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ibberty bibberty

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  1. So, by the 28 September 2015, the Court has ordered exchange of WS and disclosure of all documents each party relies on. The Court has said that the case is suitable for mediation but the Claimant has said he considers this to be not suitable, his reasons for this are unreasonable. Although the deadline is 17 days away, has the Claimant made any contact with you as regards the Court's order? ibberty bibberty
  2. Hello there Ford (Saab) and jono and all Please accept my apologies for not getting back to you sooner on this. Thank you Ford for the link to the Australian authority, which appears to support what I believe to ours (and others) agreement on this point of law as regards a creditor’s date of cause of action complained of against his debtor. Again, apologies to all as regards the length of this post on this particular and important point of law, the following is a narrative on the same and I sincerely hope that it will provide all consumers with knowledge as to an example of how to argue their cases on statute barred/cause of action regarding debt claims in proceedings issued against them by their creditors under a regulated agreement whereby the consumer has neither acknowledge the debt nor made any payment thereon for a period of 6 years or more. BMW Financial Service (GB) Ltd v Hart [2012] EWCA Civ 1959 (10 October 2012) is such a case closer to home on this point of law, that is, the date upon which a creditor’s cause of action accrued against his debtor under s.5 of the Limitation Act 1980 (“the 1980 Act”). As regards a credit agreement regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (“the 1974 Act”) and the date upon which a creditor’s cause of action accrues under s.5 of the 1980 Act, is, in my considered opinion is a fundamental point of law for all consumers and creditors that requires to be clarified and qualified. As of the date hereof, the principle of law in this area is yet to be qualified. In the BMW case, which, it should be noted, does not relate to the 1974 Act, Lord Justice Rix said, with whom Lord Justice Moore-Bick and Lord Justice Lewison agreed: on the point of law as to the date upon which BMW’s cause of action accrued for the purposes of s.5 of the 1980 Act regarding a contract concluded in March 1999 where the total sum thereunder was £39,967.25:- Lord Justice Rix: “Therefore, both on my interpretation of Reeves v Butcher standing by itself, assisted by my interpretation of the case relied on by their Lordships in that case, the case of Hemp v Garland, and also in the light of the authoritative discussion of Reeves v Butcher both in this court in Thakore v Malick and in the Privy Council in Lakshmijit, it is plain that the learned judge in this case below erred in his interpretation both as to Reeves v Butcher and also, in my respectful judgment, in his interpretation of the contract in this case. There is no avoiding the conclusion that in this case there can be no right to sue for the clause 12 payments, that is to say for the full sum due upon an acceleration less any debits which should be credited, or plus any additional amounts which might be claimable, until a termination notice has been given or an acceptance of the repudiation has otherwise been communicated. In this case, the same termination notice was both the exercise of the right to terminate by notice, and also an acceptance of a repudiation, itself a matter referred to in clause 12. It is only upon the serving of such a notice or a communication of such an acceptance of a repudiation that the much greater amounts due under clause 12 become due. Before such a notice or acceptance of repudiation, the only amounts due are the outstanding instalments. Unlike the cases discussed in the jurisprudence, the mere failure to pay an instalment does not by itself, under the provisions of the relevant contract, accelerate the obligation to repay the whole amount outstanding”. Lord Justice Moore-Bick: “In my view, the judge was wrong to think that that decision applied to the present case. In this case, the right to recover the sum set out in clause 12 did not arise unless and until the hirer gave notice to terminate the contract. That was a right that he could choose to exercise or not, but unless he elected to do so, the contract continued in existence and instalments of hire would have fallen due at the stipulated intervals. Under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1980 time in a case of this kind runs from the date when the cause of action accrues. In this case, the cause of action to recover the amounts claimed under clause 12 did not accrue on the customer's default alone, but only upon the election of the hirer to terminate the contract”. Lord Justice Lewison: “Clause 12 is on its face subject to two conditions precedent; namely the termination of the hiring by the owner under clause 12, or the acceptance by the owner of the customer's repudiation. In my judgment, since one or other of those conditions precedent must be fulfilled before the right to payments under clause 12 arises, it must follow that no cause of action accrued until satisfaction of one or other of those two conditions”. Therefore, in the case referred, it was held that the appellant’s cause of action accrued upon the date when he served notice on the debtor that the contract was terminated or when he served notice on the debtor to accept the debtor’s repudiation of the contract. Such provision was expressly and specifically provided for in the terms and conditions of the contract by the appellant (BMW). Therefore, let us now look at the scenario such as happened in jono’s case posted here. Contract Law - Consumer Law- Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (“the 1974 Act”) and s.5 of the Limitation Act 1980 (“the 1980 Act”). As regards consumer law, under a regulated credit agreement within the meaning of the 1974 Act, upon what date does the creditor’s cause of action accrue against his debtor for the purpose of s.5 of the 1980 Act? The question posed relates to, what I believe to be, a very important point of law which will of course affect creditors and debtors, either for or against them upon the principle being clarified and qualified, and what follows here is a narrative of my expressed opinion on the principle that I believe is a fundamental one and which requires to be clarified and qualified, and of course as all members of the legal profession and all law students know, the issue on the principle is one that, as with all such issues, can only be clarified and qualified by either the Appeal Court or the Supreme Court, therefore, I set out below the law on this principle and my considered opinion thereon based upon my knowledge and understanding of the law on this point and jono’s case posted here. To begin with then, let’s take a look at the statutory provision on this point. s.5 of the 1980 Act provides:- “Actions founded on simple contract 5 Time limit for actions founded on simple contract. “An action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.” This puts us in the position with knowledge as to the limitation period within the jurisdiction concerning actions found on simple contracts; that limitation period is 6 years. In this respect, a simple contract for the purposes of this article shall mean a “credit agreement” under the 1974 Act between a creditor and debtor and is therefore a simple contract within the meaning of s.5 of the 1980 Act. Putting aside s.5 of the 1980 for the moment, the 1974 Act imposes upon the creditor a particular restriction as to termination and enforcement under ss.87, 88, which provides:- “Default notices 87Need for default notice. (1)Service of a notice on the debtor or hirer in accordance with section 88 (a “default notice ”) is necessary before the creditor or owner can become entitled, by reason of any breach by the debtor or hirer of a regulated agreement,— (a)to terminate the agreement, or (b)to demand earlier payment of any sum, or ©to recover possession of any goods or land, or (d)to treat any right conferred on the debtor or hirer by the agreement as terminated, restricted or deferred, or (e)to enforce any security. (2)Subsection (1) does not prevent the creditor from treating the right to draw upon any credit as restricted or deferred, and taking such steps as may be necessary to make the restriction or deferment effective. (3)The doing of an act by which a floating charge becomes fixed is not enforcement of a security. (4)Regulations may provide that subsection (1) is not to apply to agreements described by the regulations. (5)Subsection (1)(d) does not apply in a case referred to in section 98A(4) (termination or suspension of debtor's right to draw on credit under open-end agreement). 88 Contents and effect of default notice. (1)The default notice must be in the prescribed form and specify— (a)the nature of the alleged breach; (b)if the breach is capable of remedy, what action is required to remedy it and the date before which that action is to be taken; ©if the breach is not capable of remedy, the sum (if any) required to be paid as compensation for the breach, and the date before which it is to be paid. (2)A date specified under subsection (1) must not be less than 14 days after the date of service of the default notice, and the creditor or owner shall not take action such as is mentioned in section 87(1) before the date so specified or (if no requirement is made under subsection (1)) before those 14 days have elapsed. (3)The default notice must not treat as a breach failure to comply with a provision of the agreement which becomes operative only on breach of some other provision, but if the breach of that other provision is not duly remedied or compensation demanded under subsection (1) is not duly paid, or (where no requirement is made under subsection (1)) if the 14 days mentioned in subsection (2) have elapsed, the creditor or owner may treat the failure as a breach and section 87(1) shall not apply to it. (4)The default notice must contain information in the prescribed terms about the consequences of failure to comply with it and any other prescribed matters relating to the agreement. (4A)The default notice must also include a copy of the current default information sheet under section 86A. (5)A default notice making a requirement under subsection (1) may include a provision for the taking of action such as is mentioned in section 87(1) at any time after the restriction imposed by subsection (2) will cease, together with a statement that the provision will be ineffective if the breach is duly remedied or the compensation duly paid”. Now, under a credit agreement within the meaning of the 1974 Act, the debtor’s principle obligation thereunder is to repay the credit advanced pursuant to the key terms and conditions thereof, this obligation of the debtor is a fundamental one and underlies the foundation of the agreement with his creditor. What, then, is the situation whereby a debtor is in breach of his fundamental obligation to his creditor under the credit agreement and the breach continues? In such circumstances of the debtor’s fundamental breach, the creditor has every right to invoke his legal right under 87(2) of the 1974 Act and in almost all circumstances the creditor exercises such strict legal right and rightly so. In these circumstances, however, this brings in to play s.5 of the 1980 Act as regards the date upon which a creditor’s cause of action accrued. Under s.87 of the 1974 Act, the creditor is not entitled to terminate the agreement, to demand earlier payment of any sum, to recover possession of any goods or land or to enforce any security, unless the creditor serves a valid default notice on the debtor pursuant to s.88 of the 1974 Act. (see Harrison v Link Financial Ltd [2011] EWHC B3 (Mercantile) (28 February 2011) & Brandon v American Express Services Europe Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1187 (25 October 2011) ). So, for an example, let’s say that the debtor’s fundamental breach occurs in January 2007 and it continues for the next 5 years and 363 days from that date (in a ‘leap year’ the amount of days would be 364), notwithstanding numerous correspondence from the creditor, including the creditor’s instructed debt collection agent, requesting that the debtor brings the account up to date or engages in discussion to explain the reason as to why he has not made any payments to the account for that period of time and setting out the consequences on the debtor if he should continue with his unreasonable conduct and fundamental breach of his obligation under the credit agreement, the debtor’s breach, however, continues; with the 6 year limitation period on the verge of expiring, the creditor serves a valid default notice on the debtor at 5 years and 349 (or 350) days, the debtor fails to remedy the breach complained of within the statutory 14 day time limit and therefore the creditor (rightly or wrongly) elects his entitlement under s.87 of the 1974 Act to terminate the agreement and demand payment of all sums due thereunder and asserts that this is the date upon which his cause of action accrued against the debtor. In such a case the debtor will almost always claim that he can and does rely upon s.5 of the 1980 Act and send correspondence to his creditor in this respect that the creditor’s demand is statute barred. Naturally, the creditor disagrees with this and he issues a claim. The litigation on this issue places a burden upon the Court to make a judicial decision thereon based upon all the circumstances and evidence relating thereto. That point of law, in such case as referred, on which the Court is called upon to decide, is this:- The issue a) Does the creditors’ date of his cause of action accrued against his debtor begin only when the creditor has served a valid default notice pursuant to ss.87, 88 of the 1974 Act (as amended) upon his debtor, which the debtor has not remedied; or, b) Does the creditor’s cause of action accrue upon the date upon which his debtor fails to comply with his fundamental obligation under the credit agreement to pay the required monthly payment pursuant to the terms and conditions of the credit agreement, which the debtor has agreed, and effectively promised, to comply with such fundamental obligation thereunder? We have now seen the statutory position on this point, in this regard, does s.5 of the 1980 Act override ss.87 & 88 of the 1974 Act, or vice versa? Both are individual sophisticated pieces of legislation, and in my opinion, one statute cannot contradict another, and it is my understanding that one statute never contradicts another, the reasons for this are obvious. In a case such as referred (above), if the Court should find in favour of the creditor in that service of a valid default notice, which has not been complied with, provides him with grounds as to the date upon which his cause of action accrued, would not such a finding effectively extend the statutory 6 year limitation period under s.5 of the 1980 Act for a further 6 years and thereby grant the creditor a total of 12 years in which to issue his claim? Would such a judicial decision contravene s.5 of the 1980 Act? In my opinion, it would. Because, ss.87.88 of the 1974 Act relate exclusively to a creditor’s right and entitlement to terminate the credit agreement and demand full payment of the debt owed/claimed. The 1974 Act doe s not relate to a creditor’s cause of action and unless he (the creditor) has included specific clauses in the agreement (such as BMW did), the date on which his cause of action accrues will be the first time when his debtor fails to comply with his fundamental obligation under the agreement to make the required monthly payments that he has expressly agreed to make thereunder and continues (for whatever reason) to breach the agreement. The debtor is therefore in anticipatory breach of the agreement. Such conduct is referred to as repudiation under contract law and if the creditor does not affirm the contract he is entitled to elect rescission against the debtor and treat the contract at an end and enforce. However, under a regulated agreement, the creditor is not entitled to elect and end the contract and enforce unless he first serves a valid default notice on his debtor which the debtor does not remedy. Some may argue that service of a valid default notice constitutes affirmation of the agreement by the creditor against the debtor’s conduct of repudiation and in a way it is, but such affirmation does not extinguish the date upon which the creditor’s cause of action accrued, unless the debtor remedies the breech within the 14 day time limit. However, in the circumstances of jono’s case, his creditor knew that as of February 2009 jono was in fundamental breech of the agreement and jono’s conduct continued to evince clear and unequivocal repudiation of the same. Therefore, in jono’s case, service of a valid default notice and non-remedy of the same did not provide his creditor with the date on which his cause of action accrued, the default notice served simply entitled the creditor to terminate the agreement and demand payment of all sums due under the agreement, however, by the time the creditor served the default notice and the statutory 14 days to remedy the breech had expired, the 6 year limitation period under s.5 of the 1980 Act had long expired and this provided jono with a complete defence against his creditor’s claim. The judge in jono’s case, who sat as judge in an inferior Court (lower Court such as County Court) has erred in law as to the case pleaded before him by the creditor. The decision made against jono is plainly wrong. The creditor in jono’s case used ss.87 & 88 of the 1974 Act as a means of extending s.5 of the 1980 Act and as a means of evading the limitation period provided thereby which is entrenched in our law and this is manifestly unjust. ibberty bibberty
  3. You need to make an application to your local Magistrates Family Proceedings Court for a residency order for your children to reside with you; such application should be made with immediate effect, i.e. tomorrow 9 September 2015. All family proceedings are dealt with pursuant to Family Procedure Rules (“FPR”). Simply state to the Court precisely what you have stated here and the Court will recognise that you are a very good man and extremely responsible parent who is putting his childrens’ well-being and welfare first in circumstances that are incredibly upsetting and distressing, the Court will grant you the order without delay. Tell the ex that from now on she is entitled to visit your children, but only on your terms because her behaviour is unreasonable and is upsetting and distressing your children. If she wants to visit, then she must give you at least 24 hrs notice and during the week her visits will be limited to 2 hrs at a time and on Saturday her visits will be limited to no more than 5 hrs and that the other man and his children are not permitted to take part in any of her visits because your children cannot cope with that environment and the atmosphere of it is far too distressing for them. The foregoing, as regards visits, is simply a suggestion I am making to you and you may wish to seek such from the Court so it (or something similar) is included in the order so as to provide maximum protection for your children and of course for you while you are all trying to come to terms with the family breakup and trying to adapt and cope with the same. You are doing a great job in circumstances that can only be described as incredibly traumatic and tragic. I note from your other thread on this subject that you said your (ex) wife had a mental breakdown at work and was fired, however, it is more likely to be the case that she has not had a mental breakdown at all, rather it is the case that the other man has put her under pressure, time and time again, to leave you and bring their relationship out in the open. Soon though, she will realise what a ****-bag he is because he is not even willing to give her the bus fare or taxi fare to come and see her own children and if he drives, he is clearly not willing to drop her off at your home so she can spend some quality time with her own children and this behaviour is from a man who is without his own children as he clearly has no regard for them! The law is on your side, use it to your advantage and to the advantage of your children. Further, you ought to instruct a solicitor (or do it yourself) to commence with divorce proceedings against her on grounds of adultery whereby you will seek full and permanent custody of your children and seek a ‘clean break agreement’ as part of the divorce. ibberty bibberty
  4. True. Usual directions are for exchange of witness statements (“WS”) simultaneously. However, disclosure takes place before exchange of WS and the original poster has said that he/she has not received anything from the Claimant and that is the reason why I asked about what directions have been given. ibberty bibberty
  5. Thank you dx. So there must have been a SJ that caroline did not respond to? ibberty bibberty
  6. If you have been directed by Court order to file and serve your witness statement 2 weeks before the hearing/trial, what has the Court ordered the Claimant to do? ibberty bibberty
  7. How are you doing on this? Please up-date because time is of the essence. Thank you. ibberty bibberty
  8. Can you please post up the details of the General form of judgment or order that you have received from the Court, word for word? Minus all the personal information set out in the order. We need to see precisely what the order says so that we can establish what order has been made against you, if indeed, of course, any order has been made against you at all. Thank you. ibberty bibberty
  9. Seeing that the judge did not take your equitable counterclaim into account against the JC’s enforcement action, there has, therefore, been a serious procedural error in the case because the judge has not applied CPR r.73.8(2)© & (d) – (see below), and, in the circumstances of your case posted here, the judge has clearly disregarded the authority Geldof Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 677, which confirms that it is manifestly unjust for a Court to allow a Claimant’s enforcement action without taking the Defendant’s cross-claim (counterclaim) into account and off-setting the same against the Claimant’s enforcement action. Such claim and cross-claim must be so closely connected for it to be manifestly unjust to allow the claim but not take the cross-claim into account. If this matter was decided in your local County Court, then, depending upon the amount of monies involved for both actions, it is quite possible that the DJ did not have authority to deal with it and therefore he should have adjourned the charging order hearing and transferred the entire matter to the High Court – Chancery Division or Queen’s Bench Division, where either of those Courts would have served directions on you and the Claimant for the purpose of the matter to go to trial. Based on what you have posted here, you have clear grounds to apply back to the same Court to have the charging order set aside and for the matter to be transferred and formally adjudicated on by a High Court judge (Chancery or Queen’s) after a trial of the matters/issues in dispute have been heard and all evidence thereon put before the Court. Rule 73.8 Further consideration of the application 73.8 (1) If any person objects to the court making a final charging order, he must— (a) file; and (b) serve on the applicant; written evidence stating the grounds of his objections, not less than 7 days before the hearing. (2) At the hearing the court may— (a) make a final charging order confirming that the charge imposed by the interim charging order shall continue, with or without modification; (b) discharge the interim charging order and dismiss the application; © decide any issues in dispute between the parties, or between any of the parties and any other person who objects to the court making a final charging order; or (d) direct a trial of any such issues, and if necessary give directions. (3) If the court makes a final charging order which charges securities other than securities held in court, the order will include a stop notice unless the court otherwise orders. (Section III of this Part contains provisions about stop notices.) (4) Any order made at the hearing must be served on all the persons on whom the interim charging order was required to be served. CPR r.73.5(1) "Such other creditors as the court directs" 73.5.1 The court has a discretion whether or not to make a charging order. It may not be equitable to do so where there are other creditors, the judgment debtor is insolvent, and there is or is about to be an arrangement to distribute available assets among the creditors pro rata (D Wilson (Birmingham) Ltd v Metropolitan Property Developments Ltd [1975] 2 All E.R. 814; Rainbow v Moorgate Properties Ltd [1975] 2 All E.R. 821). Accordingly, in the application, the judgment creditor is required to state other creditors of the judgment debtor of which they are aware and the court has power to direct service on them. A debtor's spouse would be regarded as a creditor where an application for ancillary relief has been registered against the property (see generally, Harman v Glencross [1986] 1 All E.R. 545). Therefore, your other creditors should have been served with the charging order application. ibberty bibberty
  10. You cannot and must not trust these blackguards. You must, however, start drafting your Defence against this claim. Your Defence must be filed to the Court by no later than 4:00 pm on 13 September 2015, which is a Sunday and therefore you must file your Defence by no later than 4:00 pm on Friday 11th September 2015, which gives you just 5 days from the date hereof in which to do so. Post up a draft of your Defence so that we can peruse the same and advise you as to any amendments to make thereon. Can you please confirm as to whether or not the agreement had any non-optional ppi on it and what the amount of ppi was and also can you please confirm if a valid default notice was served on you pursuant to ss.87 & 88 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) (“the 1974 Act”) and also the precise date upon which you entered into this regulated agreement with the creditor? The evidence on these facts are crucial to your Defence and, depending upon the ppi element, you may be able to completely defeat this claim on grounds of it being wholly irredeemably unenforceable, which will bring an end to the claim and mean that you are not obligated to pay a single penny to the creditor. Further, again, depending on the ppi issue/element of this matter, you may have a cause of action against the creditor (a counterclaim) for recovery of the £20k that he claims from you. It is common knowledge that creditors, their agents and their intermediaries undertook the so-called act of ‘mis-selling’ ppi to all consumers, however, such ppi has never been ‘mis-sold’ and has always been deliberately sold to the consumer with the creditor’s knowledge that such insurance is in fact absolutely worthless to the consumer but provides the creditor with a very lucrative means of making substantial profit therefrom for him (the creditor) and third parties (his agent, the intermediaries – the insurance provider) at the expense of the unaware consumer. In a nut shell, ppi is a fraud on the consumer and the insurance documents relating exclusively thereto are in fact prohibited articles within the meaning of ss.1.7(b)(i) & 1.8(d) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 because the same has been made, adapted and used by the creditor (and the third parties) in connection with his fraud on the consumer in contravention of s.1 of the Fraud Act 2006. Further, the fraudulent selling to consumers of non-optional ppi by the creditors and the third parties involves generates the burden on the consumer of non-optional borrowing of funds to advance payment to the insurers to which the consumer is unaware and who will be re-paying such further credit (often hidden by the creditor in the Key Financial Information or in the details of the Mortgage Breakdown of Credit Advanced), whereby, such additional non-optional borrowing has been made by the creditor of his own decision without any reference to the consumer. In this regard, the creditor, his agent and the intermediaries are in fundamental breach of the Insurance Conduct of Business Rules (“ICOB”), in particular:- ICOB 2.2.3(1) R which provides: "(1) When a firm communicates information to a customer, it must take reasonable steps to communicate in a way that is clear, fair and not misleading. (2) Paragraph 1 does not apply to a firm when it communicates a non-investment financial promotion in circumstances in which ICOB 3 (Financial promotion) applies to the firm." ICOB 2.2.5 G states: "ICOB 2.2.3 R covers all communications with customers, for example, any oral or written statements, telephone calls and any correspondence which is not a non-investment financial promotion to which ICOB 3 (Financial promotion) applies." A contravention of an ICOB rule by an authorised person such as CCL is actionable in damages at the suit of the person who suffers loss as a result of the contravention: see Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s.150(1). (See:- Figurasin & Anor v Central Capital Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 504 (16 April 2014) In such a case as referred, the creditor, his agent and any intermediaries involved in the process of the consumer’s application for a credit facility, whether regulated under the 1974 Act or by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the 2000 Act”), as regards the ppi element, are in breach of both statutes and this conduct constitutes a contravention of s.21 of the 2000 Act which entitles the consumer to repayment of the entire debt pursuant to ss.30 & 397(1) of the 2000 Act, further, if the agreement was taken out by the consumer before 2006, pursuant to s.127(3) of the 1974 Act, the agreement is irredeemably unenforceable and this is because of the creditor’s failure to comply with s.61 of the 1974 Act because any ppi on the agreement would constitute a ‘charge for credit’ and such must be detailed by the creditor under key financial information set out in the agreement, if it is not, pre-2006 credit agreements regulated by the 1974 Act are, as said, irredeemably unenforceable against the debtor/consumer. (See:- Wilson v First County Trust House of Lords) ibberty bibberty
  11. OK, thank you for the above information. You need to establish if a statutory demand (“SD”) was served on your wife and if so, by what method? Send the solicitors an email and request they confirm if a SD was served and for proof of service of the same. Do you have a copy of the default notice (“DN”)? If yes, please post up the contents set out therein minus personal details and the date of the notice. We need these details to see if we can establish whether or not the DN was valid. Did you ever receive a Notice of Assignment (“NOA”) (sale) of the debt/credit card pursuant to s.136 Law of Property Act? A Subject Access Request is a good idea; however, it will take around 40 days before you are in receipt of the information sought. What amount of monthly payment did you offer and what reasons were given for rejecting your offer? If the solicitors make the application for a possession order, you can respond to that with an application (on form N244) for a stay pursuant to s.285 of the 1986 Act (as above, in my previous posts) pending your investigation to establish as to whether or not the creditor had standing and/or entitlement to enforce the credit agreement against your wife, it is your belief that he did not, further, you believe that the creditor did not serve a SD on you and you are trying to obtain evidence for this Court to prove all of the same. With your application you will need to file a witness statement (“WS”) with it and a copy of your medical records/documents proving your ill-health and ask your GP to write a brief letter to explain that both before the bankruptcy and thereafter, your wife was unable to make rational decisions as to her financial affairs and if the creditor did serve a SD (which is not admitted), your wife was not well enough to deal with it. The GP’s letter should be included with your application. See if you can find the DN and also the NOA and post back here. If we can establish that the DN is invalid, you will then have irresistible grounds to apply to have the bankruptcy annulled under s.282(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986, however, please be aware that if this should be the case, the Court may order your wife to still pay the receiver’s costs etc.etc. If we can establish non-service of the SD, then, again, the bankruptcy can be annulled, however, the Court may direct the creditor to serve a new SD and if that should be the case, then we will deal with it and try to have it dismissed or submit a counterclaim based on mis-sold ppi to reduce the amount below the £750.00 mark (if there was any ppi on the credit agreement, it is more likely than not that there was ppi on it). So it is very important that you methodically and meticulously go through all your own paperwork relating to this matter to see what evidence turns up that can be used in your favour. ibberty bibberty
  12. You have a legally binding contract that is extant with the agent as regards his quotation provided for the works to be done relating to your garage. The agent’s conscience is irrevocably bound to the same. (as is yours, however, you are not in breach of the same, the agent is) Therefore, if the sub-contractor (the base layer) seeks a payment over and above the said quotation, he must look to the agent (main contractor) for any such extra payment, you are not legally responsible for the same, the agent is. Send the agent an email and tell him it is his legal responsibility to perform his obligations under the contract with you and therefore he is responsible for the extra payment of £150.00 sought by the builder whom he sub-contracted the works out to lay the base of the garage and that unless and until the agent fulfils his contractual agreement with you he will remain in fundamental breach of the same and that you are considering taken legal action against him if the said breach continues and you will seek costs against him if such action should become necessary. Give the agent 7 days to comply with his obligations under the contract. Post back here any response you receive from the agent. Do not pay the sub-contractor any money he seeks that is over and above the said quotation. ibberty bibberty
  13. The Court is only dealing with the issue on the interim charging order application and whether or not it would be justified in making the charge a final one. It appears that the Claimant is unable to provide evidence to justify the Court making a final charge. Therefore, simply take with you whatever documents you had at the interim charging order hearing and tell the judge there has been no change in the matter since that hearing, save that the Claimant has now admitted that he is unable to provide the Court with the requisite evidence to support his application and therefore you respectfully request that the same is dismissed without costs. As regards the existing ccj against you, this is separate issue and until such time that you apply and succeed to have the ccj set aside, it will remain. ibberty bibberty
  14. Seeing that the solicitors cannot provide any details or evidence of this debt, go to the court hearing on Friday and ask the judge to dismiss the interim charging order and that the Court order provides that there be no order as to costs on the Claimant’s application. ibberty bibberty
  15. Don't forget to see #2, because your Defence deadline is 13 September ibberty bibberty
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