SPML/LMC anyone claimed for mis selling and unfair charges?

[mnoesere]

Ooops.. sorry, it came out wrong. I will repost it

 

RNS Number : 2946E

Southern Pacific Securities05-2 PLC

17 December 2009

 



THIS NOTICE IS IMPORTANT AND REQUIRES THE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION OF NOTEHOLDERS. IF NOTEHOLDERS ARE IN ANY DOUBT AS TO THE ACTION THEY SHOULD TAKE, THEY SHOULD SEEK THEIR OWN FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ADVICE, INCLUDING AS TO ANY TAX CONSEQUENCES, IMMEDIATELY FROM THEIR STOCKBROKER, SOLICITOR, ACCOUNTANT OR OTHER INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL OR LEGAL ADVISER.

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE TO THE HOLDERS OF THE

 

 

€72,000,000 Class A1a Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2025

(ISIN: XS0225842359, US84359XAA63)

$205,000,000 Class A1b Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2025

(ISIN: XS0225843670, US84359XAB47)

£15,000,000 Class A1c Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2025

(ISIN: XS0225851186, US84359XAC20)

£244,800,000 Class A2c Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(with Detachable A2c Coupons)

(ISIN: XS0225858512, XS0226046604)

€26,000,000 Class B1a Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(ISIN: XS0225861490, US84359XAG34)

£17,700,000 Class B1c Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(ISIN: XS0225862894, US84359XAJ72)

€22,000,000 Class C1a Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(ISIN: XS0225865483, US84359XAK46)

£7,750,000 Class C1c Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(ISIN: XS0225876688, US84359XAM02)

€25,800,000 Class D1a Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(ISIN: XS0225877652, US84359XAN84)

£6,375,000 Class E1c Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(ISIN: XS0225879278)

£19,125,000 Class E2c Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes due 2043

(ISIN: XS0225879518)

 

 

are together referred to as the "Notes"

 

 

issued by

SOUTHERN PACIFIC SECURITIES 05-2 PLC

(the "Issuer")

on or about 8 August 2005

We refer to:

(a) the Mortgage Administration Agreement (the "Mortgage Administration Agreement") dated 10 August 2005 between, among others, Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited (whose role has been transferred to Capstone Mortgage Services Limited) (the "Mortgage Administrator"), Capita Trust Company Limited (the "Trustee") and the Issuer; and

(b) the Bank Agreement (the "Bank Agreement") dated 10 August 2005 between, among others, Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited (whose role has been transferred to Capstone Mortgage Services Limited) (the "Cash/Bond Administrator"), Capita Trust Company Limited (the "Trustee") and the Issuer.

Southern Pacific Personal Loans Limited ("SPPL") is an originator and current holder of the legal title to the Mortgages. The SPPL re SPS 05-2 Trust Collection Account (the "Collection Account") held by Barclays into which repayment amounts are paid by Borrowers is also in the name of SPPL.

The Issuer has been informed that SPPL has no directors and may be made insolvent imminently. In any case, the Issuer notes that a lack of directors may be considered evidence of the imminent insolvency of SPPL. The imminent insolvency of SPPL will have various implications, such implications including but not limited to, issues relating to the holding of title to the Mortgages relating to each Loan comprised in the Mortgage Pool and the Collection Account.

 

 

Capitalised terms used but not otherwise defined in this notice shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Mortgage Administration Agreement and the Bank Agreement.

 

 

Clause 15.1(b) of the Mortgage Administration Agreement provides that the Mortgage Administrator shall, if requested by the Issuer (with the consent of the Trustee) or the Trustee, deliver to the Issuer (with the consent of the Trustee) or the Trustee, as the case may require, all Property Deeds and up-to-date schedules for attachment to the Transfers and give formal notice of a legal assignment as the case may require of each Mortgage relating to each Loan comprised in the Mortgage Pool and of such charge and guarantee to the relevant Borrowers, insurers and other persons all in such form or forms as may be required by the Issuer (with the consent of the Trustee) or the Trustee (the "Mortgage Administrator Actions") if the Trustee considers that the Charged Property or any part of it is in jeopardy (including due to the possible insolvency of a SPML or SPPL) where legal title to any Mortgage is vested in SPML or SPPL, as the case may be.

 

 

The Trustee has given its consent to the Issuer for the Issuer to request the Mortgage Administrator to perform the Mortgage Administrator Actions and once all the necessary arrangements have been made, including the transfer of the Collection Account into the name of the Issuer, the Issuer will instruct the Mortgage Administrator to perform the Mortgage Administrator Actions accordingly.

Clause 9.2 of the Bank Agreement provides that Barclays (with the consent of SPML and SPPL) agrees upon receipt of notice by the Trustee to the effect that SPML or SPPL has become insolvent, to comply with any direction of the Trustee expressed to be given by the Trustee pursuant to the Trust Deed to the extent amounts standing to the credit of the Collection Account are attributable to the Loans.

Due to the imminent insolvency of SPPL, the Trustee has directed Barclays to accept instructions from the Cash/Bond Administrator in relation to the Collection Account. Once all the necessary arrangements have been made the Issuer, the Cash/Bond Administrator, Barclays and the Trustee will work together to arrange the transfer of the Collection Account from SPPL to the Issuer.

Queries may be addressed to the Issuer as follows:

SOUTHERN PACIFIC SECURITIES 05-2 PLC

c/o Capita Trust Company Limited

7th Floor, Phoenix House

18 King William Street

London EC4N 7HE

Attention: Emma Hamley

Telephone: +44 (0) 20 7800 4122

Fax: +44 (0) 20 7648 7499

e-mail: [email protected]

Ref: SPS 05-2 PLC

This Notice is given by the Issuer.

15 December 2009

[ryde]

this is sppl not spml world of difference.anyone actually affected by this? 2nd mortgage with sppl?

In the words of aled jones and thunderclap newman(remember him).

 

"There's something in the air"

 

The movement of addresses , change of account numbers all ain't for nowt,why hasn't attia been made director of sppl,she was up to april this year

In fact may still have some role,look here:

 

FSA Register

 

then again here

WebCHeck - Select and Access Company Information

 

 

Who's gonna pay the land registration fees and the sdlt for the transfer of all these titles ,should be the originator sppl but they're a busted flush so wheres the cash coming from?,whats happening to lmc and matlock they haven't got any directors either??

lot of questions but no answers yet

ITBG should be persuaded to return from rap heaven and self imposed exile to finish the b.stards off.

Edited December 18, 2009 by ryde

[not another b----- letter]

this is sppl not spml world of difference.anyone actually affected by this? 2nd mortgage with sppl?

 

We have our 2nd mortgage with SPPL, rang Capstone this morning to ask who our loan was with?, SPPL was the answer no its not was my reply, spoke to four different people and was told by number four that the system was playing up and they are only collecting payments today not answering any questions, anyone with any advice about where we go from here.

[ryde]

NABL will pm you

[enoughisenough]

Post it on open...

 

unless of course there's a very specific reason not to.

[ryde]

EIE

you're back, specific reason far too many eyes, timing critical ,

anyone in same position will forward them the same.

Whats your take on all this lot and where is it leading?

Must be some big underlying reason why they've abandoned sppl and for the spv to take this action which could have simply been prevented by attia remaining or being reappointed director,thats all it would take and this lot are far from that stupid,their apparent stupidity is always with intent.

It's as though the spv is not in touch and somehow detatched and distant from its slave capstone,mystifying.

Edited December 18, 2009 by ryde

[JonCris]

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

4 June 2009 (*)

(Directive 93/13/EEC – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Legal effects of an unfair term – Power of and obligation on the national court to examine of its own motion the unfairness of a term conferring jurisdiction – Criteria for assessment)

In Case C‑243/08,

REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Budaörsi Városi Bíróság (Hungary), made by decision of 22 May 2008, received at the Court on 2 June 2008, in the proceedings

Pannon GSM Zrt.

v

Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi,

THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of K. Lenaerts, President of the Chamber, T. von Danwitz, R. Silva de Lapuerta (Rapporteur), E. Juhász and J. Malenovský, Judges

Advocate General: V. Trstenjak,

Registrar: B. Fülöp, Administrator,

having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 2 April 2009,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

– Pannon GSM Zrt., by J. Vitári, C. Petia and M.B. Bíró, ügyvédek,

– the Hungarian Government, by J. Fazekas, R. Somssich, K. Borvölgyi and M. Fehér, acting as Agents,

– the Czech Government, by M. Smolek, acting as Agent,

– the Spanish Government, by J. López-Medel Bascones, acting as Agent,

– the French Government, by B. Cabouat and R. Loosli-Surrans, acting as Agents,

– the Austrian Government, by C. Pesendorfer and A. Hable, acting as Agents,

– the United Kingdom Government, by S. Ossowski, acting as Agent, and by T. de la Mare, Barrister,

– the Commission of the European Communities, by W. Wils and B. Simon, acting as Agents,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1 This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29; ‘the Directive’).

2 The reference has been made in the course of proceedings between Pannon GSM Zrt. (‘Pannon’) and Mrs Sustikné Győrfi relating to the performance of a telephone subscription contract concluded between those parties.

Legal context

Community legislation

3 According to Article 1(1) of the Directive, its purpose is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer.

4 Article 3 of the Directive provides:

‘1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.

2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract.

…

3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair.’

5 Subparagraph (q) of paragraph 1 of that annex refers to terms which have the object or effect of:

‘excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy …’

6 Article 4(1) of the Directive provides:

‘Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.’

7 Article 6(1) of the Directive states:

‘Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.’

8 Article 7(1) and (2) of the Directive states:

‘1. Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.

2. The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions whereby persons or organisations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers, may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such terms.’

National legislation

9 At the time of the facts at issue in the main proceedings, the Civil Code, in the version resulting from Law No CXLIX of 1997 (Magyar Közlöny 1997/115, ‘the Civil Code’), and Government Decree No 18/1999 on terms to be considered unfair in consumer contracts (Magyar Közlöny 1998/8), in the version in force at the time of the dispute in the main proceedings, were applicable.

10 In accordance with Article 209(1) of the Civil Code, a party can challenge any general contractual term which it considers to be unfair. Under Article 209B(4) of that code, specific provisions set out terms which are regarded as unfair in consumer contracts. Under Article 235(1) of the Civil Code, where a challenge to a term is upheld, the contract in question loses its legal force from the date on which it was concluded. According to Article 236(1) of the Civil Code, a challenge to a term of the contract must be communicated in writing to the other party within a period of one year.

11 Government Decree No 18/1999, in the version in force at the time of the dispute in the main proceedings, classes the contractual terms in two categories. The first category contains those contractual terms the use of which is prohibited in consumer contracts, and which are, consequently, null and void. The second category contains terms presumed to be unfair until evidence to the contrary is presented, the party which drafted that term being entitled to rebut that presumption.

The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

12 On 12 December 2004, Mrs Sustikné Győrfi entered into a subscription contract with Pannon for the provision of mobile telephone services. The contract was concluded on the basis of a form supplied by Pannon which stipulated that, by signing the contract, Mrs Sustikné Győrfi acknowledged the applicable terms and conditions, including the general contractual conditions forming an integral part of the contract, and accepted their content.

13 Under those terms and conditions, the two parties to the main proceedings accepted that the court for the place where Pannon has its principal place of business has jurisdiction for any dispute arising from the subscription contract or in relation to it. That term conferring jurisdiction was not individually negotiated by the two parties.

14 Taking the view that Mrs Sustikné Győrfi had not complied with her contractual obligations, Pannon applied, pursuant to that term, to the Budaörsi Városi Bíróság (Budaörs District Court) for an order for payment, it being the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which Pannon has its principal place of business.

15 That court made the order sought by Pannon. Mrs Sustikné Győrfi then filed, within the prescribed time-limit, a statement of opposition to that order, and the proceedings thereby became contentious.

16 That court noted that Mrs Sustikné Győrfi’s place of residence was not within its jurisdiction. It held that Mrs Sustikné Győrfi, who receives invalidity benefit, has her place of residence in Dombegyház, in the judicial district of Békés, 275 km from Budaörs, and indicated that means of transport between Budaörs and Dombegyház are very limited on account of the lack of a direct train or bus service.

17 The Budaörsi Városi Bíróság observed that the applicable rules of procedure provide that the court with territorial jurisdiction is the court for the place where Mrs Sustikné Győrfi resides, that is to say, the Battonyai Városi Bíróság (Battonya District Court).

18 The referring court explained that the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the court, in the district in question, must raise, of its own motion, the issue of territorial jurisdiction. However, as the jurisdiction is not exclusive, it is no longer possible to raise that issue after the first filing by the defendant of her defence to the substance of the dispute. The court which is seised may examine the accuracy of the facts relied on, to establish that it has jurisdiction, only where they are inconsistent with self-evident facts or facts of which the court has knowledge ex officio, or if such facts are impossible to prove or the other party disputes them.

19 In those circumstances, the Budaörsi Városi Bíróság, entertaining doubts as to the possible unfairness of the term conferring jurisdiction in the general conditions of the contract at issue, decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘1. Can Article 6(1) of … Directive [93/13] – pursuant to which Member States are to provide that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer – be construed as meaning that the non-binding nature vis-à-vis the consumer of an unfair term introduced by the seller or supplier does not have effect ipso jure but only where the consumer successfully contests the unfair term by lodging the relevant application?

2. Does the consumer protection provided by Directive [93/13] require the national court of its own motion – irrespective of the type of proceedings in question and of whether or not they are contentious – to determine that the contract before it contains unfair terms, even where no application has been lodged, thereby carrying out, of its own motion, a review of the terms introduced by the seller or supplier in the context of exercising control over its own jurisdiction?

3. In the event that the second question is answered in the affirmative, what are the factors which the national court must take into account and evaluate in the context of exercising this control?’

The questions referred

The first question

20 By this question, the referring court wishes to know whether Article 6(1) of the Directive, pursuant to which unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier are not binding on the consumer, must be interpreted as meaning that it is only where the consumer has successfully challenged such a term that he is not bound by it.

21 In order to reply to the question referred, it should be recalled, at the outset, that the obligation imposed on the Member States under Article 6(1) of the Directive is intended to accord a right to the citizen, in his role as a consumer, and defines the result sought by the Directive (see Case C‑144/99 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I‑3541, paragraph 18, and Case C‑478/99 Commission v Sweden [2002] ECR I‑4147, paragraphs 16 and 18).

22 Thus, the system of protection introduced by the Directive is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge. This leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence the content of those terms (Joined Cases C‑240/98 to C‑244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I‑4941, paragraph 25).

23 The Court also held, in paragraph 26 of that judgment, that the aim of Article 6 of the Directive would not be achieved if the consumer were himself obliged to raise the unfairness of contractual terms, and that effective protection of the consumer may be attained only if the national court acknowledges that it has power to evaluate terms of this kind of its own motion.

24 It must be pointed out, in that regard, that, if that power is to be granted to the national court, Article 6(1) of the Directive cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is only in the event that the consumer has brought a specific application in relation to it, that an unfair contract term is not binding on that consumer. Such an interpretation would rule out the possibility of the national court assessing, of its own motion, in the context of examining the admissibility of the action which is before it, and without a specific application from the consumer to that effect, the unfairness of a contractual term.

25 As regards the legal effects of an unfair term, the Court stated, in Case C‑168/05 Mostaza Claro [2006] ECR I‑10421, paragraph 36, that the importance of consumer protection has led the Community legislature to lay down, in Article 6(1) of the Directive, that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier ‘shall … not be binding on the consumer’. It emphasised that it is a mandatory provision which, taking into account the weaker position of one of the parties to the contract, aims to replace the formal balance which the latter establishes between the rights and obligations of the parties with an effective balance which re-establishes equality between them.

26 The Court added further, in paragraph 37 of that judgment, that as the aim of the Directive is to strengthen consumer protection, it constitutes, according to Article 3(1)(t) EC, a measure which is essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Community and, in particular, to raising the standard of living and the quality of life in its territory.

27 Consequently, the expression ‘as provided for under their national law’, set out in Article 6(1) of the Directive, cannot be understood as enabling Member States to subject the non-binding status of an unfair term to a condition such as that mentioned in the first question referred.

28 Therefore, the reply to the first question is that Article 6(1) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that an unfair contract term is not binding on the consumer, and it is not necessary, in that regard, for that consumer to have successfully contested the validity of such a term beforehand.

The second question

29 By this question, the referring court asks the Court about the obligations on the national court, by reason of the provisions of the directive, in order to determine whether the national court, in the context of assessing its jurisdiction and irrespective of the type of action, must rule, if necessary of its own motion, on the unfairness of a contractual term.

30 In order to reply to that question, it should be recalled that, in Case C‑473/00 Cofidis [2002] ECR‑10875, paragraph 34, the Court has held that the protection which the Directive confers on consumers extends to cases in which a consumer who has concluded with a seller or supplier a contract containing an unfair term fails to raise the unfairness of the term, whether because he is unaware of his rights or because he is deterred from enforcing them on account of the costs which judicial proceedings would involve.

31 It should also be pointed out that the Court has held, in Mostaza Claro, paragraph 38, that the nature and importance of the public interest underlying the protection which the Directive confers on consumers justify the national court being required to assess of its own motion whether a contractual term is unfair, compensating in this way for the imbalance which exists between the consumer and the seller or supplier.

32 The court seised of the action is therefore required to ensure the effectiveness of the protection intended to be given by the provisions of the Directive. Consequently, the role thus attributed to the national court by Community law in this area is not limited to a mere power to rule on the possible unfairness of a contractual term, but also consists of the obligation to examine that issue of its own motion, where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task, including when it is assessing whether it has territorial jurisdiction.

33 In carrying out that obligation, the national court is not, however, required under the Directive to exclude the possibility that the term in question may be applicable, if the consumer, after having been informed of it by that court, does not intend to assert its unfair or non-binding status.

34 In those circumstances, the specific characteristics of the procedure for determining jurisdiction, which takes place under national law between the seller or supplier and the consumer, cannot constitute a factor which is liable to affect the legal protection from which the consumer must benefit under the provisions of the Directive.

35 The reply, therefore, to the second question is that the national court is required to examine, of its own motion, the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task. Where it considers such a term to be unfair, it must not apply it, except if the consumer opposes that non-application. That duty is also incumbent on the national court when it is ascertaining its own territorial jurisdiction.

The third question

36 By this question, the national court seeks guidance on the factors which it must consider in assessing the possible unfairness of a contractual term.

37 In order to reply to that question, it should be noted that in referring to concepts of good faith and significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties, Article 3 of the Directive merely defines in a general way the factors that render unfair a contractual term that has not been individually negotiated (Case C‑237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten [2004] ECR I‑3403, paragraph 19).

38 In that context, the Annex to which Article 3(3) of the Directive refers contains only an indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms which may be regarded as unfair (Freiburger Kommunalbauten, paragraph 20).

39 Furthermore, Article 4 of the Directive provides that the unfairness of a contractual term is to be assessed taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of it.

40 However, as regards the term which is the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings, it should be borne in mind that, in Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, paragraphs 21 to 24, the Court has held that, in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier within the meaning of the Directive, a term, drafted in advance by the seller or supplier – which was not subject to individual negotiation – the purpose of which is to confer jurisdiction in respect of all disputes arising under the contract on the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the seller has his principal place of business, satisfies all the criteria necessary for it to be judged unfair for the purposes of the Directive.

41 As the Court stated in Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, paragraph 22, a term of this kind obliges the consumer to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which may be a long way from his domicile. This may make it difficult for him to enter an appearance. In the case of disputes concerning limited amounts of money, the costs relating to the consumer’s entering an appearance could be a deterrent and cause him to forgo any legal remedy or defence. The Court therefore concluded that such a term falls within the category of terms which have the object or effect of excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action, a category referred to in subparagraph (q) of paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Directive.

42 While it is true that the Court, in exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 234 EC, in Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, paragraph 22, interpreted the general criteria used by the Community legislature in order to define the concept of unfair terms, it cannot however rule on the application of those general criteria to a particular term, which must be considered in the light of the particular circumstances of the case in question (see Freiburger Kommunalbauten, paragraph 22).

43 It is for the national court, in the light of the foregoing, to assess whether a contractual term may be categorised as unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive.

44 In those circumstances, the reply to the third question is that it is for the national court to determine whether a contractual term, such as that which is the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings, satisfies the criteria to be categorised as unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive. In so doing, the national court must take account of the fact that a term, contained in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier, which has been included without being individually negotiated and which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the seller or supplier has his principal place of business may be considered to be unfair.

Costs

45 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:

1. Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, on unfair terms in consumer contracts, must be interpreted as meaning that an unfair contract term is not binding on the consumer, and it is not necessary, in that regard, for that consumer to have successfully contested the validity of such a term beforehand.

2. The national court is required to examine, of its own motion, the unfairness of a contractual term where it has available to it the legal and factual elements necessary for that task. Where it considers such a term to be unfair, it must not apply it, except if the consumer opposes that non-application. That duty is also incumbent on the national court when it is ascertaining its own territorial jurisdiction.

3. It is for the national court to determine whether a contractual term, such as that which is the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings, satisfies the criteria to be categorised as unfair within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13. In so doing, the national court must take account of the fact that a term, contained in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier, which has been included without being individually negotiated and which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the seller or supplier has his principal place of business may be considered to be unfair.

 

[signatures]

[scedminc]

sced

if attia is prosecuted as sole director then for non submission of accounts (still can't understand that one unless the 2008 submissions were actually for 2006) being sole director of spml/pml they might be dissolved???

wars here!

get armed!

 

In theory yes but in reality Preferred would put another director in place before its forced dissolution.

 

Sced

[ryde]

sced

cannot understand why they haven't done that for sppl , her appointment as director was terminated on that one earlier this year yet fsa register still shows her as "active"; for the sake of appointing a director for a paper company someone is gonna have to pick up a whopping great bill,this just isn't like them.

Edited December 18, 2009 by ryde

[mnoesere]

just pm'ed u re-sppl

[midge61]

seems they are considering the insolvency of SPML as well

 

required by the Issuer (with the consent of the Trustee) or the Trustee (the "Mortgage Administrator Actions") if the Trustee considers that the Charged Property or any part of it is in jeopardy (including due to the possible insolvency of a SPML or SPPL) where legal title to any Mortgage is vested in SPML or SPPL, as the case may be.

 

and my securitisation is included so ryde can you pm me too please.

[sohoscribbler]

Could you PM me too please as I am in the same boat, or a least I think I am.

 

seems they are considering the insolvency of SPML as well

 

required by the Issuer (with the consent of the Trustee) or the Trustee (the "Mortgage Administrator Actions") if the Trustee considers that the Charged Property or any part of it is in jeopardy (including due to the possible insolvency of a SPML or SPPL) where legal title to any Mortgage is vested in SPML or SPPL, as the case may be.

 

and my securitisation is included so ryde can you pm me too please.

[midge61]

These guys are supposed to be able to act as advocates for consumers

 

About Us – Consumer Focus

 

Maybe we should be lobbying them?

[sohoscribbler]

Yes, but only in energy and postal services.

 

These guys are supposed to be able to act as advocates for consumers

 

About Us – Consumer Focus

 

Maybe we should be lobbying them?

[midge61]

I thought that at first but its not just that if you read on their site.

[ryde]

will pm everyone who's asked by tomorrow a/m this is own opinion please understand that,but cannot see how it can possibly harm anyone's cause you will also see why its in a pm,please bear with me. CAN SOMEONE TELL ME HOW TO EMPTY MY MESSAGE BOX ITS 100% FULL SO CAN'T SEND ANYTHING,sorry for being a numpty.!

Edited December 18, 2009 by ryde

[sohoscribbler]

I stand corrected. It might be worth a try. I spoke today to the FSA, the Insolvency Service and Companies House and none was much help, although the FSA asked for a copy of the notice about SPML and SPPL's going into insolvency. Companies House confirmed that SPML is not yet insolvent.

 

I thought that at first but its not just that if you read on their site.

[sohoscribbler]

Thanks. I look forward to receiving it with great curiosity.

 

will pm everyone who's asked by tomorrow a/m this is own opinion please understand that,but cannot see how it can possibly harm anyone's cause you will also see why its in a pm,please bear with me.

[ryde]

The notice concerns sppl only as there are no directors can someone please point out where spml are stated to be insolvent as they have a director amany attia.

The veritable sh.t will hit the fan if they go down as they are THE major player.

 

LMC and matlock bank same as sppl no directors should be dissolved did anyone include these in their complaint???

Edited December 19, 2009 by ryde

[midge61]

Hi

what I quoted in post 3389 came fron a norice on the Irish Stock Exchange for Southern pacific securities 05-3 plc which is the one my mortgage is included in.

[ryde]

midge

think they've just quoted the blurb from the prospectus as loans from both sppl and spml were securitized with this spv,it is sppl who are stated as being likely to be imminently insolvent.

 

IT APPEARS CAPSTONE ARE NOW VIGOROUSLY PURSUING A STEPPED UP POLICY OF REPO. from some of the pm's I've received.

They say which is accepted without question by the courts, that they are acting for the originators without any letter of authority or power of attorney,as the originators have no personnel especially sppl I cannot possibly see how they can have any valid authorisation to bring claims on their behalf.

SO FOR HOW LONG HAVE CAPSTONE BEEN BRINGING ILLEGAL AND SUCCESSFUL ACTIONS AND REPOS FOR A COMPANY THAT HAS HAD NO DIRECTORS FOR SOME TIME (APRIL 2009) AND CONSEQUENTLY FROM WHOM THEY CAN HAVE NO POSSIBLE LEGAL AUTHORITY?!!

SURELY THIS MUST BE REPORTED YET AGAIN TO THE FSA AS IT IS STILL GOING ON NOW.

 

Comments please?!!

Edited December 19, 2009 by ryde

[littledotty27]

They can't!!!

 

Let them try,i'm sure with enough info from companies house showing no directors,that the DJ's will tell them to sling there hook!!!

[sohoscribbler]

I think there needs to be more pressure on Companies House before we reach that stage.

 

They can't!!!

 

Let them try,i'm sure with enough info from companies house showing no directors,that the DJ's will tell them to sling there hook!!!

[rocket1]

Ok Guys 'n Girls'

 

Sorry to intrude, but I would like to let you all know I have started a blog site here with the express purpose of drumming up public support from the whole public as well as CAG.

 

The idea is to collect ghastly mortgage stories on this blog site and inform readers about joining in a class action and how they can join in if they want to.

 

A class action simply becomes automatic from the Office of Fair Trading if they receive enough complaints from mortgage holders and the re-possessed.

 

This blog aims to make sure the Office of Fair Trading Will get enough complaints and therefore all the hard work and cost of a legal action will be born by the OFT and not us.

 

The blog site is called:

 

HOMEOWNERS FOR JUSTICE AGAINST MORTGAGE RACKETEERING

[ryde]

catchy

where have you been? any chance of some harassing phonecalls to capstone next week or have they blacklisted you,think you have been the catalyst that started this in the first place when they virtually admitted they were one of the gang of 4 being investigated by the FSA,HAVE QUOTED THEIR RESPONSE TO YOU IN MY STATEMENT OF CASE!!

THEY ALWAYS MAKE OUT AND ARE BELIEVED THEY ARE THE POOR HONEST LENDER WITH INTEGRITY WHO WAS TRUSTING ENOUGH TO LEND THE DECEITFUL BORROWER THE MONEY TO FIND THEMSELVES NOW BEING TURNED OVER BY THE WICKED AND ERRANT TOE RAG AND HAVE COME TO COURT AS A LAST RESORT TO SEEK HONEST JUSTICE.FILTHY SLIMY BLOODSUCKING GOB****ES.

FINISH 'EM ALL OFF,sorry ranting again.

Edited December 19, 2009 by ryde