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Varuna

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About Varuna

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  1. Well, thank you again. However, I've followed all the links or comments about legislation variously made and nothing that I've seen is definitive. Sure, I can see the force of LoPA/136 and I accept that if this question were being asked in the 1920s that would probably be definitive, even though the "property" there cited is clearly physical or directly related to physical property and even more specifically land based. I'm not a legal professional in any way but what I have learned about law is that it can be worth looking closely at later legislation because of the real modifying effect
  2. Thanks. That's helpful in clarifying that the CCA does apply (as I'd assumed it probably would). However, that doesn't directly address the question of a right to assign regardless and because later consumer and contract legislation will also apply there may be issues regarding the application of LoPA 1925/136. I do appreciate that, as you say, debt purchasers appear confident of their rights and of course they may well be justified in that but despite being standard practice their confidence may be misplaced. After all one could also say that private parking enforcement firms are confident of
  3. This began on a different thread and was moved here so the first part is missing. However, no specific case was cited and it was stated that it was not a matter of seeking a loophole to avoid debt payment, merely process. In summary, the question was whether, given that a lender may terminate an agreement following a default, and given that the new agreement then between lender and debtor generally does not (or may not) include a provision permitting onward sale, is this onward sale of necessity permitted or can the borrower insist that s/he will continue to deal only with the original lender.
  4. Oh, and one thing which has surfaced is the possibility of calling on equitable estoppel, that is, objecting to an action which is contrary to a previous claim or action. Here the point would be that if the original creditor had said nothing about selling on debt but had said or implied that he would continue to deal with the debtor in ordinary creditor/debtor manner, perhaps particularly if he had agreed with the debtor to freeze interest and accept reduced payments until matters improved or the debt was cleared, then he would be barred from taking action inconsistent with those earlier claim
  5. Thanks @Dodgeball I accept that "a thing in action" denotes a creditor's right to be paid and therefore although this Act appears to be entirely about land and buildings and hence mortgage debt (which is several times specified) the inclusion of "thing in action" may thereby extend. From the fairly rapid searching I've done there appears to be disagreement about this. Even though electronic cards and accounts were not in use in 1925 bank loans and debts clearly were and therefore it would seem reasonable that monetary loans should have been specified. Against that "thing in action" may we
  6. Thanks. that's helpful. I'll check through the law, and more particularly later amendments.
  7. Forget my comment about the 1925 act. I realise from Dodgeball's post what it is and I'm looking through it now.
  8. It’s recognised that banks and the like can sell on debts owed to them by individuals or organisations. However, what seems unclear is on what basis this is legally obligating so far as the borrower is concerned. When a debtor defaults on a loan the lender will serve a default notice in prescribed form and duly terminate the contract on account of non-compliance with the terms on the part of the borrower. It’s that original contract between borrower and original lender that would typically include a clause requiring acceptance by the borrower of the sale of the debt and consequen
  9. Update: I was able to cobble together enough cash to pay the claim for the outstanding amount and the £40.00 court fee and so paid that on the Friday before the court sitting on the Monday. My name was therefore presumably removed from the list as I certainly didn't get any further advice on that, for instance about an order having been made. I then wrote a detailed letter to the council requesting a return of the court fee and making certain arguments about my view that the summons should not have been raised anyway. Nothing happened and so after a wait of six weeks or so
  10. Yes, that seems reasonable and appropriate. In this particular case I'm not sure without full checking whether the council specified how payments would be allocated although I do remember the (I paraphrase) comment "try to keep up with the instalments due for this [current] year". Certainly I hadn't given the matter a great deal of thought, generally seeking to agree repayment over time with the council according to my means and in that seeking also to avoid legal action or additional costs, but if pressed I suppose I'd have drawn on the general business situation as I understood it, namely th
  11. Thanks for the comment and observations. The claim that payments are ordinarily allocated to the latest outstanding amount and then, if appropriate, carried over to earlier sums due is interesting, not least because it seems directly contrary to ordinary business practice but also because it can lead to exactly the situation in which I found myself, namely that by treating the sum due to the council as a single debt gradually being reduced as possible and as broadly agreed with the council (allowing, of course, for the monthly increase/update on the continuing part) I end up with addition
  12. Thanks. I suspected that would be the case and so it makes sense to try to scrape up the whole amount somehow.
  13. Thanks again. I've only been involved in three court cases ever (one a defence against Companies House, one suing a bank, and one many years ago against a lawyer house tenant) and I've won every one so maybe that's a good omen! Or maybe my luck will break, of course. As I say, we'll see, if it comes to that - but I do note your caution here and I appreciate the advice. There's a further point on which I'd welcome clarification: if I pay the outstanding CTax in time (£444.00) but not the £40 court fee does that still leave open the existing court process and, if so, the possibility of a li
  14. Thanks. While I can see that argument I'd want to point out (in court) if disputed that I would not reasonably be expected to know that payments would be allocated to a later account in the event of a running debt on an earlier one. What irritates me particularly is that although it's extremely difficult for me to reduce the amount outstanding I'm succeeding in doing so, have discussed this in detail with the council, and still end up with a - to my mind - quite unnecessary additional charge of £40.00. Well, we'll just have to see what transpires.
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