If you would care to read the original post properly/ read the pdfs (which include pictures)- I paid, 2 tickets issued (both saying Display on dashboard). I displayed one and took the other with me for proof of parking costs.

For a windscreen ticket (Notice To Driver) please answer the following questions.... 1 The date of infringement? 01/05/18 2 Have you yet appealed to the parking company yet? [Y/N?] NOT YET if you have then please post up whatever you sent and how you sent it and the date you sent it. has there been a response? If you haven't appealed yet - ,......... have you received a Notice To Keeper? (NTK) [must be received by you between 29-56 days] NO what date is on it Did the NTK provide photographic evidence? 3 Did the NTK mention Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) [Y/N?] N/A 4 If you appealed after receiving the NTK, N/A did the parking company give you any information regarding the further appeals process? [it is well known that parking companies will reject any appeal whatever the circumstances] 5 Who is the parking company? NCP/ Manchester Council 6. where exactly [Carpark name and town] did you park? Bridge Street Car Park off Bridge St, Manchester Merged PDF.pdf

Whilst parking for my case against WY Parking (which I won), I return to my car with a PCN attached (FML) I paid (confirmed money has left my bank account also) using my debit card - The ticket machine gave 2 tickets (both saying DISPLAY THIS WAY UP ON DASHBOARD). I took the ticket showing my parking fee more clearly to claim for costs.. Still displayed the counterpart though. I am still within my appeal timescale: Just want to confirm what I should write where it says "Why do you think you should not have been given a ticket" Tickets.pdf PCN.pdf Manchester Council Pictures.pdf

I WON + GOT LIMITED COSTS (£110) I will post a lengthier report when I get chance

Ok, so I haven't heard anything from Gladstone's so I assume they all ready to go tomorrow. I should question who the individual is from Gladstone's and rights of audience? I shall read through my witness statement and defence again. Do I need to print out 3 copies of everything again? (already sent both Court and Gladstone's all documents I intend to rely on including transcripts of previous cases) Any more advice? Thanks!

How does this look? Needs to be sent today

Ok, this may be something or nothing but my searches on the land registry and title plans/ deeds have confirmed: WY Parking agreement in respect of car parking control is- Address: Glassy Bar Bradford 95 Legrams Lane, Bradford BD7 1NH Client print and signature: Raj Parekh (who is the Bar Land Lord of Glassy Bar): https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/09399997 Throughout the whole claim (including ALL court paperwork) they have alleged I breached terms of parking at above address (95 Legrams Lane) HOWEVER, Land registry shows the above land is NOT owned by Raj Parekh but someone else: (ie. Their agreement is not with landowner) SITAL THAKORLAL PATEL who is director of T.B. (HALIFAX) LIMITED registered address 91 Legrams Lane, Bradford BD7 1NH: https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/01890795 My car wasnt parked on 95 Legrams Lane but on 91 Legrams Lane according to the Land registry title plans. (ie. The address and land that they are going after me on are wrong) The Site plan in WY Parking Witness Statement also does not agree with the Land registry title plans. (ie. They have lied on their witness statement?) PlanWYK136927.pdf PlanWYK539883.pdf RegisterWYK539883.pdf

Thank you dx100uk for sorting the PDF. Could you link me a Witness Statement you would recommend to use? Also any comments/ anything you note from their bundle? (will await ericsbrother comments also)

Yes, please remove the attachment- will reupload

1. Checked with court- Yes the Claimant has paid the court fee 2. Today I have received the following: - Witness Statement (numbered pages 1-4) - Agreement with land owner (numbered page 5) - Pictures and Site Plan (numbered pages 6-9) - Notice to Keeper (numbered pages 10-12) - Debt Recovery Plus Letter (numbered page 13) - Zenith Collections Letter (numbered pages 14) - ? Record of Letters sent out (numbered pages 15) - Letter before Claim (numbered pages 16) - Pictures (numbered pages 18-21) My Comments: Amount - The Sign says "Parking charge £90" - The Notice to Keeper says "Parking Charge Notice - £120" - Debt Recovery Plus Letter says "£126.65 instead of full amount £149" - Zenith Collections Letter says "£149" - Letter before claim says "£150" - Claim Form says £150" Witness Statement - Point 7. Relying on Beavis again (different signage and circumstances) - Point 8. Signs are not clear and unambiguous - Clearly state "Permit Holders Only". District judges also disagree with this (Forbidding notice: KPC v Masterson B4GF26K6, PCM-UK v Bull et al B4GF26K6, Horizon Parking v Mr J C5GF17X2) - Point 9. "Valid permit must be displayed" reinforcing forbidding notice - Point 12. Just shot themselves in the foot by quoting "Once it is established that sufficient and adequate warning notices were in place" (No entrance signage, only 3 signs not 4, 2 of which on other side of car park on building (2 stories up) and forbidding notice - Point 19. The Charge (see above regarding amount) I am planing to submit the following in my defendants bundle- Witness Statement Exhibits- Beavis Sign & Their Sign (to show the difference) Photos of their signage (No entrance signage, only 3 signs not 4, 2 of which on other side of car park on building (2 stories up) and forbidding notice) Case Transcripts: 1. Forbidding notice: UKPC v Masterson B4GF26K6, PCM-UK v Bull et al B4GF26K6, Horizon Parking v Mr J C5GF17X2 (cant find actual transcript for this) 2. Legal Rep Fees: Parking Eye v Mrs S B9FC508F (cant find actual transcript for this) BPA Code of practice (relevent extracts) Bradford Council email confirming no advertisement consent 1. Please can you advise or point me in the right direction of what should be different in my Witness Statement compared to my Defence? Even better a draft witness statement/ link to another thread? 2. Anything else of note in their witness statement which I should bring up? Deadline for Above: 16th May glads WS.pdf

Directions questionnaire was done months ago? https://www.consumeractiongroup.co.uk/forum/showthread.php?477641-WY-Gladstones-claimform-PCN-Glassy-Bar-95-Legrams-Lane-Bradford-BD7-1NH&p=5066325&viewfull=1#post5066325

I did follow DragonFly1967 advice and alter the wording regarding legal representative. Received the attached Notice of Allocation to the Small Claims Track: Hearing on the 1st of May Notice of Allocation.pdf

Yes, all those with vested interests wont want it but this can only be good for consumers! Consumers will also be represented by motor/ consumer associations according to the draft bill. Look at all the county courts up and down the country being bogged down due to these **** of the earth (parking companies and their associated robo solicitors). High time they were regulated and made to pay levies/ further levies for not following good procedures.

Final draft above - Am I ok to send? Needs to be served by 4pm on 24th Jan (Wednesday) Many many *thanks* in advance!

FINAL DRAFT Defence Statement Introduction I am X, the defendant in this matter. My address for service is X. This is my statement of truth and my defence. As an unrepresented litigant-in-person I seek the Court's permission to amend and supplement this defence as may be required upon any further disclosure of the claimant's case. For the avoidance of doubt on the relevant date I was the registered keeper of a X, registered number X. It is believed that it will be a matter of common ground that the purported debt arose as the result of the issue of a parking chargeicon notice in relation to an alleged breach of the terms and conditions by the driver of the above vehicle when it was parked at X. Purported Basis of Claim Further to the claimant not responding to a CPR 31.14 request received by them on 18th of August 2017. The court ordered the claimant to serve an amended Particulars of Claim. Based on these Further Particulars of Claim and correspondence, it appears to be the claimant's case that: a) There was a contract formed by the defendant and the claimant on X. b) There was an agreement to pay a sum or parking chargeicon. c) That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site including the boundaries of the parking space to be controlled. d) That in addition to the Parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional but unspecified additional sums. e) The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the terms of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. f) The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice of which they were member at the time and still is a member. g) Further that the defendant has not paid the alleged debt. Rebuttal of Claim The claim is denied in its entirety. I assert that I am not liable to the Claimant for the sum claimed, or any amount at all, for the following reasons, any one of which is fatal to the Claimant's case It is denied that: a) A contract was formed b) There was an agreement to pay a parking charge. c) That there were Terms and Conditions prominently displayed around the site and that the area allegedly under the control of the Claimant was unequivocal. d) That in addition to the Parking charge there was an agreement to pay additional and unspecified additional sums. e) The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the terms of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. f) The claimant company fully complied with their obligations within the British Parking Association (BPA) Code of Practice of which they were member at the time and still is a member. g) That I am liable for the purported debt. It is further denied that I owe any debt to the claimant or that any debt is in fact owed or that any debt exists or could ever exist or has ever existed. That in any event the claimant has failed to comply with the requirements of the Civil Procedureicon Rules and that their claim is both unfounded and vexatious. The claimant is put to the strictest proof of their assertions. 1. No entrance signage therefore no contract As the claimant is relying on the case of ParkingEye v Beavis, I wish to point out that there is a test of good faith: "Para 205: The requirement of good faith in this context is one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps. Appropriate prominence should be given to terms which might operate disadvantageously to the customer." The Claimants claim relies on signs to form the basis of a contract. This is broken down into: a) Entrance signs b) Specific parking-terms signage The BPA Code of Practice says regarding entrance signs: "18.2 Entrance signs play an important part in establishing a parking contract and deterring trespassers. Therefore, as well as the signs you must have telling drivers about the terms and conditions for parking, you must also have a standard form of entrance sign at the entrance to the parking area." There is no signage on the entrance to the car park. The signage fails to meet the specification above. The elements of offer, consideration and acceptance have therefore not been satisfied and so no contract can exist. 2. No specific parking-terms signage seen therefore no contract Further to the requirement of good faith is Section 18.3 of the BPA Code of Practice (Specific parking-terms signage) which gives clear instructions as to the placing, visibility and clarity of any signs that are used to form contracts. It says: "18.3 You must place signs (plural) containing the specific parking terms throughout the site, so that drivers are given the chance to read them at the time of parking or leaving their vehicle. Keep a record of where all the signs are. Signs must be conspicuous and legible, and written in intelligible language, so that they are easy to see, read and understand." Section 18 (Signs) of the BPA Code of Practice (Specific parking-terms signage) states: "18.5 If a driver is parking ... they must have the chance to read the terms and conditions before they enter into the contract with you." The claimants case relies on one single sign. The single sign is of low height and on a fence which shows signs of disrepair (falling back). This is backed by photographs. This sign was blocked by a medium sized van on the day of the incident. This prevented both myself and 4 other passengers from seeing it. The image provided showing the vehicle with sign has been taken and distorted in a clever way to hide: a) The vehicle parked infront of the sign b) The proximity to the vehicle (there are at least 2 cars between the vehicle and the sign ie. sign is in third box away from vehicle) I refute that I saw or read any sign and the claimant is put to the strictest proof of their assertions. The elements of offer, acceptance and consideration have therefore not been satisfied and so no contract can exist. 3. Sign is of prohibition - Not of an offer to park therefore no contract The sign is incapable of forming the basis of a contract. The first line below to "Warning" "Private Property" states "Permit holders only". This is a forbidding notice, not an invitation to park on certain terms. Further it is trite law that a term that is forbidding cannot also constitute an offer. It is therefore denied that any contract was formed or was capable of being formed. This is clear from several cases. In PCM-UK v Bull et all B4GF26K6 [2016] the signage forbade parking and so no contract was in place. A trespass had occurred, but that meant only the landowner could claim, not the parking company. In UKPC v Masterson B4GF26K6[2016] it was also found the signage was forbidding and so the matter was one of trespass. The parking company did not have standing to claim. In Horizon Parking v Mr J C5GF17X2 [2016] it was also found the signage was forbidding and so the matter was one of trespass. The parking company did not have standing to claim. 4. No advertisement consent therefore no contract The Claimants claim relies on a sign to form the basis of a contract. As the sign does not fall under any of the classes in Schedule 1 or Schedule 3 of The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007 the claimant should apply for advertisement consent. The Bradford Council Planning Register does not show any such applications in its planning history. Furthermore I have confirmation from Bradford Council planning department that there is no advertisement consent for any signage at this location. The Claimant is put to strict proof that at the time of the alleged event they had both advertisement consent and the permission from the site owner to display the signs. In the absence of strict proof I have reasonable belief that the Claimant was committing an offence and therefore no contract could have been entered into. 5. No Locus Standi WY Parking Enforcement Ltd are not the lawful occupier of the land. Section 7 of the British Parking Association Code of Practice outlines to operators some of the common law principles of operating on someone else's land as a licensee. One such item is written authority - a written contract - to be there. It defines the elements of this written authority as follows: "7.1 If you do not own the land on which you are carrying out parking management, you must have the written authorisation of the landowner (or their appointed agent). The written confirmation must be given before you can start operating on the land in question and give you the authority to carry out all the aspects of car park management for the site that you are responsible for. In particular, it must say that the landowner (or their appointed agent) requires you to keep to the Code of Practice and that you have the authority to pursue outstanding parking charges. 7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken. 7.3 The written authorisation must also set out: a) the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined. b) any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation. c) any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement d) who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs. e) the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement." The Claimant has failed to show any authority from the landowner to enter into contracts with the public or to make civil claims in their own name. This was requested via a CPR 31.14 request received by them on 18th of August 2017. They have failed to provide this. It is the Defendents belief the Claimant does not have this and therefore no cause for action. 6. Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 applies - Unfair Terms The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 defines where a term is considered as unfair: "5.(1) A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. (2) A term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term." In the case of a car park, clearly the terms and conditions will have been drafted in advance, so this law would apply to them. Where a term is considered unfair, it therefore might not be binding: "8.(1) An unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall not be binding on the consumer." In the case of a parking ticket, if a term is found to be unfair, then the parking company may not be able to enforce it. Schedule 2 of the document gives indicative information about terms which may be considered unfair. In particular: "1. Terms which have the object or effect of– (e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfill his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation." It is asserted that the Claimant’s charges are unlawful, as they are in breach of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 7. The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 applies - not providing mandatory information therefore not bound by contract Any alleged contract would be a distance contract for services as defined in The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The regulations define three types of contracts; distance contracts, on premises contract and off-premises contracts. The regulations define a distance contract as: “distance contract means a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded" The contract is clearly concluded without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer. There is clearly the exclusive use of one means of distance communication (signage) up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded. This is therefore a distance contract. None of the exemptions in regulation (6) apply. No vending machine or automated premises was used to conclude the contract. Any contract would be concluded by parking and walking away. The purported contract created by the signage is therefore subject to the mandatory requirements set out in section 13, relating to the statutory information which must be provided by the trader. The Regulations state, at 13(1)(a), that the information listed in Schedule 2 must be given or made available to the consumer in a clear and comprehensible manner. The Claimant’s notice fails to comply with various clauses of Schedule 2, including but not limited to: 2© – Requirement to provide a geographical address. The Claimant’s address is given as a PO Box number. 2(k) – Requirement to provide a complaint handling policy. This is not described on the signage. 2(o) – Requirement to provide information about the right to cancel, or to state that there is no right to cancel. This is not stated on the signage. 2® – Requirement to provide information about Codes of Conduct. This does not appear on the signage. 2(x) – Requirement for access to an Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanism. Not indicated by the signage. The contract fails to provide the required information. Due to these significant breaches of the Regulations, it is submitted that I cannot be held contractually liable, according to the wording of the Regulations at 13(1): “Before the consumer is bound by a distance contract, the trader must …” 8. Applicability of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 The Claimant might argue that the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in the Beavis case is applicable.. Mr Beavis refused to pay a charge of £85 for overstaying a permitted period of free parking in a car park at a retail park. The signs displaying this information were accepted to be large, prominent and legible. The notice stated ‘2 hour max stay… Failure to comply … will result in a Parking Charge of £85.’ Mr Beavis exceeded the time limit by one hour but declined to pay the charge and maintained the term which sought to impose the charge was an unfair term. The Beavis case does not assist the claimant and in fact, supports my defence: This case is not supported by any similarity in the circumstances or signage. 9. The further costs clause is a penalty The sign provides for a parking charge of £90. The Claimant seeks £150 which is an extravagant and unconscionable penalty, and therefore unenforceable. In ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis the Supreme Court recast the test to be applied when seeking to distinguish a liquidated damages clause from a penalty clause. To engage a penalty the question was whether the relevant provision was “unconscionable” or “extravagant” (Lord Hodge at [221]). The full test was expounded by Lord Hodge (at [255]). The Supreme Court was only prepared to accept a charge (£85) that was sufficient to act as a disincentive and that was worth collecting. The Supreme Court had previously stated that £135 would be unacceptable (ParkingEye v Somerfield). The charge to the Defendant of £150 is evidently extravagant and unconscionable in that it is disproportionate to the Claimant’s interest, and disproportionate to the highest level of damages that could possibly arise from the Defendant’s alleged breach of contract. The Defendant therefore disputes the amount claimed, as it comprises excessive and non-contractual elements, and additional costs must be proved. The Claimant claims a sum of £150 as a ‘parking charge’ (for which liability is denied), which includes £50 that the claimant has untruthfully presented as contractual charges, which amounts to double charging. The Protection of Freedoms Act does not permit the Claimant to recover a sum greater than the parking charge before a Notice to Keeper is issued. In any event the Protection of Freedoms Act is clear that a vehicle keeper would only be liable for the amount of the penalty charge notice, and no further costs. 10. Legal representatives fees The Claimant has claimed a £50 legal representative’s cost on the claim formicon, despite being well aware that CPR 27.14 does not permit such charges to be recovered in the small claimsicon Court. The Defendant also has the reasonable belief that the charges have not been invoiced and/or paid. The Claimant is known to be a serial litigant, issuing up to 1,000 similar claims on a weekly basis. This appears to be an attempt at double recovery as a way to inflate the value of the claim. Additionally, as this is already included as part of the costs of the claimant, factored into the £100 parking charge, this is essentially double charging and therefore unlawful. In the alternative, the Claimant is put to strict proof to show how this cost has been incurred. The £50 solicitor cost was disputed in the case of ParkingEye v Beavis and Wardley. HHJ Moloney refused to award the £50. His award was; “JUDGMENT FOR CLAIMANT FOR £85 PLUS ISSUE COSTS”. This was presumably the £25 court fee. The £50 was also struck out by DJ Sparrow on 19 August 2015 in ParkingEye v Mrs S, claim number B9FC508F. In view of all the above the court is invited to strike the matter out of its own motion. Counter schedule of special damages The defendant will seek to recover his costs. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. Signed