Still nothing. Doubt they have anything (or their team of elves have not yet been able to copy and paste up something resembling it). Have stopped making any payments, and not heard any complaints from them about this. Not paying a penny more to them in absence of an agreement. Even if they do manage to produce an actual copy, then I shall contest it's compliance with the CCA, and have it declared unenforceable. If on the other hand they bodge something together.... then its' a fraud case. PM

Fair enough Sparkie, If you have already sent all such stuff off, then they have the option of either; reading it here first, or waiting and choking over their morning latte when it arrives in the mail at work. We're all certainly assured of your confidence here, sure your well in control of the matter, and waiting to see the outcome. We all wish the best, and support you on this, and I hope my post was not taken as being in any way critical of your handling of this affair. PM (may still be advisable to remove your and other witnesses personally identifiable info from posts though ) ?

Sparkie, This is all a fascinating read, and I along with many others have been keen to follow what is going on..... ... However, just wondering, given the seriousness of your case, and the sensitivity of it all, whether you should maybe play your cards a little closer to your chest at this given moment ? Remember, this is a public forum, and we do get guests here, including possibly perhaps those in opposition to you, who may then glean some advantage from reading what you've posted up? Just my own feeling, and the way I would maybe play things if it were me. Regards PM

IMHO, No they have not complied. The T&C's should be contemporary to the date of signing. In fact I would even suggest that as the T&C's are stated as supplied separately, then this would be unlawful. Such separation of documents means there is no way to prove what T&C's you actually agreed to, leaving the door open for them to just alter and adjust them at their own will. This cannot be right, and I'm sure there is something in the CCA about this.

Anyone interested in looking at Dave's case please look here: http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/general-debt-issues/84285-ccas-dave-against-world.html PS: Everyone, please do not post up anything other than your site name and maybe the lender your contemplating taking actions against. I ask this because, if this thread ends up cluttered with discussion etc, then it might be easy to miss the names of anyone who has posted an interest. PM

PM

If you think you may have a similar case, and perhaps contemplating similar actions then please post your interest here: http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/general-debt-issues/178176-contemplating-similar-case.html#post1923114 PM

Pleas post up your name here if your are contemplating a similar action to the one that davefirwalker is undertaking? Please, just post up your name (alias obviously, NOT your real name), and the name of the institution you are opposing. PLEASE DO NOT GO INTO ANY DETAIL (OR POST LINKS) ABOUT YOUR CASE HERE. SOMEONE WILL CONTACT YOU ONCE WE HAVE THOUGHT THINGS THROUGH. DO NOT WORRY IF WE DO NOT GET BACK TO YOUR SOON, IT DOES NOT MEAN WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN TALKING TO YOU, IT IS JUST GOING TO TAKE A SHORT WHILE BEFORE WE HAVE DECIDED WHAT TO DO. ALSO.... PLEASE... DO NOT PM US, IT FILLS UP OUR BOXES, AND THOSE ANNOYING LITTLE POP UPS ARE VERY IRRITATING WHEN YOU ARE TRYING TO DO OTHER STUFF !!! PM

I would just like to add, that I have been in contact by PM with Dave discussing this type of action. I MUST RE-ITERATE WHAT DAVE HAS JUST SAID; THIS TYPE OF CASE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO END UP IN A HIGH COURT, AND THE COST RISKS OF LOSING WOULD BE ENORMOUS !! Similar cases have indeed been brought by others in the past, and even won, but such people normally had legal representation (or came to an agreement out of court). So be very wary of pursuing such an action, even if you feel confident you have a good case, understand the principles and law, and confident of being able to argue your case. Remember: You will be up against very experienced professional barristers and lawyers, who do this kind of stuff every day..... and also charge enormous fees, which will be included in your costs liabilities should you lose !! We are contemplating another possible approach to this at the moment, so do not lose heart.... our day will come. We would be interested in perhaps hearing from anyone who thinks they may have a strong case, and were perhaps contemplating similar actions. I will start a thread and post up a link, please add your name to it, and and we will contact you in due course once we have decided what to do here. Do not worry if we do not get back to you straight away, it does not mean we are not interested in your case, we just need to talk and think things through first. PM

Any suggestions ? how about here? BBC NEWS | Entertainment | Arts | Fringe breaks phone box record

Well I quite liked the Princess Louise !!

I'll try to make it again......... (just remember to tell the barman which pub your REALLY going to though) !! PM PS: Someone sent me this funny email, just wanted to share it: Subject: Real Court Cases These are from a book called Disorder in the American Courts, and are things people actually said in court, word for word, taken down and now published by court reporters. ATTORNEY: Are you sexually active? WITNESS: No, I just lie there. _______________________________ ATTORNEY: What is your date of birth? WITNESS: July 18th. ATTORNEY: What year? WITNESS: Every year. _____________________________________ ATTORNEY: What gear were you in at the moment of the impact? WITNESS: Gucci sweats and Reeboks ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: This myasthenia gravis, does it affect your memory at all? WITNESS: Yes. ATTORNEY: And in what ways does it affect your memory? WITNESS: I forget. ATTORNEY: You forget? Can you give us an example of something you forgot? _____________________________________ ATTORNEY: How old is your son, the one living with you? WITNESS: Thirty-eight or thirty-five, I can't remember which. ATTORNEY: How long has he lived with you? WITNESS: Forty-five years. _____________________________________ ATTORNEY: What was the first thing your husband said to you that morning? WITNESS: He said, 'Where am I, Cathy?' ATTORNEY: And why did that upset you? WITNESS: My name is Susan. ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: Now doctor, isn't it true that when a person dies in his sleep, he doesn't know about it until the next morning? WITNESS: Did you actually pass the bar exam? ____________________________________ ATTORNEY: The youngest son, the twenty-one-year-old, how old is he? WITNESS: Uh, he's twenty-one. ________________________________________ ATTORNEY: Were you present when your picture was taken? WITNESS: Would you repeat the question? ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: So the date of conception (of the baby) was August 8th? WITNESS: Yes. ATTORNEY: And what were you doing at that time? WITNESS: Uh.... ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: She had three children, right? WITNESS: Yes. ATTORNEY: How many were boys? WITNESS: None. ATTORNEY: Were there any girls? ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: How was your first marriage terminated? WITNESS: By death. ATTORNEY: And by whose death was it terminated? ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: Can you describe the individual? WITNESS: He was about medium height and had a beard. ATTORNEY: Was this a male or a female? ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: Is your appearance here this morning pursuant to a deposition notice which I sent to your attorney? WITNESS: No, this is how I dress when I go to work. ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: Doctor, how many of your autopsies have you performed on dead people? WITNESS: All my autopsies are performed on dead people. ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: ALL your responses MUST be oral, OK? What school did you go to? WITNESS: Oral. ______________________________________ ATTORNEY: Do you recall the time that you examined the body? WITNESS: The autopsy started around 8:30 p.m. ATTORNEY: And Mr. Denton was dead at the time? WITNESS: No, he was sitting on the table wondering why I was doing an autopsy on him! ____________________________________________ ATTORNEY: Are you qualified to give a urine sample? WITNESS: Huh? ____________________________________________ And the best for last ATTORNEY: Doctor, before you performed the autopsy, did you check for a pulse? WITNESS: No. ATTORNEY: Did you check for blood pressure? WITNESS: No. ATTORNEY: Did you check for breathing? WITNESS: No. ATTORNEY: So, then it is possible that the patient was alive when you began the autopsy? WITNESS: No. ATTORNEY: How can you be so sure, Doctor? WITNESS: Because his brain was sitting on my desk in a jar. ATTORNEY: But could the patient have still been alive, nevertheless? WITNESS: Yes, it is possible that he could have been alive and practicing law.

Theyrcriminals Okay. A Subject Access Request is for information regards a "Subject". If they hold information on a company, and you are the director of that company, then it could be argued that that is information that should be revealed under such a request. However, how far reaching this is, and what information this encompasses is a a bit vague. Whether this would include statements I am unsure about? It could be argued, that this stuff should be included (particularly if the statements were headed and sent directly to either of you. The other issue is the joint partnership issue. If you were both down as recipients of statements, then this might raise some privacy issues, and you may ned to provide evidence of some joint consent. This all sounds a bit tricky, and I'm unsure were you should go here really. Perhaps others may have a better idea? Regards trying to force compliance through the courts. I have been down this route, and actually had a court appearance regards it. The outcome was, that in order for a judge to issue directions for ordering compliance, then he must be aware of a cause of action "that has some chance of success". Without a cause of action he unlikely to issue such. In my own case, he would not accept a simple plea of planning to take action over bank charges, as he believed that such a case was likely to be stayed, and possibly even fail anyhow. One other possible route is the CPR route? http://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/legal-issues/173201-why-you-shouldnt-use.html This might be possible to adapt for SAR purposes for info such as statements etc. But again, you would ned to identify an ongoing action or a planned action, so might run into the same problems? The other issue with both routes, is the costs implications. If you fail to get directions or compliance, you could then end up facing the other sides costs in dealing with the action. These could be substantial. Have a look at the thread above, and perhaps others may comment too. Regards Photoman

From House of Lords - Wilson & others v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (appellant) 147. The issues have arisen out of a simple moneylending transaction. Under an agreement made in January 1999 FCT lent Mrs Wilson £5000 for six months on the security of her motor car. The agreement was a 'regulated agreement' within the meaning of section 8 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Section 61 of the Act requires a document containing all the "prescribed terms" of a regulated agreement to be signed by the debtor. One of the prescribed terms is "the amount of the credit". FCT charged Mrs Wilson, inter alia, a £250 fee but, by agreement between them, the £250 was not paid by Mrs Wilson but instead was added to the £5000 to be repaid by her. In the document presented by FCT to Mrs Wilson for signing, and signed by her accordingly, "the amount of the credit" was stated to be £5250. But the £250 was "an item entering into the total charge for credit" (see section 9(4) of the Act) and, accordingly, was not part of "the amount of the credit" (see Schedule 6 to the 1983 Regulations: SI 1983 No 1553). In short, the document signed by Mrs Wilson did not, in the respect I have mentioned, contain the prescribed terms. This is what the bits in bold above are referring to: From the 1974 act: 9 Meaning of credit (1) In this Act “credit” includes a cash loan, and any other form of financial accommodation. (2) Where credit is provided otherwise than in sterling, it shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as provided in sterling of an equivalent amount. (3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the person by whom goods are bailed or (in Scotland) hired to an individual under a hire-purchase agreement shall be taken to provide him with fixed-sum credit to finance the transaction of an amount equal to the total price of the goods less the aggregate of the deposit (if any) and the total charge for credit. (4) For the purposes of this Act, an item entering into the total charge for credit shall not be treated as credit even though time is allowed for its payment. AND From the 1983 act: SCHEDULE 6 PRESCRIBED TERMS FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTIONS 61(1)(A)AND127(3)OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT ACT 1974 ( Regulation 6(1) ) TYPE OF AGREEMENT: 1. Restricted-use debtor-creditor-supplier agree-ments for fixed-sum credit, services, land or other things, the acquisition of which is to be financed by credit under the agree-ment. (a) to finance a transaction comprising the acquisition of goods, services, land or other things specified in the agreement or identified and agreed on at the time the agreement is made; (b) under which the total amount payable by the debtor is not greater than the total cash price; and © under which there is no advance payment. PRESCRIBED TERMS A term stating the amount of the credit, which maybe expressed as the total cash price of the goods, TYPE OF AGREEMENT 2. Agreements for fixed-sum credit not falling within paragraph 1. PRESCRIBED TERMS A term stating the amount of the credit. So.... This means basically, that if there is an "arrangement fee" or such similar payable in order to execute the loan...... and.... that same fee is then also included in the total cost for credit...... then by virtue of section 9 of the 1974 act, such fee is classed as "an item entering into the total charge for credit"..... and as such, it is not covered by the CCA74 act. Therefore.... the agreement is a "multiple agreement" !!! The loan for the "arrangement fee" is a separate loan, and should be treated as such. ie: be itemised with its own terms, schedule of payments, interest rate, and total credit,... or it should even be drawn up as a separate agreement !! But I've also realised this too !! By virtue of the fact that the "arrangement fee" is exempt from the act, it then makes it a "multiple agreement" (ie: part of the loan is covered by the 74 act, and part is not). Therefore ( amongst numerous other infractions ) if the signature box does not contain the following, it also falls foul of the signature box requirements: From the 1983 act: Schedule 5 part 1 (Form of signature box) requires 5/ Multiple agreements of which at least one part is a credit agreement not regulated by the Act. Form of Signature box: This is a Credit Agreement partly regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Sign it only if you want to be leg-ally bound by its terms. Signature(s) of Debtor(s) Date(s) of signature(s)* Note: 1 Creditor may omit "Date(s) of signature(s)" where, by virtue of Regulation 6(3)©, the date is not required. Comments anyone ??? PM

From Wilson case: 3. When Mrs Wilson signed her agreement and pawn receipt she was charged a 'document fee' of £250. This was added to the amount of her loan. In the agreement the amount of the loan was stated as £5,250. The amount payable on redemption was £7,327, made up of £5,250 and interest of £1,827. The annual percentage rate of interest was stated to be 94.78%. 4. The agreement was a regulated agreement for the purposes of section 8 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. A regulated agreement is not properly executed unless the document signed contains all the prescribed terms: section 61(1)(a). One of the prescribed terms is the 'amount of the credit': see the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983 (SI 1983/1553), regulation 6 and Schedule 6, para 2. The consequence of failure to state all the prescribed terms of the agreement is that the court is precluded, by section 127(3), from enforcing the agreement. In the absence of enforcement by the court the agreement is altogether unenforceable: section 65(1). 5. On 24 September 1999 His Honour Judge Hull QC, in a carefully reasoned judgment, held that the fee of £250 was part of the amount of the credit. So the agreement was enforceable. He reopened the agreement as an extortionate credit bargain and reduced the amount of interest payable by one half. Mrs Wilson appealed to the Court of Appeal. Pending the hearing of her appeal she paid First County Trust £6,900 to redeem her car. That was in December 1999. 6. The appeal was heard in November 2000, shortly after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. The Court of Appeal, comprising Sir Andrew Morritt V-C, and Chadwick and Rix LJJ, allowed Mrs Wilson's appeal: see [2001] QB 407. Sir Andrew Morritt V-C recognised there was considerable force in First County Trust's submissions in support of the judge's view. But having analysed the statutory provisions, the court held that the £250 added to the loan to enable Mrs Wilson to pay the document fee was not 'credit' for the purposes of the Consumer Credit Act. So one of the prescribed terms was not correctly stated. In consequence the agreement was unenforceable. So also was the security. First County Trust was ordered to repay the amount of £6,900 Mrs Wilson had paid the company after Judge Hull's judgment together with interest amounting to £662. The overall result was that Mrs Wilson was entitled to keep the amount of her loan, pay no interest and recover her car.

This is interesting, and I shall try to look into this myself (UK, please post up or PM me with any reference or links you may have in this area). Wondering if this could be particularly relevant in respect of "arrangement fees" added onto a loan ? In such circumstances, the arrangement fee is often not explained or justified in any way. There is simply a lump sum added onto the loan principal, with no explanation of how this sum has been determined? In my own case, the arrangement fee was simply added onto the principal, and then interest added onto the whole sum.... without a separate analysis or break down of how much interest, and how much was to be repaid due to both the original principal, and also the arrangement fee. Also, in such circumstance, is it right they should simply do this? Surely, if an arrangement fee is applicable, then the borrower should be offered the option of simply paying this upfront, rather than it simply taken for granted that the borrower wished to borrow it, and also prepared to incur interest upon such ? If i recall, I think the Wilson case has a great deal of relevance here; as a big part of the disagreement was due to the fact that an arrangement fee had simply been added onto the principal loan. I'm gonna look at Wilson again, and determine what the conclusion was regards this. PM

You make it sound like "The Oscars"..... ....... You forgot to mention; Your Agent. The Production crew. Your Hair and Make-up team....... and your stunt double !!!! PM

Here is the relevant section from Francis Bennions paper. Not of particular relevance for my own purposes, but interesting, and possibly of use to others: A worked example I conclude with a fully worked example concerning the sort of transaction that readers are likely to encounter in practice. A mortgage company (M) wishes to float a Scheme under which it would offer its existing borrowers a further advance facility combined with refinancing. M wants to call this a ‘Topup Loan’. While the loan under the original mortgage would be outside the Act either because its amount exceeded the statutory limit or because it would be an exempt agreement under the combined effect of section 16 and the Consumer Credit (Exempt Agreements) Order 1989, the further advance under the Scheme would in most cases be of an amount below £25,000 and for a non-exempt purpose. Nevertheless M wishes the Act not to apply. In this connection it is pertinent to note that, by virtue of article 2(2)© of the 1989 Order, a debtor-creditor agreement secured by a land mortgage to refinance any existing indebtedness of the debtor, whether to the creditor or another person, under any agreement by which the debtor was provided with credit for the purchase of land (including, by virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978 sections 5 and 23(1) and Schedule 1, buildings on the land) is an exempt agreement. By virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978 section 11 and the definition of ‘finance’ in section 189(1) of the 1974 Act, the term ‘refinance’ here means refinance wholly or partly. Within the meaning of the Consumer Credit Act the proposed Topup Loan would wholly refinance the outstanding obligations under the existing mortgage, but it would also provide an additional loan by way of further advance which, as stated above, would in many cases be of an amount below £25,000 and for a non-exempt purpose. The borrower would be required by a term of the agreement to use the refinancing element to pay off the earlier mortgage. Therefore that element would be for restricted-use credit within the meaning of section 11. On the other hand the further advance element would be for unrestricted-use credit. In such a case the agreement for the Topup Loan would be a multiple agreement within the meaning of section 18. It would be partly (so far as it refinanced the original mortgage) either an exempt agreement or outside the monetary limit of £25,000 and partly (so far as it provided a further advance not exceeding £25,000) a regulated agreement subject to the Act’s rules as to documentation etc. It would also be partly for restricted-use credit and partly for unrestricted-use credit. By apportionment under section 18(4) the deemed separate refinancing agreement would have the relevant parts of sums specified in the actual agreement, such as the principal and interest payments, allocated to it. The same would apply to the deemed separate further advance agreement. Thus a Topup Loan would be wholly within (1) the CCA category of ‘personal credit agreement’, (2) the CCA category of agreement for ‘fixed-sum credit’ and (3) the CCA category of ‘debtor-creditor agreement’. However only the part dealing with refinancing would be within the CCA category of ‘exempt agreement’. Again, only this refinancing element would be within the CCA category of ‘restricted-use credit agreement’. Only the element relating to the further advance would be within the CCA categories of ‘regulated agreement’ and ‘unrestricted-use credit agreement’. It follows that, no matter how the proposed Topup Loan agreement is worded, it must be a Class 1 agreement. The refinancing part and the further advance part must each be treated for the purposes of the Act as a separate agreement. Making the repayment and interest provisions identical for both types of credit would not, as Professor Goode would have us believe, turn it into a unitary agreement exempt from the Act. My analysis is confirmed by Example 16 in Schedule 2 to the Act.21.The example concerns the issue of a credit card for use in obtaining on credit either cash or goods. The analysis attached to this statutory example says that so far as it relates to goods the agreement is to be treated as a separate debtor-creditor-supplier agreement, while so far as it relates to cash it is to be treated as a separate debtor-creditor agreement. In defence of his own analysis, Professor Goode finds himself compelled to say that Example 16 is erroneous.22 He also says that Example 18 is erroneous! That statutory examples are admitted by him to be inconsistent with Professor Goode’s own analysis might rather be thought an indication that it is the latter that is out of keeping with the legal meaning and intention of the Act. Section 18 has not so far come before the courts at any level higher than a county court. When it does do so they are likely to be asked to decide between Professor Goode’s analysis and my own. No one can say which will be found to be correct, but there is a possibility that mine will be upheld. This would mean that in cases such as the Topup Loan the further advance element would be held to be a separate regulated agreement that was improperly executed, with the consequences mentioned above. Very interesting. PM

This is interesting:

PT. Sorry to burden you with more questions !! Just a quick one though? I read somewhere else on another thread, that a loan provider is (and quite strictly so) not supposed to create a loan if it is used in part or in full to repay another loan held with the same provider. I will try to find out where I saw this, but wondering if you know anything about this, and could steer me in the right direction perhaps ? Thank you. PM

Thanks BRW. Just reading through it now..... certainly is very interesting !! Here's a few tasty snippets : 72. Undoubtedly, as illustrated by the facts of the present case, section 127(3) may be drastic, even harsh, in its adverse consequences for a lender. He loses all his rights under the agreement, including his rights to any security which has been lodged. Conversely, the borrower acquires what can only be described as a windfall. He keeps the money and recovers his security. These consequences apply just as much where the lender was acting in good faith throughout and the error was due to a mistaken reading of the complex statutory requirements as in cases of deliberate non-compliance. These consequences also apply where, as in the present case, the borrower suffered no prejudice as a result of the non-compliance as they do where the borrower was misled. Parliament was painting here with a broad brush. 75. Nor do I have any difficulty in accepting that money lending transactions as a class give rise to significant social problems. Bargaining power lies with the lender, and the social evils flowing from this are notorious. The activities of some lenders have long given the business of money lending a bad reputation. Nor, becoming more specific, do I have any difficulty in accepting, in principle, that Parliament may properly make compliance with the formalities required by the Consumer Credit Act regarding 'prescribed terms' an essential prerequisite to enforcement. In principle that course must be open to Parliament. It must be open to Parliament to decide that, severe though this sanction may be, it is an appropriate way of protecting consumers as a matter of social policy. In making its decision in the present case Parliament had the benefit of experience gained over many years in the working of the Moneylenders Act 1927 and the hire purchase legislation, and also the views of the Crowther committee. Further, it must be open to Parliament so to decide even though the lender's inability to enforce an agreement will not assist a borrower who consents to the enforcement of the agreement in ignorance of the true legal position. 87. There is one other issue which has to be addressed. As has already mentioned, the Court of Appeal held in its first judgment that the effect of section 127(3) of the 1984 Act was that the agreement between Mrs Wilson and FCT was unenforceable and that she was entitled to repayment of the sum which she paid over to redeem her motor car. Sir Andrew Morritt V-C said that he would not wish to arrive at a conclusion which permitted Mrs Wilson both to retain her car and to recover the money which she paid to redeem it unless the statutory provisions left no alternative: [2001] QB 407, 416D, para 20. Having considered the decision of your Lordships' House in Dimond v Lovell [2000] 1 AC 384 however he concluded that prima facie she was entitled to the orders which she sought: para 25. FCT have not sought to appeal against this decision, and it will not be disturbed. But the Secretary of State submits that the decision in Dimond v Lovell is distinguishable and that, if the agreement is unenforceable, FCT is entitled to a restitutionary remedy against Mrs Wilson ("the Dimond v Lovell issue"). 100. But the consequence of reading section 127(3) of the 1974 Act in a way that is compatible with FCT's Convention rights cannot be looked at without taking account of the effects of doing so on the other party to the transaction, Mrs Wilson. She too acquired rights as a result of the transaction, as well as FCT. The set of provisions of which it forms part, and on which she relies, were enacted for the protection of consumers. Section 61(1) provides that a regulated agreement is not properly executed unless it satisfies certain requirements. It must include a statement of all the prescribed terms, which include a term stating the amount of the credit: paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 to the Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 1983. Section 65(1) provides that an improperly executed agreement is enforceable against the debtor or the hirer on an order of the court only. The amount of the credit in this agreement was incorrectly stated, so Mrs Wilson became entitled to the protection of section 65(1) as soon as it was entered into. What this right meant in her case was spelled out in section 127(3), which provides: "The court shall not make an enforcement order under section 65(1) if section 61(1)(a) (signing of agreements) was not complied with unless a document (whether or not in the prescribed form and complying with regulations under section 60(1)) itself containing all the prescribed terms of the agreement was signed by the debtor or hirer (whether or not in the prescribed manner)." 107. The rights of property which are in issue in this case are those set in an agreement which is regulated by the 1974 Act. The Act subjects the rights of the creditor to restrictions in some circumstances. Section 65 declares that a regulated agreement which is improperly executed cannot be enforced by the creditor except by means of an order of the court, and section 127(3) declares that it is not to be enforceable at all except upon the condition which it lays down. The agreement which was entered into in this case was from the outset an agreement which was improperly executed. So it was always subject to the restrictions on its execution which sections 65(1) and 127(3) of the 1974 Act set out. I would hold that FCT's Convention rights under article 1 of the First Protocol are not engaged in these circumstances. ..... all very interesting stuff !! PM

Pleeeeeeeeeease Guys, make a comment or express an opinion, rather than just subbing !! We would all like as many views and opinions on this issue. I'm sure you all have an interest or opinion on the matter, otherwise you wouldn't be subbing ..... so do please actually say something .... even if you just want to ask something further on the issue. Otherwise this thread is not gonna get anywhere. Micko, Do you have a link to the Wilson case handy ? I've already read the case before, but can't find the link at the moment. Could you post it up (the link that is) ..... and perhaps even post what you believe are the relevant sections of the judgement. Hopefully others will then see and maybe comment on it. Lets get some in-depth serious discussion going on in here ? .... this tact and approach could have some really very massive implications for a lot of people !! Thanks PM ..... and no more "subbing" anyone (use the subscribe to thread function instead), or I'll come round and rap you over the knuckles with a ruler !! PM

So, any more thoughts from anyone on this point ?

Do you have to sit around and listen to Kate Bush singing Barbushka* though !! aaaaaggghhh, perish the thought !! PM (* Barbushka is the Russian equivalent of Santa Claus is I recall correctly)

Update please !! What has happened ? PM