contain a clause allowing quarterly interest to be applied to the claimant’s accounts both before and after judgment. It is noted, these were passed off as “true copies” of the claimant’s loan agreements, and therefore binding under sec 172 (1) of the aforementioned Act.

 

 

 

9 The terms and conditions of the claimant’s loan agreement and current account banking contract does not contain a covenant allowing the defendant to apply post judgment interest. Therefore it is submitted that the defendant is precluded from applying such interest. The claimant relies on the authority cited below.

 

 

 

The Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc, [2001] UKHL 52.

 

 

 

10. Thus a lender under a regulated credit agreement who obtains judgment against a defaulting borrower in the county court will be entitled to recover the principal outstanding at the date of judgment and interest accrued up to that date but will not be entitled to an order for statutory interest after that date, and even if the court had power to award statutory post-judgment interest it could not do so, in any case where an instalment order had been made, unless there had been a default in the due payment of any instalment. The lender may recover post-judgment interest only if he has the benefit of an independent covenant by the borrower entitling him to recover such interest. There is nothing to preclude inclusion of such a covenant in a regulated credit agreement, unless it falls foul of the fairness requirement in the regulations.

 

 

 

11 In November 2007 the defendant’s senior management finally conceded that the agreements which they purported to be “true copies” were in fact created from accounts that the claimant had never signed or agreed to, and that the only account relevant is the judgment account.

 

 

 

12 I think it fair to conclude from evidence submitted that the defendant’s continual processing of incorrect data is both unlawful and unwarranted and breaches principles set out in the Data Protection Act 1998

 

13 Furthermore their prolonged and repeated refusal to admit their conduct has caused me and my family, as well as mental distress, considerable time, money & effort in trying to prove my case

 

Summary

In summary it is the claimant’s contention that the defendant, in the absence of a true copy agreement, did reconstruct by means of conjecture an unrelated copy agreement which the defendant continued to claim for some considerable time was a true copy when it was not contrary to law

 

Looking good Paul.

 

Are you going to go in to the DPA issues this throws up now, as well?

[volvodriver]

Work in progress. I need to get this spot on, i can't afford to confuse the judge, any input is appreciated.

 

Paul

 

 

1 The claimant held a Royalties current account no 10017026 (“the account”) with the defendant which was governed by their standard terms and conditions.

 

2 In March 1998 the claimant took out a fixed rate personal loan no 03805926 (“the loan”) which was governed by terms and conditions contained in the agreement and regulated under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

3 On the 16th of July 1998 a termination notice pursuant to sec 76 and 87 of the Consumer Credit Act was issued by the defendant for the outstanding account overdraft balance and arrears on the personal loan. Subsequently, on the 30th July 1998 the defendant terminated both agreements.

 

4 On the 20th August 1998 the defendant opened two capital and interest variable rate loan accounts entirely without the claimant’s knowledge or consent and these were then used to replace the claimant’s original accounts.

 

5The claimant draws the courts attention to exhibit A and B.

 

6 Exhibit A clearly shows that the claimant’s original loan balance was discharged by monies transferred from a capital and interest loan account (no 00726774) and Exhibit B clearly shows that the claimant’s overdraft balance was replaced with a capital and interest loan account (no 00726766).

 

The claimant cites the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1879.

 

Sec2: subject to this Act, a copy of any entry in a banker’s book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of that entry, and of the matters, transactions and accounts recorded in it.

Therefore, it is submitted that all transactions and entries on the claimant’s accounts are a true record of past and present accounting events.

 

7 In December 1998 the defendant sought and obtained a county court judgment with the court setting payments of £38.00 per month to discharge the balance. The defendant then opened two further accounts “the judgment account” ref 499152 Exhibit C and “Router account” no 499152 Exhibit D. The judgment account shows a correct balance of the amount outstanding which decreases monthly. However, the “router account” continues to accrue compound interest, and contains the heading “monitoring for arrears”.

 

8 In April 2007 the claimant challenged the defendant’s legal right to apply all and further interest to the claimant’s accounts by requesting a “true copy” of the original agreement pursuant to sec 77 Consumer Credit Act 1974. To try to justify the appliance of such interest the defendant conjectured two consumer credit act agreements Exhibit D and E which contain a clause allowing quarterly interest to be applied to the claimant’s accounts both before and after judgment. It is noted, these were passed off as “true copies” of the claimant’s loan agreements, and therefore binding under sec 172 (1) of the aforementioned Act.

 

9 The terms and conditions of the claimant’s loan agreement and current account banking contract does not contain a covenant allowing the defendant to apply post judgment interest. Therefore it is submitted that the defendant is precluded from applying such interest. The claimant relies on the authority cited below.

 

The Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc, [2001] UKHL 52.

 

10. Thus a lender under a regulated credit agreement who obtains judgment against a defaulting borrower in the county court will be entitled to recover the principal outstanding at the date of judgment and interest accrued up to that date but will not be entitled to an order for statutory interest after that date, and even if the court had power to award statutory post-judgment interest it could not do so, in any case where an instalment order had been made, unless there had been a default in the due payment of any instalment. The lender may recover post-judgment interest only if he has the benefit of an independent covenant by the borrower entitling him to recover such interest. There is nothing to preclude inclusion of such a covenant in a regulated credit agreement, unless it falls foul of the fairness requirement in the regulations.

 

11 In November 2007 the defendant’s senior management finally conceded that the agreements which they purported to be “true copies” were in fact created from accounts that the claimant had never signed or agreed to, and that the only account relevant is the judgment account.

 

12 I therefore conclude from evidence submitted that the defendant’s continual processing of incorrect data is both unlawful and unwarranted and breaches principles set out in the Data Protection Act 1998

 

13 Furthermore their prolonged and repeated refusal to admit their conduct has caused me and my family, as well as mental distress, considerable time, money & effort in trying to prove my case

 

Summary

In summary it is the claimant’s contention that the defendant, in the absence of a true copy agreement, did reconstruct by means of conjecture an unrelated copy agreement which the defendant continued to claim for some considerable time was a true copy when it was not, contrary to law

 

Helpful?

[paulwlton]

Looking good Paul.

 

Are you going to go in to the Data Protection Act issues this throws up now, as well?

 

 

Thanks car, i'll include reference to the relevant breaches, then the balls in the DJs court no pun intended.

 

PW

[paulwlton]

Helpful?

 

Nice one.

[paulwlton]

If anyone can improve on below. feel free, i've pinched a few snippets from car's battles on DP issues.

 

 

 

 

13 The first principle of the Data Protection Act 1998 requires fair and lawful processing of personal data. The Claimant contends, and more importantly the Defendant admits no consent was ever given to process said and stated data relating to the disputed accounts as particularized, therefore, the defendant has and continues to process data unlawfully and is in breach of the first principle by doing so. Furthermore At no time did the Claimant grant permission, either expressly or implied, for the defendant to arbitrarily extend that permission to store, process any personal data beyond the cessation date of the original contractual agreements.

 

14 Principle 2 of the Data Protection Act, states: "2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes."

 

The Claimant wishes to emphasise the term "specified and lawful purposes" as in ‘those specified within the contract’, and no more, and also emphasises the term "shall not be further processed". Therefore processing personal data without contractual entitlement is unlawful within the meaning of the Act.

 

15 The third principle requires that Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed. It is admitted by the Defendant that only the continued processing of personal data relating to the Claimant’s “judgment account” is relevant, this implies that all other personal data being processed is irrelevant, therefore it is submitted that the Defendant is in breach of the third principle.

 

16 The Fourth Principle requires that Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. The Defendant has totally disregarded this Principle by failing in its obligation to comply with it, and correcting the inaccuracies after the Claimant had notified the Defendant’s senior management of those serious inaccuracies.

 

The Claimant further submits that the Defendant owed him a duty of care to amend the inaccurate data as soon as was reasonably possible, and that in not doing so was again in breach of the Fourth Principle and assumed that because of their position need not abide by the statute of the Data Protection Act 1998 the Claimant submits the Defendant abused that position.

 

17 The Fifth Principle: Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes”.

 

The following is taken from the Information Commissioners Legal Guidance: To comply with this Principle, data controllers will need to review their personal data regularly and to delete the information which is no longer required for their purposes

 

In May 2007 the Claimant advised the Defendant that incorrect personal data was being processed, and In August 2007 the Claimant’s Honorable MP John Healey advised the defendant’s senior management that there were serious inaccuracies relating to the said data. Therefore the Claimant contends that failure to delete and destroy the said after being so advised is a gross breach of the Fifth Principle.

[car2403]

If anyone can improve on below. feel free, i've pinched a few snippets from car's battles on DP issues.

 

My work here is done

 

The DPA is a serious can of worms which, once opened, is difficult to put the lid back on - once you understand the meaning of the Act, you begin to see just how these companies are constantly in serious breach of it and are rarely brought to justice. Seems we are changing that now, Paul.

[paulwlton]

My work here is done

 

The Data Protection Act is a serious can of worms which, once opened, is difficult to put the lid back on - once you understand the meaning of the Act, you begin to see just how these companies are constantly in serious breach of it and are rarely brought to justice. Seems we are changing that now, Paul.

 

Agree totally, and the fact that a leading MP has summoned the Information Commissioner to Westminster to answer questions regarding issues relating to a certain banks behavior concerning the Data Protection Act speaks volumes.

[dad]

Paul,

 

May I suggest you are much more specific and spell out the problem for the judge. If I understand things correctly then you might want to consider:

 

4 On the 20th August 1998 the defendant opened two capital and interest variable rate loan accounts entirely without the claimant’s knowledge or consent. Under the provisions of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 these accounts are regulated credit agreements. The Defendant failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of section 61(a) of the Consumer Credit Act and has no agreements in the prescribed form containing all the prescribed terms relating to the accounts. Where section 61(1)(a), regarding signing of agreements, is not complied with a court 'shall not make' an enforcement order unless a document, whether or not in the prescribed form, containing all the prescribed terms, was signed by the debtor: section 127(3). Thus, signature of a document containing all the prescribed terms is an essential prerequisite to the court's power to make an enforcement order. As these agreements predate the coming into force of the Consumer Credit Act 2006 section 127(3) still applies.

 

And:

 

7 In December 1998 the defendant sought and obtained a county court judgment with the court setting payments of £38.00 per month to discharge the balance on the improperly executed agreements. Because of Section 127(3) the court acted ultra vires and the Claimant claims that this judgment is void. The defendant then opened two further accounts “the judgment account” ref 499152 Exhibit C and “Router account” no 499152 Exhibit D, also without complying with section 61(1)a of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 or the determination of the OFT relating to current accounts dated 1st February 1990. The judgment account shows a correct [Comment: If RBS breached the CCA is the balance correct?] balance of the amount outstanding which decreases monthly. However, the “router account” continues to accrue compound interest, and contains the heading “monitoring for arrears”. Breach of the Consumer Credit Act by the Defendant deprives him of any lawful entitlement to these sums.

 

HTH

 

Dad

Edited May 7, 2008 by dad
spelling

[robcag]

7 In December 1998 the defendant sought and obtained a county court judgment with the court setting payments of £38.00 per month to discharge the balance on the improperly executed agreements. Because of Section 127(3) the court acted ultra viries and the Claimant claims that this judgment is void. The defendant then opened two further accounts “the judgment account” ref 499152 Exhibit C and “Router account” no 499152 Exhibit D, also without complying with section 61(1)a of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 or the determination of the OFT relating to current accounts dated 1st February 1990. The judgment account shows a correct [Comment: If RBS breached the CCA is the balance correct?] balance of the amount outstanding which decreases monthly. However, the “router account” continues to accrue compound interest, and contains the heading “monitoring for arrears”. Breach of the Consumer Credit Act by the Defendant deprives him of any lawful entitlement to these sums.

 

Nitpicking maybe, but I hadn't come across the term 'ultra viries' before and was curious as to what it meant.

 

When I googled it, the spelling 'ultra vires' seemed to fit the bill.

 

Just trying to be helpful

 

Cheers

Rob

[dad]

When I googled it, the spelling 'ultra vires' seemed to fit the bill

 

Thanks - Fat finger trouble!

[paulwlton]

Thanks, but i don't realy want to get bogged down with the legalities of the judgment, i want this claim to be judged purely on Data Protection issues, and in any case the court under this hearing has no jurisdiction on the judgment whether directly or indirectly, saying that i shall fine tune accordingly.

 

The judgment is seperate and may yet be challenged.

 

 

Important.

 

I require members who have been forwarded recreated agreements to pm me. So if anyone knows of a thread where this issue has cropped up, give em a nod. ASAP.

 

Paul

Edited May 7, 2008 by paulwlton

[paulwlton]

I think it's time to put pressure on the Data Controller. In post Tomorrow.

 

 

The Royal Bank of Scotland

Retail Regulatory Risk

Business House B

P O Box 1000

Edinburgh

EH12 1HQ

 

Claim Number 8RT01002

 

Date 11/05/2008

 

Re: Account N0s (00726766) (00726774) and Book Debt router Account No 499152.

 

Data Controller

 

Dear Mrs Tudor

 

Further to my sec 10/12 notice under the Data Protection Act 1998 dated 25th March 2008 and our recent communication by telephone.

 

I write to inform you that the above accounts are now subject to legal proceedings and that your non compliance is brought to the attention of the court as you have failed in your obligation to respond within the time limit stipulated in the said Act. You may also view this correspondence as a further notice pursuant to sec 10/12 of the said Act requiring you to cease all unlawful processing of personal data; In addition you must also delete and destroy all data relating to the said accounts. Furthermore, I require you to forward all statements relating to the above accounts this request is made pursuant to CPR 18. (request for further information) I expect to receive these within the next 5 working days. Should you fail to respond to both my requests I shall make an application to the court for an order and without further notice.

 

Furthermore, I require your reasoning behind the continued processing of the said data as well as the legal basis you rely on as per schedule 2 of the said Act . In correspondence between your senior management and my MP John Healey, it is claimed interest is being applied quarterly to my loan account. Could you please confirm that you have contractual entitlement which allows you to apply such interest? Could you also confirm that the above accounts relate to capital and interest variable rate loans? Finally, I await your defence to my application and remind you that a signed statement of truth is required.

 

Yours Sincerely

Paul Walton Copy To Court

Edited May 11, 2008 by paulwlton

[humbleman]

I also reserve the right to issue a warrant for your appearance at any future hearing, if you fail to remedy the situation.

[FANTASY CHARGES]

RE "I expect to receive these within the next 5 working days."

 

suggest you put in "I expect to receive these within the next 5 working days after the date of service of this letter."

 

also get you recorded delivery slip or special delivery slip before you finish the letter so you can quote it [the tracing number ] in the letter...

[car2403]

I love the way you can smack them with schedule 2, it's almost genius in fact!

 

These companies can't continue to run amock with our information, regardless of its intentions (usually to profit) or motives. (usually to make your life a misery)

 

SCHEDULE 2 CONDITIONS RELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE: PROCESSING OF ANY PERSONAL DATA

 

1 The data subject has given his consent to the processing.

 

2 The processing is necessary—

(a) for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, or

(b) for the taking of steps at the request of the data subject with a view to entering into a contract.

 

3 The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract.

 

4 The processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject.

 

5 The processing is necessary—

(a) for the administration of justice,

(b) for the exercise of any functions conferred on any person by or under any enactment,

© for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a Minister of the Crown or a government department, or

(d) for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any person.

 

6 (1) The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where the processing is unwarranted in any particular case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.

(2) The Secretary of State may by order specify particular circumstances in which this condition is, or is not, to be taken to be satisfied.

 

I started highlighting the important bits in this case, but ended up highlighting the whole thing, so I didn't bother!

 

I can't wait to see their reply/defence...

[paulwlton]

I also reserve the right to issue a warrant for your appearance at any future hearing, if you fail to remedy the situation.

 

Interesting, could you post relevant info on this.

[paulwlton]

I love the way you can smack them with schedule 2, it's almost genius in fact!

 

These companies can't continue to run amock with our information, regardless of its intentions (usually to profit) or motives. (usually to make your life a misery)

 

 

 

I started highlighting the important bits in this case, but ended up highlighting the whole thing, so I didn't bother!

 

I can't wait to see their reply/defence...

 

Agreed.

 

The RBS are in a complete mess.

[pt2537]

Interesting, could you post relevant info on this.

 

http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/courtfinder/forms/n20_0902.pdf

this may help

[humbleman]

http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/courtfinder/forms/n20_0902.pdf

this may help

 

As always on the ball.