VCS Spycar PCN PAPLOC Now Claimform - No Stopping 47) STOPPING IN A RESTRICTED BUS STOP /STAND Robin Hood Airport Doncaster

[notpayingapenny]

Without your sort of discernment I would be completely lost. I am sure so would many other people who would the just back down and give up! I feel confident now that I have a lot to fight from. Thank you so much.

[notpayingapenny]

Wow! It appears I have so much more to fight back with than I even imagined. I will now try to put it together in a document that I will use in my defence. I think I will probably find time on Sunday evening for this. Thanks again!!!

[notpayingapenny]

I have reproduced some of your statements verbartim and reworded some and added a few bits here and there with some comments from my understanding. I wonder what you think of this now and if it is essential to go through each of the points and rebut all of them one after another?

 

The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 does not prohibit stopping in a restricted bus stop or stand, it prohibits stopping in a clearway.

What specific clause of the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 does the claimant allege has been violated by the defendant?

 

The signage around the bus stop is prohibitive and as such is incapable of forming a contract.

The bus stop is not on relevant land because the public road on which that stand is on is covered by the Road Traffic Act. Nothing on the signs around the bus stop that says “NO Stopping” mentions VCS or Peel Investments who are now purporting to be the land owners of a public road. The signage should identify the creditor-it doesn't -a breach of the CoP.  

Further, the defendant would like to point out that the prohibitive sign is not at the bus stop but a few metres before the stand itself.

 

The claimant mentions a couple occasions where they have won such cases. None of those cited cases were on airport land. Airport land is covered by Bye Laws and hence the claim by VCS is not applicable in this instance. The remit of VCS ends in the car park and does not extend to the bus stops on public roads or land which they have no jurisdiction over. 

 

Under the Companies Act, a contract should be signed by the directors of both companies and witnessed by two independent individuals. This alleged contract, which makes no mention of pursuing registered keepers of vehicles to court makes its first appearance as a Witness Statement. Thus the alleged contract is null and void. 

 

The Beavis case referred to by the claimant was about parking in a car park. The claimant is here attempting to equate that case to stopping, not parking, in a bus stop and on a road that is covered by the Road Traffic Act.

 

The defendant would like to point out that

9] motorists do NOT accept the contract when entering the land.

First they have to read it and understand it and then they realise that

a] "No stopping" is prohibitive and cannot offer a contract.

b] the signs around the bus stop do not mention who issued the No Stopping signs so it could not have been issued by VCS since the IPC CoP states that their signs should include the IPC logo and that the creditor should be identified. 

 

10]There is no mention of a £100 charge for breaching the No stopping request or if there is it is far too small to read even for a pedestrian.

 

11] Notwithstanding what the claimant calls it, the mentioned signage is NOT a contractual clause. A “No stopping” sign is not an offer of parking terms.

 

22] Notwithstanding that the claimant claims that " the claimant has given the Defendant its contractual licence to enter the site", the claimant has not given any contractual licence whatsoever. This is a road leading to/from the airport which is covered by the Road Traffic Act. 

 

All classes of people go to the airport-travellers, taxis, fuel bowsers, airport staff, companies delivering food and drink for each aircraft, air traffic controllers, buses. It is absolutely ridiculous to attribute VCS with any sort of permissions. The defendant submits that VCS should not confuse a major thoroughfare with a car park and presume to act as land owners and usurp the control of any land which is not relevant to them.

 

23] The defendant submits that there can be no contract as there is no offer but there is only a prohibition. Again, it is not relevant land and VCS has absolutely no rights over it.

 

25] The cases which VCS cites to have won were not on any airport roads that are covered by the RTA which has its own Byelaws. VCS actually has also lost a lot more cases than they have won using their prohibitive signs.

 

26] The court should consider if there is any contract to start with and if the alleged offence is on relevant land. The consideration will inevitably lead the court to conclude that there is no contract and the land is not relevant. Also the court should note that there is no valid contract that exists between VCS and Peel.

 

27] The signage at the bus stop may show the conditions ie  no stopping, and restricted zone, but not the terms ie is there a charge for stopping and who is the creditor. The last section of the sign is illegible. 

 

29] As already stated, a Witness Statement between VCS and Peel Investments is not a valid document.

 

31] It will need more than the Claimants feather to outweigh the case against the Defendant regardless of who was driving.

 

32] There is no law of agency involved. This is not a case of employer/employee relationship. VCS cannot transfer the driver's liability to the registered keeper.

 

33] A list of highways on the Highways act 1980 does not even exist at all. The defendant brings the attention of the court to note that VCS is using this non existent document issue as a deliberate strategy to debunk the fact that this road is not relevant land. VCS are put to strict proof that it is relevant land not covered by the Road Traffic Act nor by Byelaws.

 

34] There can be no comparison between a railway station and an airport. This is a totally fatuous analogy which cannot be applied to this case. 

 

35] While it is true that landowners can bring in their own terms, it is also true that whatever terms they bring  cannot overrule Byelaws and the Road Traffic Act.

 

36] There is no mention of permits on the signage. If there were, would it mean that Permit holders were allowed to stop on “No Stopping” roads?

 

39] If Bye Laws are involved then the bus stop is not relevant land and neither is the specious argument about First Great Western Ltd. Is the claimant ignorant of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012? The road outside of Doncaster Sheffield Airport is not relevant land and is not covered by the Protection of Freedoms Act. That makes the charge against the claimant tantamount to fraud or extortion.

 

43] As stated in the defence, it is denied the Claimant is entitled to the recovery or any recovery at all. The nefarious parking charge notice given for a vehicle on a public road bus stop was ill advised to start with.

 

46] VCS has failed to present ANY reasonable and valid cause to apply to the DVLA for the Defendants details.

VCS has failed to provide ANY valid  contract with the landowners.

• “No stopping” is prohibitive therefore cannot form a contract

• the event happened on a bus stop over which VCS has no jurisdiction

• the signage either does not show that there was a charge of £100 for stopping, or the font size was too small for any motorist to be able to read it 

• the signage does not show the Creditor which fails the IPC CoP and hence the signage is not valid

• the WS contract does not appear to authorise VCS to pursue motorists to Court

 

Given all these factors it seems that VCS have breached the GDPR of the Defendant quite substantially and it would appear right that an exemplary award is made against VCS in the hope that they will drop all further cases at Doncaster airport where they are pursuing motorists on non relevant land.

 

48] The Defendant wishes to bring to the attention of the court that the Claimant cites an irrelevant case of a car park and tries to apply its merits to a bus stop. That in itself invalidates the fallacious claim.

 

59] Accordingly, this case is totally without merit. Some statements are pretty close to perjury and others are designed to mislead or misdirect. None of the analogies seem appropriate or relevant. All the false information presented as a statement of truth could have been stated using half the words and without all the repetition which appears to be trying to build a strong case where there is none at all.

One particularly bad example of misdirection is in the photographs. The Clearway sign shown near the bus stop is very unclear unlike the Clearway sign two photos before it which may well include terms and conditions. The one by the bus stop is totally different.

[notpayingapenny]

I have had a bit of a rough ride with other issues lately and took my eyes off this case.

 

Today I just read that I must deliver copies of all documents on which I intend to rely no later than 14 days before the hearing.

 

As the hearing is on 8 November that means I must send my WS and all other documents (not sure which ones are critical for this) by this Friday, am I correct?

 

Also, how do I verify if claimant paid the trial fee of £25 by 11 October to determine if there is a need for me to still proceed with this defence?

[notpayingapenny]

They apparently paid the fee on 23 September. So the hearing is definitely on. Doing my WS now as per all your recommendations!

[notpayingapenny]

Has anyone ever verified Section 43 of the Companies Act 2006 to confirm that it cannot be applied where we argue that a contract needs to be witnessed? I note that the judge in the VCS/ELMS Spy car 2*PCN PAPLOC Now Claimform for 1 of them - 'NO STOPPING' BP Station East Midlands airport case cited that act as he stated that the contract did not need to be witnessed.

[notpayingapenny]

My almost ready witness statement ... 

 

In the county court at Middlesbrough Claim No: 

Between

Vehicle Control Services Limited

(Claimant)

V

 

(Defendant)

Witness Statement

Introduction

It is admitted that the Defendant is the registered keeper of XXnn XXX

 

Locus standi/bye-laws and Relevant land

Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedom Act 2012 (PoFA) allows recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. However, the first paragraph 1 (1) (a) states that it only applies “in respect of parking of the vehicle on relevant land:”. The definition of “relevant land” is given in paragraph 3 (1) where subsection (c) excludes “any land ... on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control”. 

1. The bus stop is not on relevant land because the public road on which that stand is on is covered by the Road Traffic Act. 

2. Notwithstanding that the claimant claims that " the claimant has given the Defendant its contractual licence to enter the site", the claimant has not given any contractual licence whatsoever. This is a road leading to/from the airport which is covered by the Road Traffic Act. 

3. A list of highways on the Highways act 1980 does not even exist. The defendant brings the attention of the court that VCS is using this non existent document issue as a deliberate strategy to debunk the fact that this road is not relevant land. VCS are put to strict proof that it is relevant land not covered by the Road Traffic Act nor by Byelaws.

4. While it is true that landowners can bring in their own terms, it is also true that whatever terms they bring  cannot overrule Byelaws and the Road Traffic Act.

5. If Bye Laws are involved then the bus stop is not relevant land and neither is the specious argument about First Great Western Ltd. Is the claimant ignorant of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012? The road outside of Doncaster Sheffield Airport is not relevant land and is not covered by the Protection of Freedoms Act. That makes the charge against the claimant tantamount to fraud or extortion.

6. The claimant mentions a couple occasions where they have won such cases. It is brought to the attention of the court that none of those cited cases were on airport land. VCS actually has also lost a lot more cases than they have won using their prohibitive signs.  Airport land is covered by Bye Laws and hence the claim by VCS is not applicable in this instance. The remit of VCS ends in the car park and does not extend to the bus stops on public roads or land which they have no jurisdiction over.

7. All classes of people go to the airport. This includes travellers, taxis, fuel bowsers, airport staff, companies delivering food and drink for each aircraft, air traffic controllers and buses with passengers. It is therefore absolutely ridiculous to attribute VCS with any sort of permissions. The defendant submits that VCS should not confuse a major thoroughfare with a car park and presume to act as land owners and usurp the control of any land which is not relevant to them.

 

Alleged contract

The court should consider if there is any contract to start with and if the alleged offence is on relevant land. The consideration will inevitably lead the court to conclude that there is no contract. 

Also the court should note that there is no valid contract that exists between VCS and Peel.

Under the Companies Act, a contract should be signed by the directors of both companies and witnessed by two independent individuals. This alleged contract, which makes no mention of pursuing registered keepers of vehicles to court, makes its first appearance as a Witness Statement. Thus the alleged contract is null and void. 

The Beavis case referred to by the claimant is about parking in a car park. The claimant is here attempting to equate that case to stopping, not parking, in a bus stop and on a road that is covered by the Road Traffic Act.

The defendant submits that there can be no contract as there is no offer but there is only a prohibition. Again, it is not relevant land and VCS has absolutely no rights over it.

 

Further, the defendant would like to point out that motorists NEVER accept any contract just by entering the land.

First they must read it and understand it and then, and only then can they realise that "No stopping" is prohibitive and cannot offer a contract.

 

Bus stop signage

1. The signs around the bus stop do not mention who issued the “No Stopping” signs so it could not have been issued by VCS since the IPC CoP states that their signs should include the IPC logo and that the creditor should be identified. Nothing on the signs around the bus stop that says “NO Stopping” mentions VCS or Peel Investments who are now purporting to be the land owners of a public road. As the signage should identify the creditor, since it does not, this is a breach of the CoP.  

2. The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 does not prohibit stopping in a restricted bus stop or stand, it prohibits stopping in a clearway.

3. The defendant would like to ask the court to consider if any clause of the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 that the claimant alleges has been violated by the defendant. There is no mention of permits on the signage. If there were, would it mean that Permit holders were allowed to stop on “No Stopping” roads?

4. Notwithstanding what the claimant calls it, the mentioned signage is NOT a contractual clause. A “No stopping” sign is not an offer of parking terms.  Since the signage around the bus stop is prohibitive, it is as such is incapable of forming a contract.

5. Further, the defendant would like to point out that the prohibitive sign is not actually at the bus stop but a few metres before the stand itself.

 

There is no mention of a £100 charge for breaching the “No stopping” request, or if there is one then it is far too small to read, even for a pedestrian.

 

As already stated, a Witness Statement between VCS and Peel Investments is not a valid document.

 

It will need more than the Claimants feather to outweigh the case against the Defendant regardless of who was driving.

 

There is no law of agency involved. This is not a case of employer/employee relationship. VCS cannot transfer the driver's liability to the registered keeper.

 

There can be no comparison between a railway station and an airport. This is a totally fatuous analogy which cannot be applied to this case. 

  

As stated in the defence, it is denied the Claimant is entitled to the recovery or any recovery at all. The nefarious parking charge notice given for a vehicle on a public road bus stop was ill advised to start with.

 

Conclusion:

VCS has failed to present ANY reasonable and valid cause to apply to the DVLA for the Defendants details.

VCS has failed to provide ANY valid  contract with the landowners.

• “No stopping” is prohibitive therefore cannot form a contract

• the event happened on a bus stop over which VCS has no jurisdiction

• the signage either does not show that there was a charge of £100 for stopping, or the font size was too small for any motorist to be able to read it 

• the signage does not show the Creditor which fails the IPC CoP and hence the signage is not valid

• the WS contract does not authorise VCS to pursue motorists to Court

 

Given all these factors it seems that VCS have breached the GDPR of the Defendant quite substantially and it would appear right that an exemplary award is made against VCS in the hope that they will drop all further cases at Doncaster airport where they are pursuing motorists on non relevant land.

 

The Defendant wishes to bring to the attention of the court that the Claimant cites an irrelevant case of a car park and tries to apply its merits to a bus stop. That in itself invalidates the entire fallacious claim.

 

Accordingly, this case is totally without merit. Some statements are pretty close to perjury and others are designed to mislead or misdirect. None of the analogies seem appropriate or relevant. All the false information presented as a statement of truth could have been stated using half the words and without all the repetition which appears to be trying to build a strong case where there is none at all.

One particularly bad example of misdirection is in the photographs. The Clearway sign shown near the bus stop is very unclear unlike the Clearway sign two photos before it which may well include terms and conditions. The one by the bus stop is totally different.

[notpayingapenny]

Just to be sure, you are suggesting that I adapt and use this text? .....

Grace Period: 45. Code 13 of IPC Code of Practice states: ‘

 

13.2 Before a Parking Charge is issued Motorists must be allowed a Grace Period save and except when 13.3 is applicable.

 

A Grace Period is a 10 minute period at the end of a Permitted Period of Parking.

 

13.3 A Grace Period is not required when the Permitted Period of Parking does not exceed 1 hour providing that the signage on the site makes it clear to the Motorist, in a prominent font, that no Grace Period applies on that land.’

 

Fifthly, I would ask the Claimant to provide evidence that the car remained in the car park for more than the ten minute Grace Period allowed by the IPC Code of Practice.

 

The parking space became unpermitted at the moment the driver left the site, so then a ten minute Grace Period would apply.

 

As the vehicle was there for no more than ten minutes, then according to the ICP’s Code of Practice, which the Claimants says they complied with at all material times, a PCN should not have been issued.

 

Alternatively, the Claimant is invited to show the signage which makes it clear that no Grace Period applies. Planning Permission 46.

 

Finally, the Claimant really emphasis their signage in their Witness Statement. In schedule 2 of their (expired) service agreement it says that

 

‘The Company will provide the following – 1. Supply 6 Vehicle Control Service v Claim Number: 16 x Enforcement Signs (MAXIMUM STAY 90 MINUTES WHILST SHOPPING IN THE STORES).’

 

I was only able to find 5 enforcement signs (Exhibit 15). This is another example of VCS not caring about legal obligations, this time within their own contracts. Regardless,

 

I do not believe they have planning permission for these signs, which is a criminal offence under The Town and County Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007.

 

I have requested proof of planning permission from VCS by means of a CPR request, but they have not replied. I have searched Hillingdon council planning portal and I cannot find planning permission for the signs.

 

Whilst should mean a contract could not be formed between driver and the Claimant, as you cannot form a contract with illegality, I would like to use this as another example of how unbothered the Claimant is about the law and how they do not adhere to their own IPC Code of Practice as

 

‘Operators must be aware of their legal obligations and implement the relevant legislation and guidance when operating their businesses’ (Code 25.1 IPC Code of Practice).

 

The Claimant does not care to adhere to Code of Practice they signed up to and generally do not care about keeping their legal affairs in order.

 

I would consider that a blatant disregard for the rules and the law.

 

47. I have done some research into the Claimant and their court action.

 

They have a pattern of behaviour whereby a VCS paralegal writes a Witness Statement, then mentions in the last paragraph they may be unable to attend court and then the paralegal never turns up to be cross examined.

 

In the event Ambreen Arshad is unable to attend court to be asked about her claims, then I would like to know why she is not able to attend when the hearing has been scheduled months in advance, is during working hours and as a result of covid, is online, so there is no travel involved.

 

Mohammed Wali, the other paralegal employed by VCS, does exactly the same. Vehicle Control Service v Claim Number: 17

 

Additionally, I suspect the patrol officer will also have an aversion to explaining himself to the court. E. Double Recovery Legal Fees

 

48. The Claimant’s Particulars of Claim include £50 legal costs, yet in the letter dated 29th June 2021, the Claimant stated that they were no longer represented by Elms Legal and all further correspondence should be sent to the VCS in-house litigation department (Exhibit 16).

 

I am not sure why the Claimant is asking the Defendant to contribute to their employee’s salary.

 

49. Furthermore, as per another letter dated 24th August 2021 (Exhibit 17), the Claimant wrote,

 

‘Should you fail to accept our offer of settlement then we will proceed to Trial and bring this letter to the Court’s attention upon question of costs in order seek further costs of £220 incurred in having to instruct a local Solicitor to attend the hearing in conjunction with the amount claimed on the Claim Form.’

 

I find this an extraordinary statement given the Claimant knows legal costs are capped at £50 in Small Claims Court.

 

I cannot think of any reason why the Claimant would write this letter other than to intimidate the opposing party with the threat of an extortionate sum of money, hoping they would be able to take advantage of someone not knowing the Small Claims Court rules.

 

Given that this letter came from the Claimant’s in-house litigation department, clearly well-versed in the law, I cannot see this as anything other than deceitful and disingenuous behaviour and I hope the court will not tolerate it.

 

Vehicle Control Service v Claim Number: 18 Contractual costs / debt recovery charge 50. In addition to the £50 legal costs, the Claimant is seeking recovery of the original £100 parking charge plus an additional £60 which is described as ‘contractual costs and interest’ in the Particulars of Claim and as ‘debt recovery charge’ in the Claimant’s Witness Statement (para 31).

 

No further justification or breakdown has been provided as required under Civil Procedure Rule 16.4. 51. In the event the court has somehow allowed Protection of Freedom Act to apply, then para 4(5) Schedule 4, Protection of Freedom Act, states,

 

‘the maximum sum which may be recovered from the keeper is the amount specified in the notice to keeper’ which in this case is £100.

 

52. In the more likely event that Protection of Freedom Act 2012 does not apply to this case, then the Claimant still must demonstrate how these alleged additional costs have been occurred otherwise it would appear to be an attempt at double recovery.

 

53. In previous parking charge cases, it has been found that the parking charge is a sum so high that it includes the cost of recovery. In the case the Claimant cited, Parking Eye Ltd v Beavis (2015) UKSC 67.

 

It was held that the sum (£85) had already incorporated the costs of a private parking business model as it was inflated so as to comfortably cover all costs.

 

The Supreme Court held that a parking firm which is not in [exclusive] possession cannot plead any part of their case in damages. The case provides precedent that £85 (or up to a Trade Body ceiling of £100 depending on the parking firm) covers the costs of the letters.

 

Is there any point in revisiting the fact that the initial speculative invoice (which I never received anyway) was issued more than 14 days after the alleged incident anyway?

 

Should that alone not merit the throwing out of the case to start with?

Edited October 22, 2021 by dx100uk
Please refrain from posting a massive block of unspaced text ..took me 15 mins to space and understand it!!!....dx

[notpayingapenny]

Post 123 on that link has no attachment and post 122 which does have an attachment "Draft C2 WS2" in sections 43 to 53 seems to be talking about an issue in a car park not a bus stand and has nothing about a unicorn food tax. Am I looking in the wrong place? 

[notpayingapenny]

What I am finding is this .... 

#123  

Posted October 11

Just knocked off work now and have just read the first three points of Walley's!  Will get back to you later.

I will search for the one you are describing though.

[notpayingapenny]

Thanks. That on my device was post 120.

[notpayingapenny]

Thank you. I am onto it now and will post my final ws here as per your most valuable recommendations before sending it off on Monday morning.

[notpayingapenny]

I am just adding paragraph 10 with this text, "The clearest point on section 4.1 of the Protection of Freedoms act is that “The provisions in Schedule 4 are intended to apply only on private land in England and Wales. Public highways are excluded as well as any parking places on public land which are either provided or controlled by a local authority (or other government body). Any land which already has statutory controls in relation to the parking of vehicles (such as byelaws applying to airports, ports and some railway station car parks) is also excluded.” Therefore, as this case pertains to an airport, VCS illegally obtained the registered keeper’s details against my vehicle. Thus, on this basis alone, I implore the court to throw out this case."

[notpayingapenny]

Just added also paragraph 11 stating "

Notwithstanding the above point, if perchance Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms act 2012 were to apply, VCS should prove that they complied with the requirements of section 7 stating, “(1)A notice which is to be relied on as a notice to driver for the purposes of paragraph 6(1)(a) is given in accordance with this paragraph if the following requirements are met.

The notice must — (a)specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;” Without such proof the court must of necessity throw out this case forthwith."

[notpayingapenny]

My WS as I intend to send it... any problems anyone can spot?

 

 

 

 

In the county court at Middlesbrough Claim No: 

Between

Vehicle Control Services Limited

(Claimant)

V

 

(Defendant)

Witness Statement

Introduction

1. It is admitted that the Defendant is the registered keeper of XXnn XXX

 

Locus standi/bye-laws and Relevant land

2. Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedom Act 2012 (PoFA) allows recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle. However, the first paragraph 1 (1) (a) states that it only applies “in respect of parking of the vehicle on relevant land:”. The definition of “relevant land” is given in paragraph 3 (1) where subsection (c) excludes “any land ... on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control”. 

3. The bus stop is not on relevant land because the public road on which that stand is on is covered by the Road Traffic Act. 

4. Notwithstanding that the claimant claims that " the claimant has given the Defendant its contractual licence to enter the site", the claimant has not given any contractual licence whatsoever. This is a road leading to/from the airport which is covered by the Road Traffic Act. 

5. A list of highways on the Highways act 1980 does not even exist. The defendant brings the attention of the court that VCS is using this non existent document issue as a deliberate strategy to debunk the fact that this road is not relevant land. VCS are put to strict proof that it is relevant land not covered by the Road Traffic Act nor by Byelaws.

6. While it is true that landowners can bring in their own terms, it is also true that whatever terms they bring  cannot overrule Byelaws and the Road Traffic Act.

7. If Bye Laws are involved then the bus stop is not relevant land and neither is the specious argument about First Great Western Ltd. Is the claimant ignorant of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012? The road outside of Doncaster Sheffield Airport is not relevant land and is not covered by the Protection of Freedoms Act. That makes the charge against the claimant tantamount to fraud or extortion.

8. The claimant mentions a couple occasions where they have won such cases. It is brought to the attention of the court that none of those cited cases were on airport land. VCS actually has also lost a lot more cases than they have won using their prohibitive signs.  Airport land is covered by Bye Laws and hence the claim by VCS is not applicable in this instance. The remit of VCS ends in the car park and does not extend to the bus stops on public roads or land which they have no jurisdiction over.

9. All classes of people go to the airport. This includes travellers, taxis, fuel bowsers, airport staff, companies delivering food and drink for each aircraft, air traffic controllers and buses with passengers. It is therefore absolutely ridiculous to attribute VCS with any sort of permissions. The defendant submits that VCS should not confuse a major thoroughfare with a car park and presume to act as land owners and usurp the control of any land which is not relevant to them.

 

Protection of Freedoms Act

10. The clearest point on section 4.1 of the Protection of Freedoms act is that “The provisions in Schedule 4 are intended to apply only on private land in England and Wales. Public highways are excluded as well as any parking places on public land which are either provided or controlled by a local authority (or other government body). Any land which already has statutory controls in relation to the parking of vehicles (such as byelaws applying to airports, ports and some railway station car parks) is also excluded.” Therefore, as this case pertains to an airport, the claimant unlawfully obtained the registered keeper’s details against the defendant’s vehicle. Thus, on this basis alone, the defendant implores the court to throw out this case.

11. Notwithstanding the above point, if perchance Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms act 2012 were to apply, the claimant is put to strict proof that they complied with the requirements of section 7 stating, “(1)A notice which is to be relied on as a notice to driver for the purposes of paragraph 6(1)(a) is given in accordance with this paragraph if the following requirements are met.

The notice must — (a)specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;” Without such proof the court must of necessity throw out this case forthwith.

 

Deceit, Intimidation and Extortion

12. The Claimant’s Particulars of Claim include £50 legal costs, yet in the letter dated  03/06/2021, the Claimant stated that they were no longer represented by Elms Legal and all further correspondence should be sent to the VCS in-house litigation department. Why should the Claimant be asking the Defendant to contribute to their employee’s salary? 

13. Furthermore, as per another letter dated 30th July 2021, the Claimant wrote, ‘Should you fail to accept our offer of settlement then we will proceed to Trial and bring this letter to the Court’s attention upon question of costs in order seek further costs of £220 incurred in having to instruct a local Solicitor to attend the hearing in conjunction with the amount claimed on the Claim Form.’ I find this an extraordinary statement given the Claimant knows legal costs are capped at £50 in Small Claims Court. I cannot think of any reason why the Claimant would write this letter other than to intimidate the opposing party with the threat of an extortionate sum of money, hoping they would be able to take advantage of someone not knowing the Small Claims Court rules. Given that this letter came from the Claimant’s in-house litigation department, clearly well-versed in the law, this cannot be anything but deceitful and disingenuous behaviour which the court should never tolerate. 

 

Contractual costs / debt recovery charge 

14. In addition to the £50 legal costs, the Claimant is seeking recovery of the original £100 parking charge plus an additional £60 which is described as ‘debt collection costs’. In the Vehicle Control Service v Claim Number: 18 on 4th September 2019, District Judge Jones-Evans stated, ‘Upon it being recorded that District Judge Jones-Evans has over a very significant period of time warned advocates […] in many cases of this nature before this court that their claim for £60 is unenforceable in law and is an abuse of process and is nothing more than a poor attempt to go behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Beavis which inter alia decided that a figure of £160 as a global sum claimed in this case would be a penalty and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss and therefore unenforceable in law and if the practice continued he would treat all cases as a claim for £160 and therefore a penalty and unenforceable in law. It is hereby declared […] the claim be struck out and declared to be wholly without merit and an abuse of process.’ 

15. In Claim number F0DP806M and F0DP201T, Britannia v Crosby went further in a landmark judgement in November 2019 which followed several parking charge claims being struck out in the area overseen by His Honour Judge Iain Hamilton-Douglas Hughes GC, the Designated Civil Judge for Dorset, Hampshire, Isle of White & Wiltshire. District Judge Taylor echoed the earlier General Judgement or Orders of District Judge Grand stating, ‘It is ordered that the claim is struck out as an abuse of process. The claim contains a substantial charge additional to the parking charge which it is alleged the Defendant contracted to pay. This additional charge is not recoverable under the Protection of Freedom Acts 2012, Schedule 4 nor with reference to the judgment in ParkingEye v Beavis. It is an abuse of process from the Claimant to issue a knowingly inflated claim for an additional sum which it is not entitled to recover. This order has been made by the court of its own initiative without a hearing pursuant to CPR Rule 3.3(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998…’ Vehicle Control Service v Claim Number: 19 51. Moreover, the addition of costs not specified on signage are also in breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Schedule 2, specifically paras 6, 10 and 14. 

16. It is the Defendant’s position that the Claimant in this case has knowingly submitted inflated costs and thus the entire claim should be similarly struck out in accordance with Civil Procedure Rule 3.3(4). 

17. The Defendant is of the view that the Claimant knew, or should have known, that to claim in excess of £100 for a parking charge on private lands is disallowed under the Civil Procedure Rules, the Beavis Case, the Protection of Freedom Act 2012 and Consumer Rights Act 2015, and that relief from sanctions should be refused.

 

Alleged contract

18. The court should consider if there is any contract to start with and if the alleged offence is on relevant land. The consideration will inevitably lead the court to conclude that there is no contract. 

19. Also the court should note that there is no valid contract that exists between VCS and Peel.

20. Under the Companies Act, a contract should be signed by the directors of both companies and witnessed by two independent individuals. This alleged contract, which makes no mention of pursuing registered keepers of vehicles to court, makes its first appearance as a Witness Statement. Thus the alleged contract is null and void. 

21. The Beavis case referred to by the claimant is about parking in a car park. The claimant is here attempting to equate that case to stopping, not parking, in a bus stop and on a road that is covered by the Road Traffic Act.

22. The defendant submits that there can be no contract as there is no offer but there is only a prohibition. Again, it is not relevant land and VCS has absolutely no rights over it.

23. Further, the defendant would like to point out that motorists NEVER accept any contract just by entering the land. First they must read it and understand it and then, and only then can they realise that "No stopping" is prohibitive and cannot offer a contract.

 

Bus stop signage

24. The signs around the bus stop do not mention who issued the “No Stopping” signs so it could not have been issued by VCS since the IPC CoP states that their signs should include the IPC logo and that the creditor should be identified. Nothing on the signs around the bus stop that says “NO Stopping” mentions VCS or Peel Investments who are now purporting to be the land owners of a public road. As the signage should identify the creditor, since it does not, this is a breach of the CoP.  

25. The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 does not prohibit stopping in a restricted bus stop or stand, it prohibits stopping in a clearway.

26. The defendant would like to ask the court to consider if any clause of the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 that the claimant alleges has been violated by the defendant. There is no mention of permits on the signage. If there were, would it mean that Permit holders were allowed to stop on “No Stopping” roads?

27. Notwithstanding what the claimant calls it, the mentioned signage is NOT a contractual clause. A “No stopping” sign is not an offer of parking terms.  Since the signage around the bus stop is prohibitive, it is as such is incapable of forming a contract.

28. Further, the defendant would like to point out that the prohibitive sign is not actually at the bus stop but a few metres before the stand itself.

29. There is no mention of a £100 charge for breaching the “No stopping” request, or if there is one then it is far too small to read, even for a pedestrian.

30. As already stated, a Witness Statement between VCS and Peel Investments is not a valid document.

31. It will need more than the Claimants feather to outweigh the case against the Defendant regardless of who was driving.

32. There is no law of agency involved. This is not a case of employer/employee relationship. VCS cannot transfer the driver's liability to the registered keeper.

33. There can be no comparison between a railway station and an airport. This is a totally fatuous analogy which cannot be applied to this case. 

34. As stated in the defence, it is denied the Claimant is entitled to the recovery or any recovery at all. The nefarious parking charge notice given for a vehicle on a public road bus stop was ill advised to start with.

 

Conclusions:

 

35. VCS has failed to present ANY reasonable and valid cause to apply to the DVLA for the Defendants details.

36. VCS has failed to provide ANY valid  contract with the landowners.

• “No stopping” is prohibitive therefore cannot form a contract

• the event happened on a bus stop over which VCS has no jurisdiction

• the signage either does not show that there was a charge of £100 for stopping, or the font size was too small for any motorist to be able to read it 

• the signage does not show the Creditor which fails the IPC CoP and hence the signage is not valid

• the WS contract does not authorise VCS to pursue motorists to Court

37. Given all these factors it seems that VCS have breached the GDPR of the Defendant quite substantially and it would appear right that an exemplary award is made against VCS in the hope that they will drop all further cases at Doncaster airport where they are pursuing motorists on non relevant land.

38. The Defendant wishes to bring to the attention of the court that the Claimant cites an irrelevant case of a car park and tries to apply its merits to a bus stop. That in itself invalidates the entire fallacious claim.

39. Accordingly, this case is totally without merit. Some statements are pretty close to perjury and others are designed to mislead or misdirect. None of the analogies seem appropriate or relevant. All the false information presented as a statement of truth could have been stated using half the words and without all the repetition which appears to be trying to build a strong case where there is none at all. One particularly bad example of misdirection is in the photographs. The Clearway sign shown near the bus stop is very unclear unlike the Clearway sign two photos before it which may well include terms and conditions. The one by the bus stop is totally different.

 

47. Lastly I wish to bring to the attention of the court, a systematic pattern of the Claimant’s court action behaviour in several of their cases. They tend to have a VCS paralegal writing a Witness Statement, then mentioning in the last paragraph of the Witness Statement that they may be unable to attend court and subsequently the paralegals never turn up to be cross examined. In the event that Mohammed Wali is unable to attend court to be asked about his claims, then I would like to know why he is not able to attend when the hearing has been scheduled months in advance, is during working hours and as a result of covid, is online, meaning there is no travel involved. Ambreen Arshad, the other paralegal employed by VCS, does exactly the same. 

Edited October 24, 2021 by notpayingapenny
was missing numbering as plain text so pasted again as rich text format to include numbering

[notpayingapenny]

Thank you Dave. I am implementing the changes you have suggested. Will send the WS tomorrow morning via 2nd class postage with a proof of posting.

[notpayingapenny]

point 13 was copied and pasted verbatim from another thread as recommended by experts here so I presume they know what they are talking about.

[notpayingapenny]

one last question as i go to post ... do i sign the copy of the ws to vcs or send it unsigned?

[notpayingapenny]

10 hours ago, FruitSalad1010 said:

"the Defendant is therefore justified to make their own request to the court in accordance with CPR 27.14 (2) (g) to award their full costs outlined below to be paid by the Claimant."

sounds brilliant but though I like the idea, I am not sure what full costs to ask the court for here and what costs to outline.

20 minutes ago, dx100uk said:

You can sign it yes.

 

Dx

 

 

 

 

thanks

[notpayingapenny]

I wonder if there is anything else I need to do for Monday which is the hearing date?
Also, how could I claim the time off work if I work for myself without a registered business?

[notpayingapenny]

Case has been adjourned to the next available date as some supplementary WS was served to the courts but not to me. Claimant instructed to mail the supplementary WS within 24 days by post that they claim they sent to me but which I never received. Judge says costs are reserved.

 

Cheeky VCS wanted to "email" me the supplementary WS during the hearing and I refused to give them my address and told them I would not like to receive any emails from them and that they have been harassing me... so I was not interested. The judge said that without me having that document which they wanted to rely on then the case could not proceed if he was to be fair!

[notpayingapenny]

I was confident that my WS would have knocked them out! Maybe I should have left it for the last minute and sent it via a disposable email address last Friday by 12 noon! They would have been left without a chance to mess around and try to build supplementary nonsense!

I am sure with you guys backing me up we shall defeat them with their extortion!

[notpayingapenny]

A month ago the judge ordered VCS to mail the additional/supplementary witness statement they had against me within 14 days. I never received any to date. I hope that now the judge will just throw the case out.

[notpayingapenny]

I rang them and they say I should email them for them to act. I told them I will send a printed letter instead.

[notpayingapenny]

The case was adjourned to March 23.

 

Meanwhile I never received the supplementary WS from VCS. I emailed the court as instructed but never received any response to the email. A few weeks later I sent the same content that I had emailed to the court clerk and stated that I have not received any correspondence at all from VCS and that the court should just throw the case out and not allow VCS to continue wasting the court's time. I did not receive any reply from the court neither.

 

So now we are just almost 1 month before the hearing which was adjourned because of the missing supplementary WS and to date the supplementary WS is still missing! And I informed the court about this.

 

What, if anything should I do? I think I should just wait for 23 March and on that date state to the judge that I still never got the document since the last hearing.