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    • You're like, super helpful and unhelpful at the same time lol.   What do I search for, I searched form 4, and nothing, I searched claiming compensation and nothing about this.   I can't find the top squares logo.   Can you post a link or tell me what to search.   Sorry if I'm slow.
    • use our custom google search box  click our top squares logo it should appear on that page   dx
    • Apologies, I haven't used a forum for years!!   I defo wish to keep the 2 issues separate, sorry!   My only issue I need help with is the increased compo for marstons - if possible.   I don't know anything about claiming compo etc. (I only recently found out one of the NHS biggest costs are NDA payouts)   I don't know what form 4 is; so far, they've offered £250 and I haven't accepted or denied it.   So yeah, can you forward me to some more info?   Also, usually I'm good at google etc. but I can't find many stories on this stuff, regarding PCN/TFL etc.   Thanks again!
    • ok things are getting clearer...   I've merged 2 of your posts for clarity and removed the swearing, (behave please) I've also taken down the two images you posted should you wish to post things up please use PDF so we can zoom easily and don't forget to redect them read upload carefully.   I think you need to continue to keep the two thing sep. those being increased compo for marstons- if possible ( if you are raising a form 4? complaint through the court - it might be better you don't? - they are very hard to justify and can be costly - so the fact it might not be moving forward could be a good thing, but listen to others here too) and the issue of the PCN wasn't justified - which you need to further expand on please.   the more info you post up the better please but please use multipage PDF files only and carefully redact them    
    • Thanks for trying btw! It's kinda in 2 parts.   1 is that the PCN wasn't justified in the first place and I wasn't aware it had escalated. I received the initial fine from TFL which I challenged and heard nothing back from (for 5 months). Then another letter from a separate PCN which made me email TFL to inquire what was going on but again, heard nothing back.   (BTW I can see how confusing this is so thanks again for trying)   So, I had no idea my car was at the risk of being taken - that's the first part.   No 2. is:   I got a phone call saying my car was on the back of a truck round the corner from mine (they hadn't left any notices or anything, and the car was parked directly outside my house). My friend said they were attaching the straps and securing it to the van (so I think they got it on the back of the van and moved it before securing it).   When I ran round the corner I saw the EA's van. I went upto it and asked what was going on. He was rude and told me to go away. Then after I kept knocking he got out the van and was aggressive and refused to ID himself or tell me why he had my car.   He shouted at me, was rude and unprofessional, he then left with my car. I complained to Marstons and asked for the bodycam footage.   They gave me the footage but it was clearly edited and cut short (because in the beginning of the footage he was the most aggressive).   They then told me he wasn't required to have the camera turned on when he's in the van, only when he's 'actively pursuing a warrant' and I was only allowed the footage I was in. (which is 2 different things) So I asked them to clarify which is true.   Anyway, I reviewed the footage and sent in my complaint (talking about what happened in the footage) They replied and said they watched the footage and disagreed with everything I said.   So I wrote a more in depth response with the CIVEA code to reference + the TFL EA guide etc.    Then they asked for more time, called me and finally apologised and admitted he had acted untoward and was in the wrong.   They then offered me the goodwill payment.   This has taken up weeks of my time, caused me serious trauma and PTSD and even after I complained WITH video evidence, they still initially denied it which means they officially lied, on record, while representing TFL.   I told TFL what was happening they said I had to continue with Marstons etc.   £250 goodwill isn't enough, the car cost £800 to get out, the suspension is messed up and I'd like to claim compensation for everything.   I don't know if that makes me sound like i'm money grabbing or whatever but they shouldn't be allowed to get away with it.   The police had to come before they could call an ambulance cause I was having a panic attack and it was a HORRIBLE experience.    So any help would be great please    I have the whole file from Resolver in a ZIP file but it's a lot of writing and I think you've read enough of my writing to last a life time!   I did a statutory declaration of OOT, got it signed by the court etc. but it was rejected.   I then tried to take them to court but it cost £250 I think which I don't have. You can get it for free if your low income but they wanted bank statements that I couldn't get. They're waiting for me to reply with documents to get a free court date.    did you receive any of the pcn's - was that why you appealed? - Yes, sorry!   unless it's trying secure a greater level of compo from marstons? - Yes, sorry!   For the record I just saw this pop up, read it and now feel much less guilty about my enquiry!
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edwi69

Welcome/coast financial

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But it is sufficient to place the account in dispute where they sums being quoted are contested. Further, I suggest there is a legitimate reason for formal dispute where there are errors in the rocon. And the alleged agreement has been varied (changes to interest rates etc are variations)

Carey v HSBC para 234(4) If an agreement has been varied by the Creditor under a unilateral power of variation, the Creditor must still provide a copy of the original agreement, as well as the varied terms.

The copy of the executed agreement need not be an exact copy but it must be a ‘true copy’ and not some reconstruction of what the original might have been and it must contain the same terms as the original. Where the terms have been varied as provided for within the agreement, the copy of the original agreement must be accompanied by a document setting out the current terms, as varied. Certain details may be omitted from the original agreement but the debtor must be in no doubt as to the true nature of his obligations under the loan.

Should no original agreement be in existence it is very hard to say that the copy the creditor offers to the debtor is, in fact, a true copy as there would be no original with which to compare it. It is the view of the Office of Fair Trading the onus of proof would be on the creditor to show that the copy is a true one and where none existed he may have difficulty discharging this. Neither should creditors suggest that a consumer has signed a credit agreement where they are unable to provide evidence to support this — to do so is likely to be a misleading action under Regulation 5 of the Consumer Protection From Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (the CPRs) and would also constitute an unfair or improper business practice.

Under section 77(4), if the creditor is unable to provide this information, he is not entitled to enforce the debt while he remains in default (Decriminalised from 26 May 2008 on the coming into force of the CPRs).

Consumer Credit Act 1974 S78(4) – If the Creditor under an agreement fails to comply with subsection (1) (a) he is not entitled…to enforce the agreement

 

A copy of the executed agreement

 

Under the prescribed condition, section 77 of the Act requires the creditor to give the debtor a copy of the executed agreement.

Where a creditor receives a request to supply a copy of the executed agreement, the Consumer Credit (Cancellation Notices and Copies of Documents) Regulations 1983 (‘1983 regs’) apply. Regulation 3(1) sets out the basic position that ‘every copy of an executed agreement... shall be a true copy’.

The copy does have to be a ‘true copy’. This is a technical term, which has been discussed in a number of cases, mostly relating to bills of sale and the need to register a ‘true copy’ of the bill with the High Court. These cases come from the days before typewriters, when copies were made by hand. The consequences of filing a copy which was not a true copy were severe, since the bill would then be void and the creditor deprived of his security.

 

Meaning of ‘true copy’

 

In this context, the courts decided that a ‘true copy’ need not necessarily be an ‘exact copy,’ but it must be ‘so true that nobody reading it can by any possibility misunderstand it’ or be misled by it(In re Hewer ex parte Kahen*(1882) LR 21 Ch.D. 871 at 875). The copy must contain ‘every material provision which is contained in the original’ (except that if the defect is made good by reading the document as a whole, the omission will not be fatal) (Court of Appeal in Burchell v Thompson*[1920] 2 KB 80 at 98-99). Further, it is not sufficient for the copy merely ‘to state with complete accuracy in a summary form the effect of the stipulations contained in the original. It is not merely a document that is to state the true legal effect of the original; it is to be a copy of the original’ (per Atkin LJ in Burchellat 105).

 

Lord Sumner, speaking of the man who may wish to refer to the copy, concluded that ‘the Act promises him ... a true copy, not a puzzle. He is to inspect it, not to recover the original by a process of conjectural emendation’ .

Terms & Conditions

Regulation 7(1) of the 1983 Regs requires that a requested copy of an agreement which has been unilaterally varied under section 82(1) of the Act, shall be accompanied either by the latest notice of variation or a copy of the as varied. Regulation 7(2) extends the principle to copies of varied securities supplied either to the consumer or the surety.

Unpalatable though section 77 and 78 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 may be for some creditors, if the debt collector is unable to prove the debt, they should be more careful about the debts they buy. They cannot complain that the sections are somehow unfair as it is in the Act and so must be complied with. It is up to them to ensure they purchase and maintain sufficient records to be able to prove the debt and comply with the other requirements of the Act.

Sections 77 and 78 refer to supplying a copy of the ‘executed’ agreement within 12 working days of receiving a written request from the debtor. Failure to do so makes the agreement unenforceable against the debtor until a copy is provided. In addition, if the default continues for a period of 1 month the creditor is in breach of the Act.

 

 

Execution involves signing the agreement. If no agreement has been executed, it is impossible to supply a true copy of the agreement. Should a creditor supply a copy agreement, even though the debtor has never signed any agreement with that creditor, no indication should be given that it is a true copy or a copy of an executed agreement. To do so may contravene Regulation 5 of the CPRs and be an unfair or improper business practice.

The consequence of the debtor not having signed a credit agreement with the creditor is that the agreement is unenforceable except where the court orders that enforcement may take place. Where the agreement was made before 6th April 2007 the court is not able to make such an order unless the agreement was signed by the debtor.

Therefore it is misleading to state, when complying with a section 77 or 78 request, that the debtor has signed or would have signed (or similar) the agreement where the debtor has not done so. From 26 May 2008 such a statement will be a breach of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs). Regulation 5 of the CPRs states that a commercial practice is a misleading action if it contains false information in relation to the main characteristics of the product (amongst other matters) and is likely therefore to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise. The product in question is the credit agreement and the main characteristics include the ‘execution of the product’ (Regulation 5(5)(d) of the CPRs).

Telling a consumer that he signed such an agreement is also a misleading statement about his rights and the risks he might face as covered by Regulation 5(4)(k) of the CPRs. It is the view of the OFT that it is likely that a consumer will take a transactional decision to make a payment under the credit agreement or to refrain from exercising his rights under the agreement as a result of being misled about whether he signed it.

Breach of Regulation 5 of the CPRs is a criminal offence under Regulation 9 and can also be enforced under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002. Under section 218A of the Enterprise Act, where an application for an Enforcement Order is made the court may require the Respondent ‘to provide evidence of the accuracy of any factual claim’ (such as a claim that a debtor has signed a credit agreement).

In addition, it should be noted that threats to take action that cannot be taken is listed as one of the factors that will be considered in assessing aggressive practices in Regulation 7(2) of the CPRs.

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Hi

 

Not been on for sometime now due to wife’s health etc,

 

I have had my welcome secured loan in Serious dispute since 2009/2010 due to wrong amounts borrowed/Fees/Ppi done the SAR and CCA.

They sent me a letter saying they could not locate my true CCA

 

I now receive a letter out of the blue from Coast finance Solutions stating they have bought the debt and they have also stated it’s a mortgage and not a secured loan.

 

Just done a land registry check and on the 10/10/2018 they have now changed the charge to Coast Finance Solutions.

 

i have heard nothing from welcome apart from 6 monthly statements

 

Could anyone give me a pointer on this please,

 

Any info would be appreciated

 

Thanks

Edited by dx100uk
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Ive merged this new thread with your old one in the welcome finance forum

Ill read it all later

 

There are a couple of coast threads here already


please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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Much appreciated

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please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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Thank you

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done lots of working getting relevant posts from all around various welcome threads you randomly posted on and their replies moved to this thread so we have the complete story..

 

from now on STICK to THIS THREAD ONLY please.

 

can I check a couple of things.

 

are you still in the house the load is secured upon?

silly q I know but needs asking.

 

when was the last time you sent welcome an sar?

 

when was the last time you sent anything to welcome roughly [might help to read this thread now from post 1]

 

did you get a notice of assignment from welcome or coast that the debt had been sold on?


please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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Hi sorry for the delay but we’ve been away for a break visiting family,

 

Question 1,

yes we are sill in the same house,

 

Question 2,

The last SAR was 2009,

 

Question 3,

Last time anything sent to welcome was 2010,

 

Question 4,

 

yes we did get a notice of assignment.

 

Hope this helps

 

Regards

Edited by dx100uk
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Send coast an sar


please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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Ok will do

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Hi

 

Just a quick one to say it will be 30 days Wednesday since the sar was sent and it was 1st class recorded delivery.I haven’t even received an acknowledgement letter.

 

Cheers

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Hi dx

 

Finally received something from coast finance in the form of a disk,I will get on the pc today and check it

 

regards

 

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piece of reading for you all

Limitation and the stroke of midnight: Matthew v Sedman [2019] EWCA Civ 475

HELEN EVANS | 20 Mar 2019

Where limitation is concerned, minutes and hours can matter as much as days. This is what the Court of Appeal found in Matthew v Sedman [2019] EWCA Civ 475 upholding the judgment of HHJ Hodge QC on an issue which he had described as “short but interesting and not unimportant”. The Court of Appeal’s decision is a must-read for anyone dealing with litigation issued at or near the expiry of the limitation period.  

Matthew v Sedman concerned difficult questions about the date (or even time of day) at which causes of action accrue and the calculation of limitation periods in professional negligence claims. The trustees and beneficiaries of the Evelyn Hammond Will Trust (“the Claimants”) brought proceedings against the Trust’s former trustees (“the Defendants”) for a failure to submit claims under a court sanctioned scheme of arrangement. In November 2017 HHJ Hodge QC held that part of the Claimants’ claim was time barred and granted the Defendants summary judgment on this aspect of the case. Permission to appeal was granted and the Court of Appeal heard the Claimants’ appeal on 15 January 2019.

Clare Dixon and Nicholas Broomfield of 4 New Square (instructed by Mills & Reeve LLP) represented the Defendants. The decision of the Court of Appeal is considered by Helen Evans of 4 New Square.

The Facts

The Claimants were the current trustees and beneficiaries of the Trust. The Defendants were accountants and the former trustees of the Trust, having retired in August 2014. The principal asset of the Trust was shares in a company called Cattles plc (“Cattles”) which company then acquired Welcome Financial Services Limited (“Welcome”). By April 2008 the Trust held almost 162,000 shares in Cattles, valued at approximately £393,000. However, in April 2009 trading in Cattles’ shares was suspended and in December 2010 both Cattles and Welcome applied to enter into court sanctioned schemes of arrangement (“the Schemes”). The applications were granted by Newey J on 28 February 2011 and they were registered at Companies House on 2 March 2011.

The Schemes included provision for shareholders to make claims. In summary, the Schemes operated as follows:

  1. By clause 3.6, claims under the Schemes had to be submitted “on or prior to the Bar Date”.
  2. The Bar Date was defined as the first business day falling 3 months after the “Effective Date”, which was 2 March 2011.
  3. The Bar Date was therefore 2 June 2011. Therefore, to be made in time, a claim in the scheme had to be made by the end of 2 June 2011. A claim made on 3 June 2011 was too late.

The Defendants failed to submit a claim on the Claimants’ behalf before the end of the Bar Date, thereby preventing the Claimants from claiming under the Welcome Scheme. The Claimants accordingly sued the Defendants (for this and a related matter which was not the subject of the judgment) for negligence. Proceedings were issued on Monday 5 June 2017.

The Defendants applied for summary judgment and/or to strike out this aspect of the Claimants’ claim on the basis that it was statute barred, having been issued more than  6 years since the cause of action accrued in the professional negligence claim.

Judgment of HHJ Hodge QC [2017] EWHC 3527 (Ch)

Two points were common ground before the Judge:

  1. First, the relevance of the weekend falling on 3 and 4 June 2017 (immediately prior to the claim being issued). The parties agreed (following Pritam Kaur v S Russell & Sons Ltd [1973] QB 336) that if the last day for issuing proceedings was 3 June 2017 (a Saturday) then the claim was in time because it had been issued on the next working day, namely Monday 5 June 2017. However, if the last date for issuing proceedings was Friday 2 June 2017 (when the court office was open) then the Claim Form had been issued too late.
  2. Second, the parties agreed that if the Claimants’ cause of action had accrued part way through a day then that day should be excluded when computing time for the purposes of limitation.

Against that background, the Judge formulated the point at issue in the following terms:

“The question is this: when a cause of action is completely constituted at the very first moment of a particular day, does that day fall to be included when calculating the applicable six years’ limitation period or does it fall to be excluded? More pertinently for present purposes, if a cause of action accrued at the very first moment of Friday 3rd June 2011, is a claim issued after Friday 2nd June 2017 brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action first accrued?” 

HHJ Hodge QC found that 3 June 2011, being the date on which the cause of action had been completely constituted at the very first moment of the day, should be included in the court’s reckoning of time. In so finding he placed reliance upon the decision of Channell J in Gelmini v Moriggia [1913] 2 KB 549. Gelmini was concerned with the payment of a promissory note the time for which expired on 22 September 1906. Proceedings were issued on 23 September 1912 which the Judge found to be out of time because the cause of action was complete at the beginning of 23 September 1906 and so limitation expired six years later at the end of 22 September 1912.

In this case, therefore, the Claimants could have issued a Claim Form against the Defendants at any time on 3 June 2011 and should therefore be taken as having 6 years from and including that day to do so. 6 years from and including 3 June 2011 was 2 June 2017 and to be in time the Claim Form had to be issued, at the latest, on that date.

In so finding, the Judge drew a distinction between cases (such as this) where the cause of action was complete at (or by) the beginning of a day, and cases where the cause of action accrued at some point during a day (e.g. cases like Pritam Kaur in which an accident occurred in the workplace). In the latter case, as was common ground, the day itself was excluded. However, in the former case:

“[Where] it is absolutely clear that the cause of action arises at the very beginning of a particular day, that day should not be excluded from the calculation for Limitation Act purposes. At any moment during that day the claimant can bring a claim; and to exclude that day from the calculation for Limitation Act purposes would have the effect of giving him an extra day over and above the statutory limitation period for bringing a claim. I therefore accept Miss Dixon’s argument that where the cause of action is complete at the very beginning of a particular day, you exclude that day for the purposes of calculating the limitation period. On that footing, the limitation period in the present case being on 3rdJune 2011 and expired at the very end of 2nd June 2017. On that basis, the last day for issuing the claim form was Friday 2nd June 2017, and this claim is out of time.” 

The Judge granted the Claimants permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. (For ease of reference the parties will however continue to be referred to as the Claimants and Defendants).

 Judgment of the Court of Appeal [2019] EWCA Civ 475

Whilst agreeing in large part on the reasoning and outcome Lord Justice Irwin and Underhill gave separate judgments, with Irwin LJ stating that he had not found it an easy case to decide.

Their reasoning proceeded in two stages. First, identifying when the relevant cause of action arose. Second, having identified the relevant moment, determining whether the 3 June 2011 fell to be included within the computation of time or not.

 

When did the relevant cause of action accrue?

On appeal, the Claimants’ case was that their claim did not, and could not, accrue on the stroke of midnight but a ‘nanomoment’ thereafter, meaning that the Claimants did not have the whole of 3 June 2011 to bring their claim. The Defendants’ case was that the cause of action accrued at the stroke of midnight, there was therefore no ‘nanomoment’ to consider and, consequently, the Claimants did have the whole of 3 June 2011 to bring their claim.

Their Lordships found that in cases where there was a ‘midnight deadline’ it was wrong to attribute the accrual of the cause of action to the day after the expiry of the midnight deadline. Underhill LJ explained at [38] that in such cases “there is [not] even a ‘nanomoment’ after midnight when the cause of action is not in being”, echoing Irwin LJ’s conclusion at [32] that, “it appears to me that Miss Dixon is correct. A “midnight deadline” case is different from others in the sense that the deadline provides a categorical indication that the action accrued by that point in time, rather than accruing on the day following midnight.”

 In so finding, Irwin LJ derived assistance from a landlord and tenant case (Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 1024) in which Lord Diplock said “I do not personally derive assistance from pursuing metaphysical arguments about attributing to the one day or the other the punctum temporis between 24.00 hours on September 30 and 0.00 hours on October 1…”.

 

Computation of Time in “Stroke of Midnight” Cases

As it had been at first instance, it was common ground between the parties that the where a cause of action accrued part way through a day then that day should be excluded for the purposes of computing time for the purposes of limitation. However, the Claimants alleged that this principle applied to all cases, including “midnight deadline” cases. In support of this proposition, the Claimants claimed that Gelmini (upon which HHJ Hodge QC had placed reliance) was no longer good law as it had been departed from in Marren v Dawson Bentley, the reasoning in which had been approved by the Court of Appeal in Pritam Kaur.  As a result, their case was that 3 June 2011 should be excluded from the computation.

The Defendants sought to uphold the distinction between causes of action that accrue part way through a day and “midnight deadline”. As the Judge had found, and as Channell J had concluded in Gelmini, the cause of action had accrued at, or by, the beginning of the day following the “midnight deadline” and the Claimants had the whole of that day to bring their claim. The Claimants’ time for pursuing a claim against the Defendants had not been cut short by counting a “fragment” of a day as whole day, and there was therefore no justification for refusing to count 3 June 2011. Further, the distinction drawn by the Judge was well established in both law and principle. Not only did it follow Gelmini, but it was supported by the leading text books McGee on Limitation Periods (7th ed) and Chitty on Contracts (33rd ed) and avoided interfering with the wording of the Limitation Act 1980 by extending limitation beyond the 6 years prescribed by the draftsman. Finally, and contrary to the Claimants’ case, the Defendants argued Gelmini remained good law following Marren and Pritam Kaur, neither of which had concerned “midnight deadlines” and any comments made about Gelmini were obiter.

Both Irwin LJ and Underhill LJ held that Gelmini remained good law following Marren and Pritam Kaur and upheld the distinction drawn by both Channell J in Gelmini and the Judge at first instance. At [32], Irwin LJ explained that no “fractions of a day” arise in “midnight deadline” cases because the cause of action has already accrued “by” the first moment in the day after midnight, “rather than accruing on the day following midnight”. Underhill LJ agreed at [38] in the following terms:

In my view there is, as propounded at the end of the passage from McGee on Limitation Periods set out at paragraph 30 of Irwin LJ’s judgment, a clear distinction between the case where a cause of action accrues “at the stroke of midnight”, because it is based on a failure to do something by the end of a specified day, and the case where the cause of action accrues part way through a day.  In the latter case it is indeed well-established that for limitation purposes you ignore the date on which the cause of action accrues: the authorities go back to the early nineteenth century and were not originally concerned with the Limitation Acts, but they culminate in Pritam Kaur, which is binding authority on their application in the context of what is now the Limitation Act 1980.  But in the former type of case the cause of action arises, as Channell J put it in Gelmini, “at the commencement of [the] day”.  Even without the benefit of Dodds v Walker I would not have accepted that in such a case there is even a “nano-moment” after midnight when the cause of action is not in being, but Lord Diplock’s observations quoted at paragraph 15 above confirm my view: the cause of action arises at, not after, midnight.  I regard Gelmini as being, on this point, rightly decided.  Havers J took a different view in Marren, as Irwin LJ shows, but his decision is not binding on us, and I agree with Irwin LJ that the general approval of Marren in Pritam Kaur is not authoritative as regards this issue.  

The Court of Appeal accordingly upheld the Judge’s decision that the Claimants’ cause of action had accrued by 3 June 2011 and limitation had therefore expired 6 years later on Friday 2 June 2017. The Claimants’ claim, issued on 5 June 2017, was therefore out of time and the appeal was dismissed.

Commentary

Matthew v Sedman is a case of real and significant importance for litigation lawyers faced with cases based on “midnight deadlines”. The Court of Appeal’s judgment gives clear answers to two difficult questions, namely (a) if a “midnight deadline” is missed, when does the cause of action accrue and (b) in those circumstances, how is the limitation period computed? Contrary to the Claimants’ concerns Matthew does not impact on the well settled law applicable to anything other than “midnight deadline” cases and both Irwin LJ and Underhill LJ were careful not to trespass beyond the scope of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal, following Gelmini, concluded that in “midnight deadline” cases the cause of action accrues by the first moment of the day after midnight, and not in that first moment. It therefore follows that there is no time on the day after midnight in which a claim cannot be pursued and there is no reason not to count it for the purposes of calculating limitation.

 

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Hi

 

can anyone give me a heads up on what to do as I returned home from work today to find a hand posted note through my door by excel field services on behalf of coast finance solutions for an old welcome finance debt that has been in a serious dispute since 2009 due to non CCA compliance.

 

cheers in advance

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Have added your post to your old thread.

 

Field agents are mostly working off a local list, to see if they can manage to gain a payment arrangement, because of the surprise of having someone at the door.   They are unlikely to return, as they will move on to other targets.

 

As you have had a discussion about the debt on this site before, what is the current status of the debt ? Is it still enforceable ?


We could do with some help from you.

PLEASE HELP US TO KEEP THIS SITE RUNNING EVERY POUND DONATED WILL HELP US TO KEEP HELPING OTHERS

 

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If you want advice on your thread please PM me a link to your thread

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remind me, save looking back thru 500 posts 

is this charge still showing upon the home and is now in coasts name on the deeds.

is this a jointly owned property but this debt was solely yours?

 

dx

 


please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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Hi all 

 

Thanks for the reply yeah it’s showing as coast on the land registry now Not welcome no it’s a jointly owned debt and jointly owned property 

 

All I received from welcome when I done the CCA request was a reconstituted one and a letter saying we can’t supply a true cope at this time

 

thanks

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rock and a hard place then

 

eventually if you ever were to sell the charge would need to be settled

 

did you ever redact all that SAR and get the comms log and statements done to one pdf?

 

dx

 


please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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Hi

 

sorry for the delay in reply but I’m on site during the day and signal is hit and miss

 

received the sar but pretty much what welcome had already given me,

 

as to your last message saying between a rock and a hard place

does this mean it’s not enforceable or do I CCA coast finance,

I understand it would have to be cleared if the property sold.

 

Regards

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i'm not sure i've ever seen a charge removed because a CCA might be unenforceable.

 

you should have dealt with this 10yrs ago, and got welcome to remove the charge.

 

you appear over 21 pages to have sent lots of pretty letters but never really dealt with the most important bit which was the resultant charge removal.

 

 


please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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Hi

 

no I didn’t mean have the charge remove as I put it the last message I understand if the property sold it would have to be paid so was wondering if the debt was enforceable as it is also I said should I CCA coast finance because I want my CCA to prove that basically what they are saying I borrowed wasn’t the correct amount.

 

sorry for the confusion 

 

 

could someone please tell me if I should CCA coast finance solutions or send them a copy of the one when it was put in dispute with welcome including recorded delivery number and receivers singnature 

 

Many thanks in advance

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why?

 

it wont remove the charge.

 

we need to see all the SAR return you got

to see if there is a way to get the charge removed

the CCA agreement sadly is pretty immaterial now recon or not

unless it seriously has errors that make it void.

 

no-one has it so you can't prove anything.

 

 


please don't hit Quote...just type we know what we said earlier..

 

if everyone stopped blindly paying DCA's tomorrow

the biggest financial industry in the UK, the whole DCA industry would collapse overnight.

 

 

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