RBS Credit Card Debt

[finnigan]

I received a letter today, dated 17th August 2009:

 

ACCOUNT TERMINATION

A Default Notice was recently served against you. As the amount requested in the Default Notice has not been received, your account has been terminated.

 

We now require full payment of the outstanding debt within 14 days of the date of this letter. If you do not comply, or fail to submit proposals for repayment that are satisfactory to us, your account will be passed to our Debt Recovery Office. In addition, we may exercise our right to set off over any of your funds held elsewhere with us.

 

As your account has now been terminated, and if you have not already done so, please return your card(s) to this office, cut in two. Renewal card(s) will not be issued.

 

If your have any recurring transactions (e.g. internet subscription or breakdown cover) that are paid with this account, you should cancel these with the relevant retailer(s).

 

Interest will continue to accrue on the debt until repaid in full.

 

In accordance with Republic of Ireland government legislation, we are obliged to collect Stamp Duty. Therefore, if you reside in Eire, this will appear on your next statement of account.

 

If you are covered by Payment Protection, this insurance has now been terminated. However, this will not affect any claim already notified or any incident occurring prior to the date of this letter that results in a valid claim.

 

Your account will be reported to the Credit Reference Agencies as a Default if repayment proposals acceptable to us have not been made within 28 days of the date of this letter. If this becomes necessary, your name will remain registered for 6 years. If your account is fully repaid within this time, your file will be amended to show the debt as satisfied.

 

Still no acknowledgment of my CCA request. Any advice on this one?

[vint1954]

Hi Finnigan,

 

DN is supposed to give a date to rectify by, not just 17days.

 

Do you have another account with RBS. If so you need to set up a parachute account to put your money in.

 

Hold on to your cards. They sometimes try and use a signed card as proof of contract.

 

Send dispute letter out on the 27th August.

 

Also have a read of x20's post on termination below.

 

My fellow Caggers, back to the general issue ..

 

May be it was my doing or we've just hung on to this word 'termination' like Rotweillers. The thing is, at least as I see it is, that where a creditor seeks early repayment or the return of goods following service of an ineffective DN, he is by his words and conduct expressing in clear terms that he is no longer willing to perform the essential obligations he promised to provide under the credit agreement. True, these words and conduct ride on the back of the debtor's failure to perform the debtor's essential obligations. But in this event the creditor has only to follow the procedure laid out in the Act and Regulations. And the Act says unless and until he has met the requirements of the Act and the Regulations, he acquires no such entitlement. Accordingly, to withdraw from the debtor the right to pay sums due by instalments or withdraw the right to continue with possession of the goods is to withdraw in breach of the statutory code which regulates the agreement.

 

The withdrawal of the debtor's rights may in one person's parlance be the same as the creditor's termination of the agreement. Just like 'default' in the words of one person may amount to 'breach' in the words of another. Or 'repudiatory breach' in the language of lawyer A is 'renunciation' in the language of lawyer B. Let's say though, for the purpose of the stream of thinking which follows, that strictly and legally speaking, withdrawal of these rights in default (or breach) isn't a termination of the agreement and that for termination strictly so called to have occured, the creditor miut have served a notice of termination. Does that mean therefore that the creditor's withdrawal and demand for early payment and/or return of goods is something the court can waive? Something the debtor can be expected to have understood was a mistake and unintended? That it is of no consequence?

 

I've got Chitty on Contracts General Principles (26th Edition) (1991). A bit out of date but good enough on General Principles I would have thought. And I'd thought I'd open it. Always a good idea when examining the contractual relationship of parties. Interestingly, 'termination' does not have an entry of its own in the umpteen page index at the back. It says in relation to Renunciation (and if you look up Repudiatory Breach it refers to to the same page number) that:

A renunciation of a contract occurs when one party by words or conduct evinces an intention not to perform, or expressly declares that he is or will be unable to perform, his obligastions under the contract in some essential respect. An absolute refusal by one party to perform his side of the contract will entitle the other party to treat himself as discharged, as will also a clear and unambiguous assertion by one party that he will be unable to perform when the time for performance should arrive. Short of such an express refusal or declaration however, the test is to ascertain whether the action or actions of the party in default are such as to lead a reasonable person to conclude that he no longer intends to be bound by its provisions. The renunciation is then evidenced by conduct. Also, the party in default 'may intend in fact to fulfil (the contract) but may be determined to do so only in a manner substantially inconsistent with his obligations' [Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Limited v Molena Alpha Inc (1979)] or may refuse to perform the contract unless the other party complies with certain conditions not required by its terms. In such a case, there is little difficulty in holding that the contract has been renounced.

 

If one party evinces an intention not to perform or declares his inability to perform some but not all of his obligations under the contract, then the right of the other party to treat himself as discharged depends upon whether the non-performance of those obligations will amount to a breach of a condition of the contract or deprive him of substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties that he should obtain from the obligations of the parties under the contract then remaining unperformed.

 

The renunciation must be made quite plain. In particular where there is a genuine dispute as to the construction of a contract, the courts may be unwilling to hold that an expression of intentino by one party to carry out the contract only in accordance with his own erroneous interpretation of it amounts to a repudiation and the same is truew of a genuine mistake of fact or law.

The demanding of early payment is to my way of thinking the immediate withdrawal of consent to all the remaining credit provided for under the agreement. Further, that it substantially deprives the debtor of the prime benefit he was to derive under it. Such a demand constitutes a breach of the regulated agreement save where it is demanded in compliance with the Act. If the demanding of such things is not tantamount to the creditor terminating the agreement, it is, nonetheless in my opinion, the creditor's renunciation of it. in consequence and in my opinion, the debtor may fairly regard himself as discharged from the agreement.

 

Chitty has this to say:

 

Consequences of Discharge - Effect on Contract

It has become usual to speak of the exercise by one party to treat himself as discharged as a 'recission' of the contract but as Lord Porter pointed out in Heymans v Darwin limited (1942):

'To say that the contract is rescinded or has come to an end or ceased to exist may in individual cases convey the truth with sufficient accuracy, but the fuller expresion that ther injured party is thereby absolved from future performance of his obligations under the contract is a more exact description of the position. Strictly speaking, to say that on acceptance of the renunciation of a contract the contract is rescinded is incorrect.'

This statement was unanimously approved by The House of Lords in Johnson v Agnew (1980) where Lord Wilberforce emphasised that this so-called 'recission' is quite different from recission ab initio as may arise for example in cases of mistake, fraud or lack of consent. It has also become usual to speak of the contract as having been 'terminated' or 'discharged' by the breach. Again however, these expressions may be somewhat misleading for they might suggest that the contract ceases forv all purposes to exist in that event. Such an approach was indeed adopted by the Court of Appeal in Harbutt's Plastercine Limited v Wayne Tank & Pymp Co (1970) so as to prevent the party in default from relying on an expemtion clause inserted in a contract which had been 'terminated' by breach. But this case was overruled by the House of Lords in Photo Production limited v Securicor Transport limited (1980). The true position was there stated to be, where the innocent party elects to terminate the contrsct, ie to put an end to all primary obligations of both parties remaining unperformed - that (per Lord Diplock) '(a) there is substituted by implication of law for the primary obligations of the party in default which remain unperformed a secondary obligation to pay money compensation to the other party for the loss sustained by him in consequence of their non-performance in the future and (b) the unperformed primary obligations of that other party are discharged.'

Given Diplock's statement of the position, may be to describe the agreement as 'terminated' following the events we are describing is, to adopt the words of Lord Porter, '.. to convey the truth with sufficient accuracy.'

 

FURTER.

I am yet to be persuaded that in the context of a regulated consumer credit agreement and the receipt of an express notice or activity on the part of the creditor consistent with termination, that the agreement does not terminate unless and until the debtor signifies by word or deed that he accepts termination. The damned notice of termination says what it says.

 

For sure in those cases where the termination amounts to the anticipatory breach of the agreement by one of the parties to that agreement the law says the innocent party should elect either to accept the termination or inform the terminating party that he requires them to perform their obligations owing under the agreement. But we're not concerned with an anticipatory breach by the creditor. It's not as if the creditor having agreed to give credit has then decided not to loan after all. What the creditor is doing is calling in the loan he has already made ahead of the time when it would ordinarily have been repaid.

 

But in a regulated consumer credit agreement, what in reality can the court genuinely expect the innocent, ordinary and unsophisticated debtor to a consumer credit agreement, who is strapped for cash, do in response to the demands of the creditor? Write a letter saying 'I accept your repudiatory breach of contract'?. Of course not. Well I say of course not. That is a ludicrous expectation to hold. Was the Court of Appeal ever concerned to ascertain in Woodchester v Swayne & Co that Swayne had accepted Woodchester's termination on the back of their ineffective DN? Mais non. Swayne & Co had done nothing. Swayne & Co were a firm of solicitors in Cardiff for crissake. Yet they still were treated to the benefits of the Act as one intended for the protection of consumers. Swayne were, according to claue 9.1 of the terms of the agreement between Woodchester and Swayne, in repudiatory breach of contract, entitling Woodchester to immediately terminate the agreement. But all the same, Kennedy LJ held that the provisions of section 87 dictated what Woodchester were required to do in order for Woodchester to become entitled to claim early payment and demand the return of the photocopier let on hire under the agreement. This was regardless of what the agreement said.

 

Indeed in the context of activity, if Swayne & Co had paid some money to Woodchester they would have done themselves a favour because those payments would have been applied to the credit of the arrears.

 

I appreciate that counsel for banks are currently advancing that the absence of some clear acceptance on the part of the debtor operates to negate the meaning and intent of the creditor's express termination. The latest clever arguments seem to be that a DN is not required at all where the agreement has no fixed duration. But that's counsel pushing at the boundaries and thinking out the box in a novel way. All good lawyers do that. They invent and shape their arguments to distinguish their case from those which suggest they're on a loser so as to suit the requirements of their client. They have no idea as they're inventing and shaping that the argument they've conjured will succeed. But they sigh with relief when they appreciate their opponent is a LiP.

 

I do not buy in to the notion that unless the debtor is active or inactive in a way somewhat different to the way he was active or inactive prior to the termination, that the agreement has endured despite the delivery of an express notice of termination, or despite activity on the part of the creditor which is in keeping with the creditor having terminated the agreement. Remember this : when Woodchester v Swayne was first decided, before it got to the Court of Appeal, Assistant Recorder Higginbottom found for the creditor on the basis that

 

"A default notice served under Section 87 and Section 88 is not rendered defective merely because the action indicated as required to be taken to remedy the breach is in fact over and above the action necessary to remedy that breach."

 

The Assistant Recorder did not add 'and because the debtor had failed to serve a notice of acceptance of termination or had conducted itself in a way different to the way it had conducted itself before termination or before the creditor behaved as if the creditor had terminated.'

 

Kennedy regarded the Assistant Recorder's judgment 'as a model of clarity'. But he still found the decision was wrong. He held quite the reverse to the Assistant Recorder. He held the DN was rendered defective because the action indicated as required to be taken to remedy the breach was in fact over and above the action necessary to remedy that breach. He did not qualify that view by saying it was reached owing to the activity or inactivity of the debtor or that his view would have been different depending on what activity or inactivity there may have been on the part of Swayne & Co. As we know, because Swayne got hit with a judgment for the actual arrears, Swayne did nothing.

 

Woodchester v Swayne is still good law. Swayne & Co did the right thing. They were well placed to do the right thing. They were a firm of lawyers. The right thing they did was to appeal the decision. The result speaks for itself.

 

x20

[vint1954]

And from Pinky,

 

Failure of a default notice to be accurate not only invalidates the default notice (Woodchester Lease Management Services Ltd v Swain and Co - [2001] GCCR 2255) but is a unlawful rescission of contract which would not only prevent the court enforcing any alleged debt, but gives rise to a counter claim for damages Kpohraror v Woolwich Building Society [1996] 4 All ER 119

[finnigan]

Thanks Vint, I'll open my parachute tomorrow! Can you point me in the direction of a dispute template letter?

[vint1954]

Thanks Vint, I'll open my parachute tomorrow! Can you point me in the direction of a dispute template letter?

Dear xxxxxxxxx,

ACCOUNT IN DISPUTE

Re account no xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

I write regarding recent communication regarding the above account.

Further to my request under the above act, your attention is drawn to the fact that this account is now subject to a serious dispute. On xxxxxxxx, by recorded delivery, I requested that you supply me a copy of the executed credit agreement covering this account pursuant to the Consumer Credit Act 1974 section 78, a copy of this request is enclosed. To date you have failed to comply with my request. Without production of the said agreement I am unable to assess if I am indeed liable for any alleged debt to you, nor does it give me any chance to evaluate whether any original agreement was ‘properly executed’ as required by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. I have to date only received terms and conditions from yourselves.

Contrary to your assertion, xxxxxxxx have not complied with the terms of CCA 1974 s78. The documents that you have supplied, do not comply with your duties to supply a “True Copy” of any agreement you claim to have been signed by me.

In a recent letter from the enforcement department of the OFT, the text below was quoted, explaining what is required.

“The copy of the executed agreement need not be an exact copy but it must be a ‘true copy’ and not some reconstruction of what the original might have been and it must contain the same terms as the original. Where the terms have been varied as provided for within the agreement, the copy of the original agreement must be accompanied by a document setting out the current terms, as varied. Certain details may be omitted from the original agreement eg the signature but the debtor must be in no doubt as to the true nature of his obligations under the loan.

 

Should no original agreement be in existence it is very hard to say that the copy the creditor offers to the debtor is, in fact, a true copy as there would be no original with which to compare it. In our view the onus of proof would be on the creditor to show that the copy is a true one and where none existed he may have difficulty discharging this. Neither should creditors suggest that a consumer has signed a credit agreement where they are unable to provide evidence to support this — to do so is likely to be a misleading action under Regulation 5 of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (the CPRs) and would also constitute an unfair or improper business practice.”

 

I also refer you to the information below.

1. A valid credit agreement must contain certain terms within the signature document (s.60(1)(2) CCA 1974). These core terms are the credit limit, repayment terms and the rate of interest (SI 1983/1553 (6 Signing of agreement) which states that the prescribed terms must be within the signature document. (Column 2 schedule 6). s.61(1)(a) states the agreement must contain all the prescribed terms and be signed by both the debtor and on behalf of the creditor.

 

 

2. Further, s.127(3) CCA 1974 makes the account unenforceable if it is not in the proper form and content or improperly executed.

 

In Wilson and another v Hurstanger Ltd (2007) it was stated “In my judgment the objective of Schedule 6 is to ensure that, as an inflexible condition of enforceability, certain basic minimum terms are included which the parties … and/or the court can identify within the four corners of the agreement. Those minimum provisions combined with the requirement under s.61 that all the terms should be in a single document, and backed up by the provisions of section 127(3), ensure that these core terms are expressly set out in the agreement itself: they cannot be orally agreed; they cannot be found in another document; they cannot be implied; and above all they cannot be in the slightest mis-stated. As a matter of policy, the lender is denied any room for manoeuvre in respect of them. On the other hand, they are basic provisions, and the only question for the court is whether they are, on a true construction, included in the agreement”.

 

2. The need for prescribed terms to be contained in the credit agreement is confirmed by the Author of the CCA1974 act, I quote ““As the draftsman of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 I would like to thank Dr Richard Lawson for his interesting and well-argued article (30 August 2003) on Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All ER 97.

 

Dr Lawson may be interested to know that I included the provision in question (section 127(3)) entirely on my own initiative. It seemed right to me that if the creditor company couldn’t be bothered to ensure that all the prescribed particulars were accurately included in the credit agreement it deserved to find it unenforceable, and that the court should not have power to relieve it from this penalty. Nobody queried this, and it went through Parliament without debate. I’m glad the House of Lords has now vindicated my reasoning and confirmed that nobody’s human rights were infringed.” - 167 Justice of the Peace (2003) 773.”

I am now granting to you a further 7 days to produce a copy of an executable agreement. After that I will consider that the above matter is closed and that you will no longer pursue the alleged debt. If you are insisting that the non enforceable document, that you have supplied, is the only alleged agreement in your possession, then I would suggest that the best course of action would be to immediately set the balance of the above account number to zero.

I look forward to your response.