Thanks to all. What about (much simplified)
I am writing to object to the appeal made by the Claimant, Vehicle Control Service (VCS), for claim number XXXXX.
I believe the Claimant ignored the learned Judge's second line in the Order that dismissed the claim: 'And upon the Claimant’s representative stating that without such information and evidence the Claimant could not prove this claim’. The legally qualified representative of VCS conceded at the hearing. Having conceded, they cannot try the case at another court.
Obviously, they have no grounds to use judicial time to appeal in a case where the learned Judge made a decision based upon a clearly stated position of conceding that this claim could not be proved, coming as it did from a legally qualified representative from the Claimant. Their representative has had their chance to use the arguments, which they are now trying to introduce again. Not only did the Claimant not use that case law but they actually conceded the point, so the case should be considered closed.
I would like to take the opportunity to iterate the following points.
1. The legally qualified representative of VCS admitted during the hearing on 30/03/2021 that Southend Airport Company Limited is NOT the landowner. When requested by the Judge ‘who is landowner and where is the evidence’, The Claimant failed to provide the evidence: 1) the owner of the land; 2) the landowner had given VCS the necessary authority to issue parking charge notices and to pursue payment by means of litigation.
2. The contract provided by VCS appears to be a false instrument.
‘THIS AGREEMENT is made on the 11th day of JUNE 2019 between WEHICLE CONTROL SERVICED LIMITED (Company No. 02881745 ) … and LONDON SOUTHEND AIRPORT COMPANY LIMITED (Company No. 02078271) …’
According to Companies House, Company Number 02881745 is for London Southend Airport Company Limited, while Company Number 02078271 is East Midlands International Airport Limited.
3. No contract can exist between VCS and the defendant, as the land is not 'relevant land'. The Airport land is subject to the Airport Byelaws as specified in 'Section 63' of the Airports Act 1986. It is also subject to the Southend-on-Sea Municipal Airport Byelaws 1980. Airport Act confirms that the road on which the alleged contravention took place is subject to the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA), by virtue of Section 192(1) of RTA and it being a road “to which the public has access”.
Even that the defendant DID stop where you should not have done, under Airports Act and Road Traffic Act, VCS has no authority to issue parking charge notices and to pursue payment by means of litigation. VCS cannot pursue such case in County Court for breach of contract, whether or not there is one.
4. I would question the existence of the alleged contract, which the Claimant claims to have been breached by “stopping in a zone where stopping is prohibited”. The signage is wholly prohibitive and makes no offer of consideration. In the absence of consideration, no contract exists. It is my position that, the Claimant has no standing, or cause of action, to litigate in this matter.
5. The Claimant seeks recovery of the original £100 parking charge plus an additional £60 described as “contractual costs and interest” or “Debt collection costs”. No further justification or breakdown has been provided as required under Civil Procedure Rule 16.4. Previous parking charge cases have found that the parking charge itself is at a level to include the costs of recovery ie: Parking Eye Ltd vs Beavis (2015) UKSC 67.
6. Reason for stopping should be considered. The sole reason for the defendant to stop was to ask an onsite traffic warden for directions (the drop-off point in this case). Photos received from the claimant show the driver got off and entered the vehicle. The vehicle stopped for only 30 seconds according to the timestamps.
Please refer to my Defence and Witness Statement for more details.