It is your assertion that the sale and the ownership by the SPV is not equitable only. Your claim would be that the lender does not have the standing to bring a claim. In response to your claim, I would hold that there is no case to answer. The general approach to be followed was described by Lord Lane CJ: (1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the defendant, there is no difficulty. The judge will of course stop the case. You have failed repeatedly to provide any evidence to support your claim. (2) The difficulty arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous character, for example because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with other evidence. (a) Where the judge comes to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a submission being made, to stop the case. (b) Where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the view to be taken of a witness's reliability or other matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury.... There will of course, as always in this branch of the law, be borderline cases. They can safely be left to the discretion of the judge. The personal opinions you have expressed are inconsistent with other evidence – in that evidence (legal precedent, prospectus, accounts etc) which establishes the transaction and ownership is equitable only has been submitted. You have not built a case and appear to have no foundation to a start a claim. Therefore, no case to answer. No party to the actual transaction implies directly or indirectly that a perfection event has incurred. Without such a perfection event, the points you raise are without substance or merit. So I ask you, I applore you, I beg you ! Please substantiate your claims.

My case and point has been proven today and I rest my case.

Hello Actionnotwords, no I am not Jebediah. I have noted Supersleuth's request for me to substantiate my claims, which I did find somewhat hypercritical given that it would appear nothing has been posted (in the form of documentation or other forms of evidence) to substantiate the opposite view. As previously highlighted the various securitisation debates appear to have been instigated following Ms Butler’s submission to the Treasury Select Committee (TSC). Within this submission a number of references were made to a specific securitisation transaction – being Clavis Securities PLC Series 2006-01. I have taken the liberty of providing a copy of the Note Issue Supplement (also referred to as a prospectus) to this post. “1.6 Series Portfolio Legal Title Holder Basinghall Finance PLC whose registered office is at Woolgate Exchange, 25 Basinghall Street, London EC2V 5HA, in respect of each Mortgage in the Series Portfolio.” “ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT CERTAIN TRANSACTION PARTIES Basinghall Finance PLC is the General Treasurer and will, in relation to the Series, be the Series Portfolio Seller, the Series Portfolio Legal Title Holder, the Series Special Servicer and the Series Treasurer.” The Note Issue Supplement clearly defines Basinghall Finance PLC as the Legal Title Holder. Further information can be extracted from the Director’s Report & Financial Statement for Clavis Securities PLC. Clavis Sec Plc: Doc re. Directors' Report and Financial Stateme... | Company Announcements | Investegate “i) Loan to originator Where a transfer of a financial asset does not qualify for derecognition, the transferee does not recognise the transferred asset as its assets. The transferee derecognises the cash or other consideration paid and recognises a receivable from the transferor. In relation to the mortgage portfolios transferred to the Company, derecognition is considered to be inappropriate for the portfolio seller's or originator (Basinghall Finance PLC) own financial statements as the originator has retained significant risks and rewards of that financial asset. The Company's financial statements are therefore prepared on the basis that its acquisitions of beneficial interests in mortgage portfolios are recognised as a collateralised non-recourse loan to the portfolio seller. Under the terms of the securitisation the Company retains the right to 0.01% of available revenue receipts from the beneficial interest in the mortgage portfolio. This is reflected in the profit and loss before any movements on fair value gains and losses on derivatives. Available revenue receipts are defined by the Programme Documentation and include mortgage interest received, interest received on the bank accounts and the amounts standing to the credit of the discount reserve ledger. Profits in excess of 0.01% accrue to Basinghall Finance PLC, the portfolio seller of the underlying mortgages. Accordingly a creditor ('deferred consideration') for amounts payable to Basinghall Finance PLC for this residual interest has been recognised at the period end. The payments of deferred consideration are strictly governed by the priority of payments that sets out how cash can be utilised. The loan to originator is classified within 'loans and receivables'. The initial measurement is at fair value with subsequent measurement being at amortised cost using the effective interest method. The effective interest on the loan to originator is calculated with reference to the interest earned on the beneficial interest in the mortgage portfolio less the residual interest due to Basinghall Finance PLC as described above. Where cash has been accumulated by the Company to fund the future repayment of its inter-company loans, the Company's share of the interest arising on the beneficial interest in the mortgage portfolio is adjusted. The loan to originator is subject to impairment reviews in accordance with FRS26. A charge for impairment would be recognised where there is a risk that the income on the loan to portfolio seller will be significantly reduced. This could occur if the credit quality of the mortgage assets that are pledged as collateral for the loan deteriorated significantly. Currently the directors consider that no impairment exists.” “8. Loan to originator The Company purchased a portfolio of mortgage loans from Basinghall Finance PLC, however, as the principal risk and rewards of these mortgage loans remain with Basinghall Finance PLC, these are not deemed for accounting purposes to have transferred to the Company. Accordingly, the Company accounts for the transaction as a loan to Basinghall Finance PLC as originator. The loan to Basinghall Finance PLC is denominated in sterling and bears interest at a variable rate. It is secured on the beneficial interest in a portfolio of residential mortgage loans. The repayment of the loan to originator is linked to the repayment of the loan notes.” In summary, the Note Issue Supplement (prospectus) confirms that Basinghall Finance PLC is and will be the legal title holder. The Directors Report & Financial Statement for Clavis Securities confirms that the loan to Basinghall Finance PLC is secured on the beneficial interest only. The information publically available much of which has previously been posted on this site does not confirm that any one of three principles of the perfection of the security interest has in fact taken place. If this is an incorrect conclusion, I ask someone to post actual evidence to show that a different conclusion should be reached. Clavis Note Supplement 2006.pdf

My original intention was to not become entangled with the infantile attempts of one-upmanship, which thus far have sadly over shadowed these discussions. However, I do feel a certain compulsion to respond to the charges made against me. As the main protagonist of Ms Butler’s views on assignment and on title to sue, your response to my post Superslueth, was I have to say sadly predictable and at the same time very disappointing. Instead or raising points with regard to security interests or the like, you have made a thinly disguised attempt to discredit me (I use the term discredit, as you have accused me of being guilty of plagiarism and attempting to credit myself with having knowledge), I must assume your intention was to therefore indirectly attempt to discredit the information contained within my post. I am sure, you will say this was not your intention but actions do have a habit of speaking louder than words. I must congratulate you on your ability to establish that I post on other sites. I can confirm that I am VirginOne and I am also jockstrap on LB and MSE. However, what is the significance or relevance of my posting on other sites and does my posting on other sites detract from the accuracy of my post?

Securitisation, securitisation, securitisation & Repossession. A mortgage is a bundle of rights over someone’s land, granted as security for a loan. By granting these rights, the borrower encourages the lender to advance more than he otherwise would, or at a more favourable rate of interest, because the lender knows that the risk of default on the loan is much lower. However, the borrower needs to know that the rights he is granting to the lender are real, not notional, rights over his land, and the lender may well be able to enforce them. In everyday speech people tend to talk of a mortgage as if it were a loan (`I bought my house with a mortgage’), but a mortgage is merely the security for a loan. When banks use the term `mortgage’, `secured loan’, or `loan secured on property’, they are talking arrangements which are legally more-or-less equivalent. Although it is common to think of a lender `giving a mortgage’, legally it is the borrower who grants the mortgagor, and is thus called the Mortgagor. The lender is the Mortgagee. The Mortgagee of a mortgaged property is entitled to take possession of it. This entitlement does not follow from a particular statutory right, but is a logical consequence of the way that mortgages work in English law. A mortgage is created by granting a lease to the mortgagee, or is deemed to be equivalent to so doing (s.87 Lpa1925). By definition, a lease creates a right of possession in favour of its owner. Although possession is a right, the mortgagee does not have a right to effect possession by force. Unless the property is standing empty, the mortgagee will need to apply to the court for a possession order. Such an order will only rarely be refused unless the property is a dwelling house. In this case, s.36 the Administration of Justice Act (1970) gives the court a power to postpone possession where there is a realistic possibility that the mortgagor will be able to meet the sums due under the loan. According to s.8 of the Administration of Justice Act (1973), the `sums due’ to not include any sums that arise by virtue of the mortgagor’s failure to meet repayments of an installment mortgage. For example, it is usual for a mortgage agreement to contain a term to the effect that the whole balance becomes due if even one repayment is missed. The effect of s.8 is that the courts can grant relief to the mortgagor without requiring him to raise the entire amount of the loan. Strictly speaking, a mortgagee does not have to seek possession — with a court order or without — to be able to exercise a power of sale. However, it is unlikely that a mortgagee will be able to sell the property while the mortgagor is still occupying it. Even if he does, he may be liable to the mortgagor for failing to realise a good price (CuckmereBrick V Mutual Finance 1971) If a Mortgagor is in default of repayments, the Mortgagee may seek to sell the mortgaged property to realize his security. This power to sell is implied into every mortgage made by deed by s.101 of the Lpa1925, which goes on to say that the power of sale arises when the loan repayment becomes due. However, the power only becomes exercisable (s.103) by the mortgagee if he has served notice on the defaulting mortgagor and not received payment three months after service; or mortgage interest repayments are in arrears by more than two months; or the mortgagor is in breach of some other covenant in the mortgage agreement. The distinction between when a power of sale arises and when it becomes exercisable is important. This is because it is the responsibility of the purchaser from the mortgagor to ensure that the power of sale has arisen. If it has not, the sale is not valid. However, the purchaser does not have to satisfy himself that the power is exercisable. If the mortgagee sells the property before the power has become exercisable, he may be in breach of his obligations to the mortgagor, but it is still a good sale. The effect of sale is to vest the estate in land in the purchaser, free of the mortgage and any other mortgages of lower priority. In practice, unless the mortgaged property is standing empty, the mortgagee will need to seek an order for possession before sale. He is not obliged by law to do so, but he cannot evict the mortgagor by force, and the property will probably not be saleable unless the mortgagee can give vacant possession. The power of sale must be exercised in good faith, that is, in order to obtain the best price reasonably achievable. The mortgagee may find himself liable to the mortgagor if he fails to so so. Consequently, many mortgage lenders prefer to appoint a receiver to handle the sale; the receiver is the agent of the mortgagor, not the mortgagee, so the mortgagee cannot be liable for the negligence of the receiver (unless, perhaps, he is negligent in appointing the receiver). Particular problems arise for the mortgagee if his charge is over only over a share in the property. This may happen if, for example, the mortgage cannot be enforced against all the equitable co-owners of the property (as, for example, in williams and glynns bank v boland 1981; but note that if the mortgage advance is paid to two or more legal co-owners, the equitable co-owners will be overreached — city of london building society v flegg 1987). s.30 of the Lpa1925 allows a mortgagee to ask the court for an order of sale, and such an order would usually be granted unless to do so would cause exceptional hardship (Lloyds Bank V Byrne & Byrne 1993). However, s.30 is effectively replaced by s.14 of Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (abbreviated as 'tolata'). s.14 gives the court a much broader discretion in deciding whether to order sale. The interest of the mortgagee is only one of the factors that must be taken into account. Consequently, in Mortgage Corporation V Shaire 2000 it was held that pre-1997 caselaw on determining whether to order sale should be treated with caution. In that case, an application for an order of sale from a mortgagee was rejected, because — in essence — the rights of the occupier (whose signature had been forged on a mortgage application) — were more worthy of protection than those of the mortgagee. In many legal arguments it can be quite important to determine when the Title to some property or other passess from one person to another. Title to interests in land Strictly speaking, a private citizen cannot have any title to land: all land belongs to the Crown. Instead, we say that there is an `interest in land’, and somebody owns that interest, or owns the title to that interest (same thing). In Unregistered conveyancing, legal title to an interest in land passes on execution of a Deed of Conveyance. In Registered conveyancing, if the interest is registerable, then title passes when the new ownership is entered on the Register. A deed (technically a Deed of transfer, not a conveyance) is still required to satisfy the Registrar, but the deed itself has no effect on title. Otherwise, if the interest is not registerable, the same rule applies as to unregistered conveyancing. Typically the buyer and seller contract in advance to transfer the interest and, provided neither party attempts to rescind the Contract, the transfer itself is almost formality. If the remedy of Specific performance would be available to compel one or other party to effect the transfer, then the transfer will be `effective in equity’ from the moment of execution of the contract. Thus courts will recognize that equitable ownership has been transferred from that point; the seller retains the legal title, but on Constructive trust for the seller. For most practical purposes, the buyer owns the interest from contract. Title to goods The Sale of goods act 1979 states that in a Contract of sale, title passes at the time the contract is made. In many cases this will be at the moment an Offer is accepted. Unless the contracting parties stipulate otherwise, and in contrast to most other jurisdictions, in English law there is no automatic passage of title on delivery of the goods. However, title by delivery does apply when the transfer of title is in the form of a gift, rather than a sale. Title to things in action Things in action (e.g., copyrights, debts) have no tangible presence and therefore present particular problems in the passage of title. There is specific legislation to deal with the passage of many of these articles, e.g., debts (Law of property act 1925), shares in companies (Companies act 1985), patents, insurance policies, etc.. Both the loan (the debt) and the charge (lender rights) are things in action, also called choses in action rather than choses in possession. Both the debt and the lenders rights are choses in action as they are both intangiable. As such for the “legal title” to the debt and to the lenders rights to be “sold” the sale must comply with s.136 of the LPA 1925, in so much that a express notice of the sale must be given to the borrower. This does not need to be signed by the selling lender to be effective in law. It is the case that within the UK, notices are not given to borrowers. Therefore, the sale does not comply with s.136 of the LPA 1925 and is classed as an equitable assignment. There are arguments I have seen on consumer forums that the use of s.136 of the LPA 1925 is fraudulent and that s.136 was never designed to be used in securitisation transactions. These arguments, demonstrate a clear misunderstanding of the law. S.136 was introduced and to define the specific requirements for a legal assignment (transfer of absolute ownership). Therefore, to say that the use is fraudulent is obviously absurd and has absolutely no basis in law. Another argument, I often come across which is equally absurd and has no basis in law. It is theorised that following the implementation of the LRA 2002, under s.27 the disposition of the charge must be registered and the failure to do so is again speculated to be fraudulent. This is a clear example of putting the cart before the horse, so to speak. For there to be a requirement for a disposition to be registered as per s.27, it would stand to reason that there must have first been a disposition. If there has been no disposition, there is no disposition to be registered. As both the debt and the lenders rights are choses in action and can only be legally assigned AFTER an express notice has been given to the borrower disposition of the legal title is prevented by law. So rather than being an example of fraud as promoted by various consumer “help” forums and blogs, it is instead a clear example of compliance with the law. It should be clearly noted that all of the documentation relating to the securitisation of mortgages in the UK confirm that the sale is equitable subject to notification to the borrower and that it is only certain individuals (posters on consumer “help” forums” that insist it is otherwise. However, when put to strict proof to substaniate their arguments they always appear to fall at the first hurdle. The various debates and at times childish arguments I have followed on various sites with regard to securitisation, were original ignited by a submission to the Treasury Select Committee by Carmel B Butler. However, in her submission, one would presume for the sake of convenience she made no reference to the somewhat significant court cases that had previously judged the issues she identified. Naturally, there were the two paragon v pender cases in 2003 and 2005, being a high court case and a court of appeal case. Both resulting in important judgements that for the sake of completness should have been included within her submissions. Nevertheless, the debates with regard to securitisation continue and continue and continue. I must wonder if these debates would still continue if the success of Ms Butler’s arguments were as well documented on consumer “help” forums as the arguments themselves. In, Basinghall Finance PLC v Butler [2009] EWCA Civ 1262 (mortgages, assignment, securitisation, privity, Consumer Credit), the application to appeal was dismissed. In summary, it is the rule of law that defines and restricts the sale by the lender and the subsequent ownership by the SPV as equitable only.