Jump to content

goodwill

Registered Users

Change your profile picture
  • Posts

    161
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    1

Posts posted by goodwill

  1. I have recently had my pay monthly mobile phone stolen, however I was not aware of the theft for a couple of days as I was away on business and the phone was left in the office. In that period of time the person who stole the phone managed to amass over £2000 worth of international calls

    If o2 claimed I was responsible for running up a £2000 phone bill over a period of a "couple of days" there would be certain questions I would want o2 to answer.

     

    The numbers called and times and duration of calls.

  2. In 2004 the regulator Icstis claims the problem of premium rate numbers appearing on peoples phone bills was huge.

    http://www.icstis.org/pdfs/ActivityPlanAndBudget0506Condoc.pdf

    A consultation issued by ICSTIS on 7 January 2005

     

    Notwithstanding the increase recorded, there was a significant degree of underrecording in relation to complaints during the first half of 2004. As explained below, the volume of calls, mostly referrals by OCPs swamped our call-handling capacity. Each day around 500 of these callers were directed to our web-based information and complaints services. But for a few months, between 2,000 and 3,000 individual callers a day were failing to reach our staff or our web-service. At a time when the majority of contacts related to Internet dialler services and when a majority of these “services” were found to be in breach of our Code, it is evident that the total number of people affected by some form of PRS deception was considerably higher than the number recorded on our database.

    ICSTIS Useful Terms

    Icstis

    useful terms explained

     

    Originating Communications Provider (OCP)

    Also known as 'Originating Networks', the OCP is a phone network (e.g. BT) that sends you your phone bill and connects your call from your phone through to its destination (the number you have dialled).

    Phantom phone [problem] hits another village | The Register

    2nd July 2004

     

    A spokesman for BT insisted that the problem of premium rate phone calls appearing on customers' phone bills was "not widespread".

    So why did BT apparently mislead the media as to the true scale of complaints concerning premium rate phone calls appearing on their customers' phone bills?
  3. the original subject was done and dusted ages ago, it was an Amstrad Emailler calling 'home' - no intrigue

    yes quite

     

    but something I can't see from the thread.

    It wasn't BT exchanges that were being targeted (and BT staff responsible), but external plant that anyone can access with a screwdriver!

    Yes I agree, I don't think anybody here was seriously suggesting that

    but

    How do you know external plant was being targeted?

     

    and why did BT say

    Phantom phone [problem] hits another village | The Register

    2nd July 2004

     

    A spokesman for BT insisted that the problem of premium rate phone calls appearing on customers' phone bills was "not widespread".

    if BT told the truth in 2004 what are the tens of thousands of people mentioned in this BBC program claiming.

    BBC NEWS | Business | The Great Phone Call Con

  4. Phantom phone [problem] hits another village | The Register

    2nd July 2004

     

    A spokesman for BT insisted that the problem of premium rate phone calls appearing on customers' phone bills was "not widespread". He declined to comment on suggestions that criminals are breaking into BT's roadside boxes to make the calls.

    why did BT say this?

    when

    ICSTIS in meltdown - MPs | The Register

    1st July 2004

     

    While MPs called for the industry to put its own house in order, they also recognised that the regulator was struggling to keep up with complaints. With ICSTIS handling some 2,000 calls a day at the moment with many more not getting through, Conservative MP Sir George Young, described the regulator as being in "meltdown".

     

     

     

  5. @klubbinlass321

     

    most if not all your numbers are interactive TV premium rate numbers.

    dialled from your sky digibox using your remote control.

    you can check them on the Icstis website

    ICSTIS Consumer - Number Checker

    I have just checked and it's only the services F that are sky related

    thankyou k, yes of of course you are correct.

    So the 090 appear sky/tv interactive related

     

    the various 0845

    WWW.CAMBERLEY.ORG.UK - Welcome to Camberley Community Website

    Lloyds TSB and

    "0845 604 3550 " - Google Search

    car insurance (Sheila's Wheels)

     

    @ k if you want to search the rest google various ways

    "0845 604 3550" and

    "0845 6043550" and

    "08456 043 550 " etc.

     

    the 08715551555 - services G is an interactive tv

    TV Programs - EuroTV : Best Direct

     

    are any of these numbers the type of number you would knowingly dial?

    ................................................................................

    @ Gino32

    It appears BT misled "the village people" (and buzzer) in 2004

  6. Phantom phone [problem] hits another village | The Register

    Phantom phone [problem] hits another village

     

    BT's roadside boxes fingered

     

    Published Friday 2nd July 2004

     

    Another village in the East of England has been targeted by premium rate crooks after they apparently gained "illicit access" to BT's phone network.

    West Wickham in Cambridgeshire was targeted in May leaving some 20 or so homes stung by premium rate charges that residents insist were not made by them

     

    n a statement, BT admitted that "an investigation by BT Security has shown that a number of customers in the East Anglia area have been affected by illicit access to the BT network.

    BT's phone network hit by 'illicit access' | The Register

    Punters billed for premium-rate XXX action

     

    Published Thursday 24th June 2004

    BT has admitted that someone has gained "illicit access" to its network after half the homes in Norfolk village Thurne were billed for calls made to premium-rate XXX phone numbers.

    were BT telling the truth or were they afraid the press was going to rumble the scale of fraudulent "rogue dialler" activity on BT's billing platform?

     

    @klubbinlass321

     

    most if not all your numbers are interactive TV premium rate numbers.

    dialled from your sky digibox using your remote control.

    you can check them on the Icstis website

    ICSTIS Consumer - Number Checker

  7. Originally Posted by Gino32 viewpost.gif

    Darren

    Hi mate don't stand for it, contact o2 and get details of who sent the texts, make contact with them by e-mail as their phone numbers will be 12p per minute. Ask for details when your son was supposed to have subscribed to their service. If your sons phone is PAYG you may have a problem as I have heard of o2 charging £10 for a call printout, but they may be more helpful.

    ditto

    we put him on contract last november and outgoing calls were stopped after a week. when we queried this it was because he had sent a few texts, (£70 - yes in 1 week)

    doesn't leave many options as to who gave the crooks his number!

     

    o2 Online Ltd's recent Icstis record

    http://www.icstis.org.uk/consumers/adjudications/default.asp?mode=1&serviceprovider=O2+Online+Ltd&servicetype=&fine=0&submit=+search+

     

    here's one of the board members of the "independant" regulator

    http://www.icstis.org.uk/about/icstis/board/Mike_Short.asp

    mike short is Vice President - Research and Development at O2.

    best of luck Darren

  8. The Great Phone Call Con

    BBC NEWS | Business | The Great Phone Call Con

     

    The BBC Money Programme has identified one of the chief suspects in the rogue dialler scandal in an investigation into telecom fraud.

    He is Danish businessman Morten Sondergaard Pedersen, 38, director of Premium Media Communications (PMC) and Sun Telecom, two firms based at the same address in Majorca.

    Ms Taylor and 11,000 other complainants were charged by a ring of five companies based in Palma, Majorca, some sharing the same registered address.

    Twenty per cent of the total number of complaints to ICSTIS about rogue dialling involved the Majorca companies.

    PMC supplied technology to all five and took it upon itself to answer complaints from consumers.

    ICSTIS investigated PMC and the other Majorca firms and decided there was insufficient evidence to take action against them.

    Without giving them any backing, ICSTIS advised Ms Taylor and the other 11,000 to write to Majorca for their money.

    Ms Taylor did write and got a letter back demanding full bank account details and a copy of her passport before her claim could be investigated.

    Fearing she would be fleeced again, she declined.

    Sun Telecom, meanwhile, had been involved in a massive rogue dialler swindle in Germany netting over 3m euros.

    Last December, Mattias Meidow, a minor player in the fraud was convicted and a European arrest warrant for Mr Pedersen, believing him to be the brains behind the plot.

    When Money Programme reporter Rajan Datar visited PMC, he was told that Mr Pedersen was away travelling.

    In fact, Mr Pedersen had been arrested and his only travel plans involved extradition to Germany to face charges of masterminding the swindle.

    For rogue diallers, you take your own precautions. Ensure you're NOT compromised - not bleat to a firm because they had the ability to make money from your errors. For virus attacks, you do the same - not look for someone easy to blame.

    .
  9. Sorry got to respond on this one, and yes i am 'in the business' mainly on the recieving end of the rants and raves!

    Gino32, you are very emotive on this subject and your posts suggest that you are a sole recipient of numerous charged texts on a daily basis!

    I Have worked at front line for 6 years on pay as you go helpdesk and pay monthly, and these 'unsolicited' sms come up a few times a week - note i say 'a few times a week', with millions of customers on our network alone, the problem is not as widespread as you make out.

    Quite

    futher information can be found here

    Bibliomania: Free Online Literature and Study Guides

     

    here's a case concerning Orange customers from

    13 September 2006

    Icstis claimed they recieved 6 complaints

    ICSTIS Consumer - Adjudications

    Background Complaints were received regarding an unsolicited text message sent to their mobile phones, which charged them 50p for its receipt. It appeared that only customers on the Orange mobile network were targeted.

     

    The message stated – ‘Update: Your services have been modified. Please turn the handset off, then back on, for any changes to take effect’.

    As the unsolicited message charged recipients, for the purpose of this investigation it was considered to be both the promotion and the service in its entirety.

     

    Investigation & Decision Opera Telecomresponded to the alleged breaches directly but stated that their information provider was responsible.

     

    They stated that they realised there was a potential problem with this client when they noticed the number of messages that had gone out over their system, 60,043.

    The Orange billing platform in common with other billing platforms has a mechanism to identify Artifically Inflated Traffic (AIT).

    Orange, BT etc use this mechanism to protect themselves from fraud.

    Why don't they use it to protect thier customers from fraud?

     

     

  10. are you connected to the biz buzz

     

    The reason I ask. Several months ago I posted information concerning a particular internet dialler fraud case.

    I thought at the time it was strange that you should be so eager to attack the victims of that fraud in order to protect the companies involved.

     

    I realise that subject can appear complicated to some and that's what I put your apparent misunderstanding down to.

     

    Now with unsolicited reversed billed text messages I find it very difficult to see how any body could try to justify them.

  11. the sending of "unsolicited reverse billed text messages" are unlawful in two ways.

     

    http://www.mpsonline.org.uk/tps/

    This is because under the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2004 it is unlawful to send an unsolicited sales and marketing text message.

    and

    Knowingly taking money you are not legally entitled to is theft.

    and yes why don't the police investigate it.

    Because the government instructed to police to refer all complaints to Icstis.

    As soon as somebody tries to defend this you can be pretty sure they are involved in the industry somehow.

     

    The government knows that if the con, [problem], fraud and theft marketing methods the telecom/premium rate industry employ were "outlawed" the industry would go tits up.

  12. PNC are not the issue - they are deemed not liable for the uses their clients put to the premium numbering resource. However if they are seen to be wantonly having a higher proportion of 'problem' customers than most, the OFT can act. (In much the same way the car hire co is NOT liable for the fines etc of its customers).

    what a load of bull

    and not for the first time

    I can only asssume you are "on the game".

     

    I disagree Buzby: They were an active part of the [problem], taking profit from the sending of unsolicited reverse bill texts to innocent victims. Why should they not be punished?

    The OFT did not bother to send an acknowledgement to my letter! :evil:

    @ Gino Have you asked anybody for a refund. If so what reply?

     

    I'm a consultant to Moby Magic and am therefore acting on their behalf.

     

    Moby Magic can confirm that they are in receipt of your letter to Dialogue, and a refund of £4.50 will be made by end of May.

     

    Apologies for the delay in this matter.

     

    James McNab

    For and On behalf of

    Moby Magic

    "I'm a consultant to Moby Magic" actually he's the Director of Marketing for

    PNC.

    NOC E-Newsletter: PNC appoints new marketing director as part of business expansion

    Remember PNC buzby? PNC aka Telecom One? "The Great Phone Call Con"?

    BBC NEWS | Business | The Great Phone Call Con

  13. hi Gino32

     

    yes you are totally correct. These thefts committed by the premium rate industry in partnership with the mobile billing platforms are extremely common.

     

    The DTI, Ofcom and Icstis know exactly what is going on. Unsolicited reverse billed theft happens because the market place has been rigged to allow it to happen.

     

    Who was the content provider? Have you any details? Ask your operator details of the "service" they billed for.

  14. The whole premium rate industry is a revenue sharing criminal disgrace. The regulators Ofcom and Icstis should be horse whipped.

     

    Why the hell are they letting companies use '09' premium rate numbers that were intended to be used for the payment of crap like tarot readings and chat lines?

    and if I had anything else to add to phone them on 090 sth doesn't mention but I thought that was sth like £1.50 / minute.

    Slightly underhand I thought?

    and yes, strictly speaking they should have informed you in the letter the price rate of the call.

  15. High-tech cops probe premium-rate Internet fraud - ZDNet UK

    High-tech cops probe premium-rate Internet fraud

     

    Published: 23 Jun 2004

    "If it's only a few cases, then we can put it down to the husband or kids not admitting to surfing porn, but if 300 customers are saying the same thing about one company, then we can't ignore it," said Baht. "We can't work out what the problem is, so have recently started talking to the Hi-Tech Crime Unit so they can do a criminal investigation."

    so did they?

    From the Metropolitan Police Service.

     

    Dear *******

     

    Freedom of Information Request Reference No: ***************

     

    I write in connection with your request for information which was received by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 17/02/2007. I note you seek access to the following information:

     

    * In June 2004 Suhil Baht, policy advisor at ICSTIS, said they had "started talking to the Hi-Tech Crime Unit so they can do a criminal investigation" One of the case Icstis had been investigating throughout 2004 concerned a group of companies registered in Majorca. They were using 3,500 premium rate 0909967**** numbers that were appearing on victims telephone bills. Could you please confirm that Icstis did supply all the details relating to the case. etc

    etc .

     

    Following receipt of your request searches were conducted within the MPS to locate information relevant to your request.

     

    EXTENT OF SEARCHES TO LOCATE INFORMATION

     

    To locate the information relevant to your request searches were conducted at Metroplitan Police Services.

     

    RESULT OF SEARCHES

     

    The searches failed to locate any information relevant to your request.

     

    DECISION

     

    I have today decided that access cannot be provided to the information you have requested as it is not held by the MPS. ICSTIS was working with the National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU). The NHTCU is not part of the MPS - it became part of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency - which is a separate law enforcement agency, but is exempt from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

    from ICO

    26th February 2007

    Dear *****

     

    Thankyou for your recent enquiry.

     

    The Freedom of Information Act requires all public authorities covered by the Act to respond to requests for information. Police Forces are public authorities covered by the Act. The National Hi Tech Crime Unit has now become part of the Serious Organised Crime Agency. SOCA is an authority that is not covered by the provisions of the Act and is not required to respond to requests for information.

     

    I regret that we cannot suggest any other public authorities which may hold the information you seek.

     

    Yours sincerely

     

    *********

    FOI Good practice Section

    So what did Icstis tell the police?

    Why aren't the thousands of victims entitled to an answer to this question?

     

     

  16. BBC NEWS | Business | The Great Phone Call Con

    The Danish business identyfied in this BBC program was later convicted of an almost identical telecom fraud in a Hamburg court.

    The following are the Majorcan service providers and the numbers they used that were responsible for 20% of all dialler related UK complaints throughout 2004.

    They were all setup by the same group ncluding the Danish business man.

     

    (
    to moderator This is the contact infomation for the public taken from the Icstis web site. It is not personal details
    )

     

    Amara Amichi 2000 SL

    0909 967 7600 to 0909 967 9299 = 1700

    0909 967 9608 to 0909 967 9907 = 300

     

    Quizir SL

    0909 967 3544 to 0909 967 3578 = 35

    0909 967 3579 to 0909 967 3598 = 20

    0909 967 5000 to 0909 967 5099 = 100

    0909 967 6060 to 0909 967 6459 = 400

    0909 967 7100 to 0909 967 7599 = 500

     

    Inversion Zarnoza SL

    0909 967 7600 to 0909 967 8099 = 500

    Cala De Plata SL

    0909 967 8100 to 0909 967 8599 = 500

    Mesa rotation SL

    0909 967 8600 to 0909 967 9099 = 500

    supplied by Amara Amichi 2000 SL

    Middleton holdings ltd

    0909 967 9100 to 0909 967 9299 = 200

    0909 967 9608 to 0909 967 9907 = 300

     

    Premium Media Communications

    0909 967 2808 to 0909 967 2808 = 1

    0909 967 2995 to 0909 967 2999 = 5

    0909 967 3654 to 0909 967 3953 = 300

     

    Jokomo Media SL

    0909 967 3242 to 0909 967 3261 = 20

    0909 967 0019 to 0909 967 0029 = 11

    0909 967 0046 to 0909 967 0055 = 10

    0909 967 0582 to 0909 967 0601 = 10

    0909 967 2830 to 0909 967 2849 = 20

    0909 967 2942 to 0909 967 2966 = 25

     

    Telecolux SL

    0909 967 3217 to 0909 967 3241 = 25

     

    Ibero Latino De Telecomuniccaciones

    0909 967 3002 to 0909 967 3006 = 5

     

  17. I understand and agree with most of what you say but it doesn't explian some fundamental questions.

    Please don't take umbridge at my questioning some of your remarks.

     

    "I think you, the customer"

    At what point did I become a customer ?

    Who was I a customer of ?

     

     

    "The Rogue Dialler has fooled you and BT"

    It fooled me into down loading it but did that constitute any thing that could be described as any part of a legal agreement?

    Did it fool me into handing over money for a non-existant service?

     

    Did it really fool BT?

    http://img304.imageshack.us/img304/1394/icinvestcolour1final2cy.jpg

    Premium Media Comunications sl

    under investigation 1st Jan 2004 onwards.

     

    Eight months and several thousand identical complaints later BT are still billing the same number.

    BT's original excuses used to justify demanding payment from the "customer" were.

    "we have no way of knowing if the number was dialled by the customer or a rogue dialler"

    Surely if BT are operating their billing platform on behalf of Telecom One it's their responsibility for ensuring it's protected from fraudulent use.

     

    and

    "we have passed the money on before we have recieved the complaint"

    This was just plain false. BT were still passing money on after many thousands of complaints. BT's actions showed a reckless lack of the duty of care.

  18. Yes I think your correct in the way you describe the chain.

     

    So who has the comercial relationship with the customer? Who has accepted responsibility for retailing the service?

     

    EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 4.05.2005 SG-Greffe (2005) D/202091 Office of Communications Riverside House

     

    EUROPEAN COMMISSION

     

    Brussels, 4.05.2005

    SG-Greffe (2005) D/202091

    Office of Communications

    Riverside House

    2a Southwark Bridge Road

    London SE1 9HA

    United Kingdom

     

    For the attention of:

    Mr. Stephen Carter, Chief Executive

    Fax: +44.20.7981.3333

     

    Dear Sir,

     

    II.1. NTS Retail Uplift

    Ofcom underlines that providers terminating NTS calls (“terminating communications providers”, or “TCPs”) do not have a commercial retailing relationship with the customer making the call. It also recalls that under the current regulatory regime, BT is required to originate and retail calls on behalf of TCPs and pass the revenue after applicable discounts to the TCP, net of charges for conveyance of the calls on its network and for retailing those calls

    (including, for example, the provision for billing and payment collection services). The so-called NTS Retail Uplift is the charge that BT can make to TCPs for the retailing of NTS calls.

     

    II.2. PRS bad debt surcharge

    Ofcom recalls that PRS calls generally have higher retail prices than other NTS calls in order to provide additional revenue to service providers, to cover, inter alia, additional costs of providing the service and associated content. It finds appropriate to allow BT, in addition to the NTS Retail Uplift, to retain a further charge to cover the extra bad debt costs and financing of working capital associated with PRS calls compared to other NTS calls.

    On this basis, Ofcom estimates the appropriate PRS bad debt surcharge to be 3.03% of revenues net of VAT and discounts (but before payments to TCPs) and therefore proposes that BT is allowed to charge service providers no more than that percentage of the net retail call revenue for that PRS call.

    BT has clearly accepted payment for "retailing" the service.

    BT has always claimed it only takes a small amount for carrying the call and pass the rest on. This clearly was never true.

    Why does BT insist the "customer" has to dispute the bill with the "service provider". If BT has agreed to accept payment for retailing the services in the UK, have they a legal duty to ensure those services do not contravine uk consumer/legal laws?

  19. Am I correct in thinking that ICSTIS powers in these matters relate to the network providers (Telecom One in this case) and not the Service Providers?
    Not quite. Icstis has only ever regulated the "service provider" for the content and promotion of the service.

    In this case that would have been the Majorcan companies.

    They are also responsible for ensuring any dialler used to market that service is compliant with their code.(but this was only re-introduced in Aug 2004)

     

    Telecom One would have been considered a "carrier" and regulated by Ofcom.

    It may be the case today that Icstis may consider Telecom One to also have been responsible for supplying the "service" (I'm not sure).

     

    Icstis Powers to investigate and regulate.

     

    Well, despite what they claimed in the media at the time it appears they had little or no powers.

    The DTI (I think) refused Icstis the power to obtain the identities of the service providers that had agreements with the UK Telecom companies.

    Hence the above Ofcom case.

     

    So why did the DTI decide the Industry should be policed by a regulator with so few powers?

  20. The Great Icstis Con

    (Icstis are sponsered by the Premium Rate Industry)

     

    These are the main Majorcan "service providers":-

     

    Premium Media Comunications SL

    Cala De Plata SL

    Inversion Zarnosa SL

    Quizir SL

    Amara Amichi 2000 SL

    Ibero Latino De Telecomuniccaciones

    Mesa Rotation SL

     

    that targeted the thousands of victims in this BBC program using 3,500 Telecom One premium rate numbers.

    The Great Phone Call Con

    BBC NEWS | Business | The Great Phone Call Con

    They accounted for 20% of all complaints throughout 2004.

     

    This is what Icstis said at the time

    High-tech cops probe premium-rate Internet fraud - ZDNet UK

    However, when ICSTIS investigates these complaints, it often finds that the companies concerned appear to be conforming to ICSTIS' standards, according to Suhil Baht, policy advisor at ICSTIS.
    Ofcom case from 2005.

    CW/00833/04/05

    ICSTIS complaint regarding failure of Telecom One to comply with Directions | Ofcom

    ICSTIS complaint regarding failure of Telecom One to comply with Directions

    Complainant: The Independent Committee for the Supervision of Standards of Telephone Information Services ("ICSTIS")

    Complaint against: Telecom One Ltd ("Telecom One")

    Case opened: 17 May 2005

    Issue: ICSTIS, the premium rate services regulator, has alleged that Telecom One Limited ("Telecom One") has failed to comply with Directions made by ICSTIS under its Code of Practice and that, as such, Telecom One is in breach of the condition made by Ofcom under section 120 of the Communications Act 2003 ("the Act") for the purpose of regulating the provision, content, promotion and marketing of premium rate services ("the PRS Condition").

    Relevant instrument: Section 120 of the Communications Act 2003

    Under the PRS Condition made by Ofcom under Section 120 of the Communications Act 2003, Ofcom requires that Communication Providers comply with Directions given by ICSTIS. ICSTIS is responsible for regulating the content, promotion and overall operation of premium rate services in the UK . ICSTIS does this through its Code of Practice ("the ICSTIS Code").

    ICSTIS issued Directions to Telecom One in respect of four service providers on 11 January 2005 , 3 February 2005 , 9 February 2005 and 14 February 2005 . Directions in respect of three service providers were invoked under ICSTIS's emergency procedure. ICSTIS alleges that Telecom One provided inadequate, incomplete or late responses to its Directions. ICSTIS submitted correspondence between it and Telecom One as supporting evidence.

    Given the substantive supporting evidence submitted by ICSTIS in respect of its complaint, Ofcom considers it is appropriate for it to investigate these matters further.

     

    Case closed: 16 September 2005

    Ofcom's investigation has found that Telecom One did provide late responses to the Directions that had been issued by ICSTIS. However, all of these Directions have now been complied with, and the premium rate services that were being operated on Telecom One's network have been ceased. In addition, Ofcom's found no evidence of any material consumer detriment as a result of the delay by Telecom One in responding to the ICSTIS Directions. For these reasons, Ofcom has closed its investigation.

    Email from Icstis :

    Thank you for your email of the 5 October 2006 inquiring about Ofcom case reference CW/00833/04/05.

     

    This Ofcom case arose following ICSTIS’ referral to them of network operator Telecom One. The service providers, to whom this Ofcom case refers, are: Massalia Telecom, Adventive Media and World Travel. The fourth referral mentions various service providers of dialler services, including:

     

    o Premium Media

    o Cala De Plata

    o Inversion Zarnosa

    o Quizir

    o Amara Amichi

    o Ibero, and

    o Mesa Rotation

    "However, when ICSTIS investigates these complaints, it often finds that the companies concerned appear to be conforming to ICSTIS' standards"

    anyone recognise any names?

    The Great Phone Call Con

  21. So did BT infringe the POCA act in 2004.

    Was the money "dirty"?

    Did they have any reason to believe the money was dirty?

     

    High-tech cops probe premium-rate Internet fraud - ZDNet UK

    High-tech cops probe premium-rate Internet fraud

     

     

    Published: 23 Jun 2004

    However, when ICSTIS investigates these complaints, it often finds that the companies concerned appear to be conforming to ICSTIS' standards, according to Suhil Baht, policy advisor at ICSTIS. This has led the regulator to turn to the NHTCU.

    "If it's only a few cases, then we can put it down to the husband or kids not admitting to surfing porn, but if 300 customers are saying the same thing about one company, then we can't ignore it," said Baht. "We can't work out what the problem is, so have recently started talking to the Hi-Tech Crime Unit so they can do a criminal investigation."

    A spokesperson for the NHTCU confirmed that it is in the "early stages of the investigation". One possible cause being examined is Trojan viruses installing diallers onto the computers of unsuspecting users.

    The half a dozen "service providers" involved in my case were using 3,500 numbers. Icstis had recieved many thousands of complaints concerning each one.

    Were Icstis misleading the media when they said 300? Or were they trying to protect the Majorcan companies?

    Did they report the Majorcan case that represented 20% of all dialler related complaints to the police?

    Did Icstis supply the identities of the Majorcan companies to the police?

    Did they make them aware of the 3,500 premium rate numbers and the thousands of complaints they were recieving?

    Did they tell the police that despite the high level of complaint they were un-aware of the content of the "internet services" or how the services were being promoted and marketed?

     

    Well I don't know, basically I am unable to obtain a response from the police.

     

    There is something else that left a stink.

     

    The Majorcan gang were using 3,500 revenue sharing premium rate numbers supplied by Telecom One ltd.

     

    The BBC Money Programme has identified one of the chief suspects in the rogue dialler scandal in an investigation into telecom fraud.

     

    He is Danish businessman Morten Sondergaard Pedersen, 38, director of Premium Media Communications (PMC) and Sun Telecom, two firms based at the same address in Majorca.

    In 1997 Morten Sondergaard Pedersen was a dircetor of Telecom One.
  22. BBC NEWS | Business | The Great Phone Call Con

    The group of Majorcan "service providers" identified on post#8 were using 3,500 Telecom One premium rate numbers. 0909967****

     

    Many (if not all) had been under Icstis investigation from 1st Jan 2004 onwards

     

    This Guardian article, from Saturday July 3, 2004.

    The numbers racket costing you a fortune | The Guardian | Guardian Unlimited

    A few days ago, I received my monthly phone bill from cable company NTL. We don't use the net much, and I was shocked to see I was being billed £26 for internet calls instead of the usual £3 or £4. I immediately looked down the list of numbers and noticed two I'd never seen before. They were both 09099 numbers - one call, lasting just under 13 minutes, cost £19.53, and the other, lasting just over a minute, £1.83.

     

    I then went to Icstis. I gave them the two 09099 numbers on my bill and they revealed there had been 25 or more complaints about each since the end of May. They were able to disclose the name and address of the people behind one of the numbers - a company based in a European holiday hotspot.

    Much as I would like to name and shame these scumbags, Icstis begged me to keep schtum because it is still investigating. Identifying the company could jeopardise the chances of nabbing them. I wasn't impressed to learn that my tormentors lease their line from a leading UK telecommunications firm.

     

    I contacted him some time go and was told the European hot spot was Majorca and the number belonged to Telecom One.

    If you look on the list in the article none of the Majorcan service providers are mentioned.

    Icstis claimed they didn't want them being tipped off.

    The one's that were mentioned were under investigation why didn't Icstis mind those one's that were only using a comparitively few numbers being tipped off?

    Icstis had already put the Majocan names on it's web site and was advising victims to write to them to ask for refunds.

    Didn't they realise this would tip them off? What was the real reason Icstis did not want the Majorcan service providers and Telecom One numbers identified in the press?

    Was it because Icstis was cocerned that the media may discover the scale of the fraud this group were involved in?

     

    Another thing to notice. The Icstis spokeperson claimed each number had recieved at least 25 complaints that month.

    Assuming each number was programmed into similar dialler software, how many complaints would Icstis and BT have recieved for all 3,500 numbers for just that month alone?

     

    Just for the record. buzby and Mrshed really dont know what they are talking about. Regarding mis-selling or fraud concerning the use of illegal dialler software (rogue diallers). The victims have the same consumer/ criminal protection has in any other market place where mis-selling or fraud is being committed.

×
×
  • Create New...