Turning to the next element, the prescribed period for payment is 'before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice'. The PCN says 'within 28 days'.
The general rule is that where a period is fixed for the taking of some step, the day of the act or event from which the period runs is excluded in calculating the period. Mr Pitt-Payne conceded that 'within 28 days' fell to be construed in accordance with this rule as excluding the date on which the PCN was issued. The wording does not literally comply with paragraph (c), but does it substantially comply?
Mr Pitt-Payne referred me to Trow v Ind Coope (West Midlands) Ltd [1967] 2 All E.R. 900, which he conceded was against him. This concerned the interpretation of the Rules of the Supreme Court Order 6 rule 8(1), which provided that a writ was valid 'for twelve months beginning with the date of its issue'. The Court of Appeal held that 'beginning with the date' included the day on which the writ was issued and ousted the general rule.
Mr Pitt-Payne urged me to construe this case narrowly; to treat it as authority for the meaning of 'beginning with' only in the context with which the Court was concerned and as not applying to a penal or quasi-penal administrative penalty. This is a most unappealing proposition. If the term's meaning is dependent on context, it would mean that in every context where the term appeared there would be likely to be uncertainty as to its meaning. I would in any event have decisively rejected it, but in any case it seems to me to be inconsistent with the decision in Trow.
Furthermore, another authority, Hare v Gocher [1962] 2 Q.B. 641, is to the same effect as Trow: In Hare, where the words in question were 'beginning with the commencement of this Act' and 'beginning with the date on which it is passed', Winn J concluded that the phrase 'beginning with' was especially used to avoid equivocation and to exclude the ordinary rule.
In Trow, Harman LJ said 'I see no escape from the conclusion that where the word "with" is used, the first day is included'; and Salmon LJ said that 'Any period of time to be calculated as commencing or beginning with a certain day must include that day.' I emphasise: 'Any period'. This makes clear that this is a matter not of context but of the ordinary meaning of the language.
Mr Pitt-Payne argued that if the draftsman had intended the first day to be included, he could have made that clear by including words such as 'including the day of issue of the notice'. The answer to that is that given that the meaning of the phrase chosen by the draftsman is well established, any such embellishment would have been verbiage.
Mr Pitt-Payne also argued that if the wording of the PCN differed from the language of the statute, the effect was to give an extra day for payment to be made. If there was an error, it was in favour of the person liable to pay; so nobody was prejudiced by the error. This argument might well be relevant to the second substantive question - the effect of non-compliance - but it does not support the argument that the PCN is compliant. The Local Authority has no power to extend the statutory period as a matter of law. The fact that it may as a matter of administrative practice allow longer than the prescribed periods (an issue I will return to) is a different point and cannot justify a misstatement of the legal position, which is the purpose of the requirements of section 66(3).
The PCN therefore fails the compliance test in this regard also.
single yellow in restricted street
meant they wouldn't be in operation anyway.
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Originally Posted by boblit
What car is it??
