Reference to 'United Kuwait' as an Authority was made because it was heard in the Supreme Court.

 

Apple

Hello Apple as I have posted Kuwait was in the exactly the same Court as Pender....

I have posted the links for both cases. Read them and you will see.

Ben

Hi Ben

 

Section 2 applies to Regulated Mortgages:

 

(5)This section does not apply in relation to—

 

(a)a contract to grant such a lease as is mentioned in section 54(2) of the M1Law of Property Act 1925 (short leases);

 

(b)a contract made in the course of a public auction; or

 

©a contract regulated under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, other than a regulated mortgage contract;]

 

 

Which means that all the Deeds that you posted could if they relate to any Regulated Mortgage be void as non of them make space for the Lenders signature.

 

Apple

s.2 of the LPMP applies the mortgage agreement not the mortgage deed.

Hi Ben....

 

(*) Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage [2010] 13th edition, page # 41 & 42, para # 3.6 states: "... Defective legal mortgage ... A document, which for some defect or form (but which is otherwise valid), fails to take effect as a legal mortgage will, subject to what follows, will be a good equitable mortgage. The basis of this is the court's power specifically to perform a contract to create a legal interest in land. However, for an informally executed legal mortgage, made after 27th September 1989 to take effect as an equitable mortgage, it must nonetheless comply with the provisions of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, s2 in relation to the formalities required for the creation of an equitable mortgage ... Moreover, as informally executed mortgages are frequently executed only by the mortgagor, this may result in many such mortgages not creating any contract and security interest at all ... To be an equitable mortgage, the instrument must comply with s.2 of the 1989; United bank of Kuwait -v- Sahib [1997] CH 107 CA. This in turn means that the document must bear the signatures of both parties. Compliance with the requirements of the Law of Property Act 1925 s53(1)a), which provides that only the signature of the person disposing of the equitable interest (i.e. the mortgagor) is insufficient ..." (*).

 

source: http://voidmortgage.socialgo.com/topic/13/fisher-and-lightwoods-law-of-mortgage

 

 

Applecart

You are confusing yourself in terms of the relevance of s.2 to the mortgage agreement and mortgage deeds.

Please read the eagle star case for clarification

I am away for the rest of the day.. I will respond further tomorrow. In the mean time, please Apple read and digest what has been posted..

The necessity for validity of a Deed are different to what you misunderstand as the formalities for any contract in relation to the creation of an in interest in relation to land...'Delivery' is a 'formality' that is specific to deeds under the LPA 1925 s.52 - by virtue of LPMP Act, CA 2006, LPA s.74 etc....simply put....it means the same as the Lenders obligation to sign the Deed as much as would be necessary for the Lender to sign a contract that creates an interest - except the Formalities of 'Delivery' go back 400 yrs - not that the solicitor has attested the Borrowers signature....

The Formality in relation to a Deed is 'execution' as well as 'delivery'

That said 'delivery' provides that both the Lender and Borrower must have intended to be bound - the Borrowers right to redemption is a legal implication of the interest in the creation of the Lenders interest in his home in favour of the Borrower - section 2 makes no such provision of 'delivery' for a 'contract for sale' or a document that relies on s.53 makes no provision for a Borrowers redemption rights and is tantamount to a 'clog' on the Borrowers legal remedy to redemption.

Applecart

You are confusing yourself in terms of the relevance of s.2 to the mortgage agreement and mortgage deeds.

 

Please read the eagle star case for clarification

No Ben, what you are implying is that 'Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage [2010] 13th edition is 'confusing' you given that it contradicts the points you are seeking to establish....

Your point in relation to Eagle Star speaks only of the formality of 'execution' - the Judge simply said '" A deed is a different kind of instrument from an ordinary contract; and it is not a requirement of the execution of a deed that it should comply with the requirements of section 2 of the 1989 Act."

Execution in that sense in relation to the Borrower - simply means that the Borrowers signature showed that he had 'executed' the Deed - had the Greens argued the point further under Section 1 (2) and showed that whilst they had complied - that the Lenders compliance is by virtue of CA 2006, - then, I think the outcome may have been different - for the argument would have brought into play the necessity of 'Delivery' - which is the Lenders duty to 'Accept' the Deed.....

The formality of a Deed includes the necessity of both 'execution' and 'delivery' - they are not stand alone requirements - they are integral to the creation of a Valid Deed.

It overstates the formalities of what we take for granted as the 'execution' of a contract - but, it means the same thing.

Apple

I am away for the rest of the day.. I will respond further tomorrow. In the mean time, please Apple read and digest what has been posted..

Ok, have a good day - we will get back to this when you free in due course : )

Apple

Good Morning Apple

I hope you are well

I think we need to go over both the United Bank of Kuwait and the Pender cases, as it would appear that the point I have previously made has been lost. Therefore, I will break it down further, to clarify my point.

As we already know, you said -

CASE LAW....There is:

 

United Bank of Kuwait PLC v Sahib & Ors [1996] EWCA Civ 1308 - Supreme Court....

 

In Brief......in this particular case..LORD JUSTICE PETER GIBSON was tasked with a similar issue that will face any court, when a Borrower brings a challenge where the deeds are not signed by the lender - he begins:

 

'since 1783 a deposit of title deeds relating to a property by way of security has been taken to create an equitable mortgage of that property without any writing notwithstanding section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677 and its successor, section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925.

 

The main question that arises on this appeal is whether this much criticised but well established rule has survived the coming into force of section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989...'

 

At page 4 (beginning) he says: 'The effect of section 2 is, therefore, that a contract for a mortgage of or charge on any interest in land or in the proceeds of sale of land can only be made in writing and only if the written document incorporates all the terms which the parties have expressly agreed and is signed by or on behalf of each party'

 

This case was not an 'application' seeking permission to appeal - this was an actual 'appeal' and is an Authority...Lower courts are bound by it.... unlike Paragon v Pender..if I am wrong as to that, then I'm more than sure others will argue the point in time....but I think not : )

In another post in this thread you said -

In the Penders case they had made an application seeking permission to appeal - that application was dismissed summarily by 3 lordships.....the dismissal of the application to appeal has been confused as an 'authority' for all things 'securitisation' ever since.

 

The confusion has been caused simply because the application was heard as an 'oral' application, the 'oral' application went before a singly judge, who agreed the application, upon that agreement, it went before 3 lordships who were looking to decide if permission to appeal should be allowed, out of time, and stay of execution....they decided on the facts of that case, that they would not grant the right to appeal... The summarily judgment is and was not final, and nor can it be considered to be so either... on the ground that it was a decision from an oral hearing for permission to appeal...

In response to your assertion that United Bank of Kuwait is binding and Paragon is not, I posted a number of extracts to demonstrate the similarities in terms of the legal process between the two cases to demonstrate that your assertion is incorrect. Regretfully, my posts have fallen on deaf ears, so I now feel it is time put this matter beyond any doubt.

Let us first look at where the United Bank of Kuwait case was heard -

So the United Bank of Kuwait case was heard "In the Supreme Court of the Judicature In the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)"

Now lets look at where the Pender case was heard

The Pender case was heard "In the Supreme Court of the Judicature In the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)"

So the first point I would make is that both the United Bank of Kuwait Case and the Pender case were heard "In the Supreme Court of the Judicature In the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)"

links to United Bank of Kuwait and the Pender cases

Now that we have established beyond any doubt that both cases were heard "In the Supreme Court of the Judicature In the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)", I turn to the matter of who heard each case.

As I have previously posted -

 

http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-to-court/court-of-appeal

 

"Bringing an appeal is subject to obtaining ‘permission’, which may be granted by the court below or, more usually, by the Court of Appeal itself. Applications for permission to appeal are commonly determined by a single Lord Justice, full appeals by two or three judges. The Civil Division of the Court Appeal also deals with family cases."

So we can establish that an application to appeal (obtaining 'permission') is usually determined by a single Lord Justice whereas full appeals by two or three judges.

First we turn to the United Bank of Kuwait

Kuwait was before Lord Justice Leggatt, Lord Justice Peter Gibson & Lord Justice Phillips.

If we now turn to the Pender case -

Pender was heard before Lord Justice Ward, Lord Justice Jonathan Parker and Lord Justice Carnwath.

We are therefore able to establish that both cases were heard before three judges. As per the above extract, this would indicate that both were in fact full appeals and that Pender was not an application to appeal as you have repeatedly asserted previously.

As I have posted previously the similarities between the two cases do not stop there and continue.

links to United Bank of Kuwait and the Pender cases

To recap

We have now established beyond any doubt that both cases were

• heard "In the Supreme Court of the Judicature In the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)"
  
• and that they were both heard by three judges (indicating a full appeal and not an application as you have asserted in the case of Pender).
  

Now we turn to the actual wording of each case. As before we first look at the United Bank of Kuwait case. -

As stated above the first four word of the second paragraph read "This is an appeal".

We now turn to Pender -

The very first four words of Pender are "This is an appeal"

We have now established beyond any doubt that both cases state that they are appeals and not application for appeals.

In response to this observation you said -

The Penders appeal process came unstuck.... they did not win the right to overturn the lower courts decision - that's all the decision says and stands for.......I'm conscious that courts have been persuaded to rely on its findings....but it does not change the fact that it is.... simply what it is.... the appeal courts decision to refuse the Penders the right to overturn the lower courts decision.

 

The divisional court (made up of 3 lordships) dismissed the appeal.....that is.... they denied the Penders the right to the opportunity to overturn the lower courts decision.....

 

Had the divisional court (the 3 lordships) 'allowed' the appeal....and they say 'I allow this appeal', 'I agree', 'I agree'..... then....it would be the outcome from there.... that would be of interest... and.....what you assert.....would make a lot more sense......to me... and no doubt many others....

 

Apple

You say that Pender could not have been an appeal as the three judges dismissed the appeal. However you insist that the United Bank of Kuwait was an appeal.

I think to respond to this point, we need to look at the outcome of both cases further.

links to United Bank of Kuwait and the Pender cases

As you correctly point out, in the case of Pender the appeal was dismissed

Therefore, if we follow your reasoning the outcome of the United Bank of Kuwait must be different to the outcome of Pender being the appeal is dismissed.

Now we turn to the outcome of the United Bank of Kuwait case -

As confirmed by the above Lord Justice Gibson states "I would dismiss this appeal"

As confirmed by the above Lord Justice Philips states "I agree this appeal should be dismissed"

As confirmed by the above Lord Justice Leggatt agrees with Lord Justice Gibson

The order of the Court is also confirmed by the above as being "Appeal Dismissed"

We can now establish that in both cases the appeal was dismissed.

links to United Bank of Kuwait and the Pender cases

To recap everything -

We can establish beyond any doubt that

1) both cases were heard "In the Supreme Court of the Judicature In the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)"

2) both cases were heard by three judges

3) both cases state that they are appeals (not applications)

4) In both cases the appeal's were dismissed.Despite all of the above similarities, you consider that a United Bank of Kuwait is binding and that Pender is not.Your opinion appears to be based upon your asserted understanding and knowledge of the administrative process (as you have previously posted in your post #58 )

The posted similarities bring into question, your asserted understanding and knowledge of the administrative process and your view that the United Bank of Kuwait is binding whilst Pender is not.

I now turn to your argument in terms of the fact that a lender must sign the mortgage deed for it to be valid and that without the signature of the lender, you argue that the mortgage deed is void and unenforceable.

No Ben, what you are implying is that 'Fisher and Lightwood's Law of Mortgage [2010] 13th edition is 'confusing' you given that it contradicts the points you are seeking to establish....

 

Your point in relation to Eagle Star speaks only of the formality of 'execution' - the Judge simply said '" A deed is a different kind of instrument from an ordinary contract; and it is not a requirement of the execution of a deed that it should comply with the requirements of section 2 of the 1989 Act."

 

Execution in that sense in relation to the Borrower - simply means that the Borrowers signature showed that he had 'executed' the Deed - had the Greens argued the point further under Section 1 (2) and showed that whilst they had complied - that the Lenders compliance is by virtue of CA 2006, - then, I think the outcome may have been different - for the argument would have brought into play the necessity of 'Delivery' - which is the Lenders duty to 'Accept' the Deed.....

 

The formality of a Deed includes the necessity of both 'execution' and 'delivery' - they are not stand alone requirements - they are integral to the creation of a Valid Deed.

 

It overstates the formalities of what we take for granted as the 'execution' of a contract - but, it means the same thing.

 

Apple

From reading your post, it would appear that you did not actually read my post of that you misunderstood it. For your convenience I will post it again for you. To prevent any misunderstanding, I am not confused by Fisher and Lightwood's.

If you read the below case again, you will note that your points in terms of United Bank of Kuwait and s.2 (thus your reference to Fisher and Lightwood's) do not support your argument.

The reason why both United Bank of Kuwait PLC v Sahib & Ors [1996] EWCA Civ 1308 and section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 are irrelevant to your argument in terms of the lender signing the mortgage deed can be found in

Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd v Green & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 1389 (8 August 2001)

13. Mr Green referred to some passages in the report of the Law Commission which led to the bill enacted in the 1989 Act. He referred to passages in the Law Commission Paper No.164, in particular 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8. He also referred to a number of authorities. I think the most important of these (because it was concerned with a mortgage, while the other cases he referred to concerned contracts for the sale of land) was United Bank of Kuwait Plc v Sahib [1997] Ch at 107. I have been supplied with a copy in [1996] 3 All ER 251. That is an important case. It decided that the requirements contained in section 2 of the 1989 Act to the effect that a contract for the sale or other disposition in land must be in writing in a single document incorporating all the terms and signed by the parties, abolished the rule that a mere deposit of title deeds relating to property by way of security created a mortgage or charge. Following the 1989 Act the rule had changed. There had to be a written document, not merely a deposit of title deeds by way of security in order to create a mortgage or charge.

 

14. Mr Green relied on that for the proposition that the same should apply to this case because there was, in this case, within the mortgage deed a contract by him in the form of the covenant to repay. There were also contractual provisions or covenants by Eagle Star. So, he said, if the mortgage in United Bank of Kuwait v Sahib was governed by section 2 of the 1989 Act, so should this mortgage with similar results for its enforceability.

 

15. In my judgment this argument does not stand any real prospect of success. This is not a case of a contract: it is a case of a deed. If we were simply dealing with a contract to create a mortgage then Mr Green would be right. But in this case he and Miss Challis have actually executed a deed. It is clear from the provisions of the 1989 Act itself that a distinction is drawn between the formal requirements affecting the execution of deeds and the formal requirements governing contracts. Section 1 makes alterations to the law about the execution of deeds. For example, they are no longer required to be written on any particular kind of substance and a seal is not required for the valid execution of an instrument as a deed by an individual. There are a number of detailed provisions in section 1 relating to deeds. Section 2 does not apply to deeds; it applies to contracts. It may be a contract for the sale of land, it may be a contract for some other kind of disposition of an interest in land, one other kind of disposition being a transfer by way of security over what is commonly called a mortgage or charge.

 

16. In this case, as Mr Green points out, there is no preceding contract for the creation of the mortgage in issue. He draws the conclusion from that that the contract must be in the deed. In my judgment that is a misunderstanding. A deed is a different kind of instrument from an ordinary contract; and it is not a requirement of the execution of a deed that it should comply with the requirements of section 2 of the 1989 Act. That is clear. Section 1 refers throughout to deeds, section 2 refers throughout to contracts, clearly recognising that they are two different legal concepts

 

17. In my judgment the case in United Bank of Kuwait v Sahib does not help Mr Green, because that was a case where there was no deed, unlike this case. There was in that case a purely informal equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. That had no effect because, as a contract, it was required to comply with section 2 and it did not comply. In my judgment His Honour Judge Jones was right to reject the submission that Mr Green made on the effect of section 2. Having referred to the point that it was unarguable, he said:

 

"Section two applies to a contract for the sale of an interest in land or a contract for some other disposition in relation to land. A contract to create a mortgage would obviously have to comply with section two and if it did not then it would not be a valid contract.

 

However, in this case there was no contract for the mortgage, there was simply the execution of the mortgage deed. That mortgage deed is a mortgage deed. It is not a contract to create a mortgage. I need really say no more than that about it."

 

18. He went on to refer to United Bank of Kuwait v Sahib, and correctly concluded that it did not assist Mr Green's case, as it was only concerned with the creation of an equitable charge and there was no deed in that case. I agree with the reasons given by His Honour Judge Jones. It follows that this point would not succeed on an appeal and therefore there is no point in my granting permission to appeal on that point.

 

Of course I could point out that where it states -

 

" A deed is a different kind of instrument from an ordinary contract; and it is not a requirement of the execution of a deed that it should comply with the requirements of section 2 of the 1989 Act."

 

The requirements he refers to, is the requirement argued by Mr Green and Applecart that a mortgage deed must be signed by the lender.

 

"In my judgment this argument does not stand any real prospect of success. This is not a case of a contract: it is a case of a deed. If we were simply dealing with a contract to create a mortgage then Mr Green would be right. But in this case he and Miss Challis have actually executed a deed."

 

But that would be pointing out the obvious

As you appear to have missed the pertinent points the first time, I will emphasis them again in my next post.

1) "In my judgment the case in United Bank of Kuwait v Sahib does not help Mr Green, because that was a case where there was no deed,unlike this case"

To avoid any confusion in the case of United Bank of Kuwait, there was no mortgage deed

2) "There was in that case a purely informal equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. That had no effect because, as a contract, it was required to comply with section 2 and it did not comply."

As posted - "It decided that the requirements contained in section 2 of the 1989 Act to the effect that a contract for the sale or other disposition in land must be in writing in a single document incorporating all the terms and signed by the parties, abolished the rule that a mere deposit of title deeds relating to property by way of security created a mortgage or charge. Following the 1989 Act the rule had changed. There had to be a written document, not merely a deposit of title deeds by way of security in order to create a mortgage or charge."

3) In my judgment His Honour Judge Jones was right to reject the submission that Mr Green made on the effect of section 2. Having referred to the point that it was unarguable, he said:

"Section two applies to a contract for the sale of an interest in land or a contract for some other disposition in relation to land. A contract to create a mortgage would obviously have to comply with section two and if it did not then it would not be a valid contract.

However, in this case there was no contract for the mortgage, there was simply the execution of the mortgage deed. That mortgage deed is a mortgage deed. It is not a contract to create a mortgage. I need really say no more than that about it."

To be clear Eagle Star confirms that s.2 applies to mortgage contracts and not to mortgage deeds.

Unlike s.2 of the LPA MP (which applies to contracts) s.1 (which applies to mortgage deeds) does not include a provision that the document must be signed by both parties which is the point made -

" A deed is a different kind of instrument from an ordinary contract; and it is not a requirement of the execution of a deed that it should comply with the requirements of section 2 of the 1989 Act."

I now turn to your post -

You say

Execution in that sense in relation to the Borrower - simply means that the Borrowers signature showed that he had 'executed' the Deed - had the Greens argued the point further under Section 1 (2) and showed that whilst they had complied - that the Lenders compliance is by virtue of CA 2006, - then, I think the outcome may have been different - for the argument would have brought into play the necessity of 'Delivery' - which is the Lenders duty to 'Accept' the Deed.....

I will first address your assertion that 'Delivery' is the lenders duty to 'accept' the deed.

This point has already been covered in the main mortgage deed thread. However, for the benefit of anyone that has not read that thread, I will repeat the information below -

Chitty on Contracts (31st Edition, volumes 1 & 2), page 88 section 1-113

Apple, you assert that 'Delivery' is the lenders duty to 'accept' the deed. However, Chitty confirms that delivery is "namely, an act done so as to evince an intention to be bound. - Any act of the party which shows that he intended to deliver the deed as an instrument is enough"

As you are fully aware as part of the home buying process the purchaser once he has executed his deed, gives it to his legal representative to send to the HMLR for registration following the release of funds by the lender.

The act of the mortgage deed being sent to the HMLR for registration is enough to show that the purchaser intends to be bound by his deed.

Therefore, delivery takes place.

The purchasers legal representative will confirm to the lender that they are in receipt of the executed mortgage deed. In acceptance of the deed granted by the purchaser the lender will release the funds (provided the purchase of the property proceeds).

In response to your comment

"'executed' the Deed - had the Greens argued the point further under Section 1 (2) and showed that whilst they had complied - that the Lenders compliance is by virtue of CA 2006, - then, I think the outcome may have been different"

You are correct that s1 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 relates to the execution of a deed by an individual and that the Companies Act 2006 relates to the execution of a deed by in reference to this debate the lender.

However, the important point you choose to either overlook or ignore is that neither specifies that a mortgage deed must be signed by both the borrower and the lender.

Each only refers to when either an individual or a company executes his/her/its own deed that it has granted.

If it really was the intention of legislation that a mortgage deed had to be signed by both the borrower and the lender, it would say that as it does in the case of a mortgage contract (s.2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989).

Despite the circles we have continued to go around in the course of this debate, nothing that has been posted expressly confirms that both parties must sign the mortgage deed. Case law, such as Eagle Star which specifically relates to a mortgage deed that has not been signed by the lender (unlike Kuwait and the other cases you have posted), confirms that it does not have to be signed by the lender to be valid and enforceable.

Nothing in subsequent legislation has altered that fact, as yet.

Let's remember that legal precedent establishes principles that lower courts adopt when dealing with subsequent cases with similar facts.

As an example of how you have not grasped the issue can be found in your many posts.

The following is by way of an example -

Such success for the Borrower can be found so far in:

 

Silver Queen Maritime Ltd v Persia Petroleum Services [2010]

 

Silver says 'YES' by confirming that if the lender has not signed then it is a deed in escrow - awaiting performance from the lender and that a deed in escrow is not 'instant' and is therefore invalid until such time as it is signed or a complete nullity if the time of signing is way past a reasonable time...

If we look at Silver, we can see exactly what it confirms -

"116. In my view the relevant facts place the Settlement Deed firmly in the second of the three categories identified by Nourse LJ in Longman v Viscount Chelsea. This was an escrow. In other words, the Settlement Deed, when sent by Memery Crystal, in accordance with their instructions, to King & Spalding on 21 July 2009 was in the class of document described by Farwell LJ in the Foundling Hospital case (at p 377) as one which is "delivered upon a condition on the performance of which it will become a deed, and will take effect as from the delivery". The conditions, and the only conditions, upon which the Settlement Deed was delivered were those set in the e-mail sent at 5.01 p.m. on 21 July 2009 by Memery Crystal to King & Spalding to which it was attached, namely, first, that it was to be signed for Silver Queen, and secondly, that it was then to be sent back to Memery Crystal. Those conditions had both been discharged when King & Spalding's e-mail of 4.04 p.m. on 22 July 2009 was sent to Memery Crystal, whereupon the Settlement Deed took effect as a deed. Thus the escrow conditions were promptly discharged, and there is no room in the present case for any argument that their performance was unreasonably delayed (see Harman LJ's caveat in Beesly v Hallwood Estates (at p 118)). Being irrevocable from the time of its delivery as an escrow, the Settlement Deed could not be recalled by PPS pending its taking effect. Thus PPS's purported withdrawal "from the exchange of the settlement agreement" in Memery Crystal's e-mail of 8.15 a.m. on 22 July 2009 was not, and could not be, an effective revocation of it."

The deed was only delivered in escrow, because of conditions set by Memery Crystal to King & Spaldingin an email of 21 July 2009. Those conditions being -

1) that it was to be signed for Silver Queen

2) that it was then to be sent back to Memery Crystal

As you are fully aware when a borrower delivers his deed (evidenced by it being sent to the HMLR for registration) the borrower does not set an escrow condition that it has to be signed by the lender before it takes effect.

Therefore, you have misunderstood the relevance of this case and the support you considered it gave your argument. On the contrary it merely serves to disprove rather than prove your argument.

If you are so sure about the basis of your opinion that a mortgage deed that has not been signed by the lender is void, why don't you request a copy of your own mortgage deed and as you have suggested to others

Once you have a copy of your mortgage deeds and you are as sure as you can be that your lender has not signed the deed, this link is to the application form required to be completed if you decide to go direct to the Adjudicator at HMLR..:

 

http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/forms/tribunals/ahmlr/RectifyOrDocuments.pdf

 

Hope this helps?

 

Applecart

Then you can report back on CAG if you was successful.

I wish you the best of luck in your future endeavors. However, before you recommend or suggest a course of action, such as you have in relation to mortgage deeds, you should really ensure that the argument is tried and tested before you portray it as a matter of fact or as a matter of law rather than just your own untested personal opinion.

I hope that my posts have been of assistance to you and others.

Before responding, as I know you will. Could you digest what has been posted, especially in regards to your opinion of which cases are binding and which are not and also in regards to there not being a statutory requirement for the lender to sign the mortgage deed for it to be valid and enforceable.

If nothing else Apple, I hope I have at the very least given you food for thought and highlighted some of the potential pitfalls that you (or others) may face if this argument was ever to be used in Court.

Unfortunately, I will not have access to CAG for the next few days (possibly up to 10 days) , so in the mean time I respectfully ask that you don't put your usual spin on my posts

Wow - someone has been busy.... I'm not even going to go there - LOL

I have posted updates here: http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/showthread.php?386717-Mortgage-Deed-Does-it-need-to-be-signed-by-the-lender&p=4203080#post4203080

It's where matters pertaining to whether deeds need be signed by both parties to it are being addressed.

If Ben wishes to open up another issue as to what is authority etc.... surely, he should be requested to start a new thread?

Apple

Good Afternoon Apple

Wow - someone has been busy.... I'm not even going to go there - LOL

Based upon your assertions about Kuwait and Pender - and the information I have since posted, if I was you, I wouldn't either

I have posted updates here: http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/showthread.php?386717-Mortgage-Deed-Does-it-need-to-be-signed-by-the-lender&p=4203080#post4203080

 

It's where matters pertaining to whether deeds need be signed by both parties to it are being addressed.

 

If Ben wishes to open up another issue as to what is authority etc.... surely, he should be requested to start a new thread?

 

 

Apple

A strange comment to make, as it was you that raised the issue in this thread in the first place, I have merely responded to your posts.

c'est la vie

Ben

Would it fair to ask if a lender's signature is required?

Hi tmb70

There is a thread dedicated to the said question...

see here: http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/showthread.php?386717-Mortgage-Deed-Does-it-need-to-be-signed-by-the-lender&highlight=mortgage+deed

Apple

Would it fair to ask if a lender's signature is required?

Hello TMB, it is fair to ask but the answer is a straight forward no.

The requirement has no basis in either case law or legislation.

It is an argument construed by a poster on CAG, with case law and legislation interpreted to support that argument. If you read the mortgage deed thread, you will see what legislation and case law actually has to say is very different to what certain parties would have us believe that it means.

When you have the time read the case law and legislation for yourself and it will all become clear without the need for anyone to interpret anything.

However, if you decide to follow the advice and suggestions made by Apple (as it would appear Apple isn't willing to do as he/she has advised), could you please post details of the results, it would be of great interest and assistance to others that may be considering a similar course of action.

All the best

Ben